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i 
PART 1 
 
1.1. BACKGROUND AND EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
China’s growth spurt began in the late 1970s. But it was only in second half of the 
1990s that its impact on the global economy began to be felt. China’s export-
drive was not unique by East Asian standards (Figure 1.1). However, its size 
(China has more than 20 percent of the global population) means that it is having 
a very significant impact on many other economies, including on low income 
economies in SSA. Its economy has grown at a compound rate of more than nine 
percent p.a. since 1979 and if this is sustained, it will be second in size to the US 
by 2018. Its trade impact is especially important, since its trade-GDP ratio is 70 
percent (relatively high by comparison with other developing countries). In 2004, 
China was the world’s third largest exporter, accounting for around 10 percent of 
the world’s exports. The Organisation for Economic Development (OECD) 
estimates that China will be the leading global exporter by 2010 
 
Figure 1.1. Chinas comparative performance, from base year of export surge 
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Source: Calculated from World Bank World Development Indicators, 2005. 
 
China’s impact on the global economy can be transmitted via a number of 
channels – through trade, through investment flows, through financial flows, 
through environmental spillovers, through policies adopted by international 
organisations and through geo-political developments (IDS, 2006). Its impact can 
be both direct (for example, China’s imports from a specific country) and indirect 
(for example, China’s exports to third-country markets affecting global supply and 
demand, and hence the prices for the imports and exports of a specific country). 
Its relationship with other economies can also be complementary (for example, 
inflows of Chinese FDI) or competitive (for example, competing in global markets 
for export-oriented FDI). 
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From the perspective of SSA in the early 21st Century, it is through the trade 
conduit that the impacts are most likely to be felt. Here it is possible to distinguish 
a number of potential trade-related effects, direct and indirect and complementary 
and competitive: 
 
• China’s imports of commodities either directly fuels export growth (for 
example, South Africa’s exports of commodities such as steam coal to 
China) or indirectly raises the price of commodities in global markets (for 
example, China’s demand for oil raises energy prices in global markets 
and Nigeria gains from higher oil revenues, even though its exports to 
China are small)  
 
• China’s direct imports of intermediate manufactures from SSA promotes 
manufacturing in SSA (as is the case in its trade with East Asia where 
China runs a trade deficit in manufactures, importing intermediates which 
are subsequently incorporated into final products which are then exported) 
 
• China’s exports to SSA provide cheap and appropriate products to 
enhance consumer welfare and to boost productive efficiency. 
 
• China’s exports to global markets lead to a fall in global prices, 
undermining the profitability of SSA exporters. 
 
This Report addresses the impact of China on SSA by focusing on the trade 
channel in general, and the final bullet point in the preceding paragraph in 
particular. That is, it examines the indirect and competitive impact on SSA of 
China’s participation in third-country export markets. It is of course only part of 
the story for SSA, and there are many respects where China’s impact is likely to 
be both more direct, and where it is likely to be complementary rather than 
competitive (IDS, 2006; Chen et. al., 2005).  
 
Following discussion with DFID in the spring of 2005, it was decided to focus on 
two sectors – garden furniture and particularly clothing and textiles. These are 
labour-intensive and resource based sectors which individual DFID country 
offices considered to be of importance to current and future growth and 
employment in SSA, and hence to poverty alleviation. These sectoral studies 
were to be seen as exploratory, defining an agenda for future policy-related 
enquiry. 
 
“The objective of this project is to assess the impact of the two major 
Asian Driver economies (China and India) on SSA manufacturing by 
focusing on two leading sectors in three African sub-regions [Southern, 
East and West Africa]…  
 
The distinctive feature of this research is its focus on sectoral dynamics, 
that is, the forces determining the future of African producers in each of 
these sectors. The modesty of funding rules out a full survey of producers 
in many SSA countries. However the project will determine how significant 
the role played by the Asian Drivers on SSA economies is likely to be, and 
will establish a methodology for extended investigation in the future, in 
these and other potentially affected sectors”. 
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Box 1.1. Share of US in exports of key SSA 
clothing exporters.* 
Supplier Year Exports ($ '000): 
     World   USA  US share 
Kenya 2000 51,527 46,701 90.6% 
  2004 305,448 295,520 96.7% 
Lesotho 2000 154,192 146,364 94.9% 
  2004 494,155 481,787 97.5% 
Madagascar 2000 610,683 115,377 18.9% 
  2004 559,501 345,728 61.8% 
Swaziland 2000 37,712 33,356 88.4% 
  2004 190,537 188,467 98.9% 
South Africa 2000 453,153 150,313 33.2% 
  2004 252,453 149,402 59.2% 
*  Mauritius in a major SSA exporter but is excluded from 
this table as it is not part of this study. 
 
The major part of this study focuses on the clothing and textiles sector. Although 
individual DFID country offices had felt that furniture exports were a source of 
concern, the level of actual and projected furniture exports from these three sub-
regions has been small. This is not to say that there are not China-related 
impacts in the furniture sector (see Part 3 below), but rather that they pale into 
insignificance when compared to the clothing and textile sectors, particularly in 
Southern and East Africa. An additional reason for placing particular emphasis on 
the clothing and textile sector was the expiry of the MFA quotas on the 1st 
January 2005. 
 
There are two distinctive features of this Report. First, although there have been 
many attempts to model and predict the impact of quota removal on SSA clothing 
and textile exports, to the best of our knowledge there has as yet been no inter-
country comparison of actual impacts following the removal of quotas. And, 
second, and again to the best of our knowledge, with the exception of a study 
some years ago on the European retail clothing market (Gibbon, 2003), there has 
been no attempt to assess the future of the SSA clothing, textiles and furniture 
sectors by examining what buyers think. This is particularly true for US buyers, an 
important issue as the US is the overwhelming destination of SSA clothing and 
textile exports. Moreover, since an increasing number of global sectoral value 
chains either are already, or are becoming buyer-driven chains (that is, the key 
decisions affecting global production are made by chain-buyers rather than chain-
producers), this has been a particularly important omission limiting the policy-
contribution of previous studies on SSA exports of manufactures. 
 
 
1.2. SUMMARY OF MAJOR FINDINGS: CLOTHING AND TEXTILES 
 
SSA clothing and textile exports have 
grown rapidly and the USA has 
become the primary export destination 
(Box 1.1) 
 
With the exception of South Africa, 
clothing and textiles have become a 
leading export sector for these 
economies. In Lesotho, clothing and 
textiles accounted for virtually all 
manufactured exports in 2002, and 
contributed 50 percent of GDP. In 
Kenya in 2003, clothing enterprises 
accounted for the equivalent of nearly 
20 percent of all formal sector 
manufacturing employment. 
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The key driver for these growing 
clothing and textile exports has been 
trade preferences in general and the 
US AGOA preference scheme in 
particular (Box 1.2). However, within 
AGOA, there has been a key 
derogation on the rules of origin 
which allows SSA exporters to import 
inputs from outside of the AGOA 
region or the US. Mauritius and South 
Africa, which do not qualify as least 
developed countries, do not qualify 
for this derogation.1  
 
This derogation was initially limited to 
September 2004, and was extended 
to September 2007. Its intent was to 
encourage backward integration into 
the textile sector. 
 
The only significant case of the 
development of a textile industry has 
been the construction of a $100m 
denim plant in Lesotho, coming on 
stream in mid-2004. 
 
 
However, trade preferences are not unique to SSA, and for much of the second 
half of the twentieth century the global clothing and textile industry has been 
dominated by complex systems of trade preferences, particularly the MFA 
(formally known as the Agreement on Textiles and clothing). The key element of 
the MFA is that it provided for quantitative restrictions on imports into major high-
income economy markets. These quotas alone explain the establishment of an 
export-oriented clothing industry in low-income SSA economies, as 
predominantly East Asian producers took advantage of SSA’s unused quota 
access into the US and the EU. However, these quotas were removed in January 
2005. 
 
The predicted consequences of MFA quota-removal on SSA (and Latin America 
and the Caribbean) were alarming. Almost without exception, it was believed that 
SSA would be unable to compete on prices, despite access to US tariff 
preferences. The industry would be decimated, in a very short period of time, and 
the primary beneficiary would be China.  
 
Comparing 2005 and 2004 exports, the outcome has not been quite as bad as 
expected (Box 1.3). Overall AGOA exports fell by 17 percent, Lesotho’s and 
Madagascar’s exports each fell by 14 percent, Swaziland’s by 10 percent and 
                                            
1  However, Mauritius was provided with this derogation for a one-year period in late 
2004-2005. 
Box 1.2. The major provisions of tariff 
preferences into the USA 
 
The GSP provision provides duty-free access into 
the USA for imports from least developed 
economies. However, it excludes clothing and 
textiles, where tariffs are between 15-32 percent. 
 
AGOA was introduced in 2001, providing similar 
levels of preferential access to the US for 
qualifying SSA economies. Unlike GSP, it 
covered clothing and textiles. 
 
However, with the partial exceptions of S Africa 
and Mauritius, no SSA clothing exporters were 
able to meet the initial AGOA rules of origin. 
 
Therefore the AGOA rules of origin were 
amended to allow least developed SSA 
economies to use materials imported from global 
least-cost suppliers. This derogation was time-
bound, initially to September 2005, and 
subsequently to September 2007 
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Kenya’s by three percent.  The major casualty of quota removal was South 
Africa, whose AGOA exports collapsed, virtually halving. By contrast, comparing 
similar product groupings, China’s exports to the US increased very rapidly 
during the same time period. This meant that whilst AGOA clothing and textile 
export growth had led to a growth in the share of SSA exporters in US markets in 
their areas of market-niche between 2001 and 2004, this turned around during 
2005, and their market shares began to decline (Box 1.4). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Box 1.3. SSA export performance following 
quota removal (2004 versus 2005) 
% Change in Exports 
  SSA export 
value 
China exports in 
equivalent product 
groups 
AGOA -17 58 
Lesotho -17 112 
Madagascar -14 76 
S. Africa - 45 65 
Swaziland -10 91 
Kenya -3 77 
 
 
Box 1.4. 
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Nevertheless, although with the 
exception of S Africa, the export 
performance was not as bad as 
had been anticipated, firm-
mortality and employment loss 
were much more severe and 
indeed did border on the 
catastrophic for some of these 
economies, particularly Lesotho 
and Swaziland (Box 1.5). 
 
The main reason why the overall export performance was not as bad as expected 
relates to the degree of effective subsidy offered to AGOA producers in the US. 
Nominal rates of tariff on AGOA exports range between 16 and 32 percent. 
However, with the exception of S Africa (and Mauritius, except for a one-year 
exemption in 2004-5) AGOA clothing products (which attract duties on their full 
nominal value) can incorporate duty-free imports of materials (which often make 
up 60 percent or more of costs). Therefore, the implicit “effective rate of subsidy” 
is substantially higher than the nominal rates of protection would suggest. We 
calculate these nominal rates as ranging between 27 and 84 percent for 
representative exported products. 
 
This rate of subsidy is required for AGOA clothing producers to compete in the 
US market. This is because scales are low in SSA plants, and many producers 
suffer from poor bureaucratic and physical infrastructure. But there is also 
pervasive evidence that many SSA clothing plants suffer from low levels of 
productivity arising out of poor organisational procedures, low levels of skill and 
inadequate management within plants.  
 
The impact of these developments on poverty and livelihoods is very substantial. 
Some of this is positive, insofar as reduced prices of imports enhance the 
consumption power of consumers. But the negative impacts are very large, and 
focused, and hence command attention, because there are so few backward 
linkages into textiles, the major conduit for income-dispersal in the clothing 
industry has been through direct employment. The scale of job-losses arising 
from the end of MFA quotas is alarming (Box 1.5). It is not just the degree of job 
loss (particularly in Lesotho and Swaziland) which is of concern, but the nature of 
the jobs which have gone. It mostly involves women, and the impact on their 
families is severe. (In S Africa, for example, it is estimated that approximately four 
people are supported for every job in the formal sector). For countries without 
alternative sources of employment, this employment-decline has major poverty 
implications. But we also know from global experience that rapid economic 
growth can be a significant factor in reducing poverty levels, and the loss to both 
GDP and exports arising from a sharp contraction of the clothing sector will have 
a further negative impact on poverty levels. 
 
Another and potentially important poverty related outcome is the consequences 
for income distribution as SSA economies restructure to meet the threats and 
opportunities posed by China. The threat surfaces in the loss of labour intensive 
industries both though a decline in exports and heightened competition in 
domestic markets. The opportunity arises in the expansion of the mineral sector. 
Unlike labour intensive industries, minerals production is very capital intensive 
Box 1.5. Employment decline in clothing 
sector, 2004-2005. 
 
 2004 2005 % decline 
Kenya 34,614 31,745 9.3 
Lesotho 50,217 35,678 28.9 
S Africa 98,000 86,000 12.2 
Swaziland 32,000 14,000 56.2 
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and ownership is heavily concentrated. Hence, both because of its impact on 
poverty levels (through employment) and on income distribution (through 
changing forms of economic specialisation), China’s poverty-related impact on 
SSA is likely to be significant. 
 
In conclusion, what future is there for AGOA clothing producers? 
 
• Without the continued derogation on imported inputs, little of AGOA’s 
current export-oriented clothing industry will survive. The severity of the 
impact on South Africa (which cannot use imported materials) and which 
has experienced not only a 45 percent fall in export values during 2005, 
but rapidly rising import penetration, is clear evidence of this danger. 
 
• Those countries linked to the Rand – where currency appreciation in part 
reflects booming commodity exports to China – have suffered adversely. 
For Lesotho and Swaziland these Dutch Disease effects are particularly 
damaging since they do not simultaneously benefit from the upside of this 
growth in the commodity-exporting sector. 
 
• There is scope for reducing costs at the plant level. This will require a 
structured programme of benchmarking and continuous improvement. 
There is also scope for reducing the costs of poor bureaucratic and 
physical infrastructure. 
 
• There are many pockets of expertise in the region, including in good 
government. But the lessons from these isolated areas of competence will 
not diffuse naturally and require policy support. 
 
 
1.3. SUMMARY OF MAJOR FINDINGS: FURNITURE 
 
Relatively-speaking, SSA’s clothing industry is characterised by achievement. 
Although the share of global markets is small (3.7 percent in 2004), until 2005 
this share had been growing and was diffused through six countries. By contrast, 
SSA’s share of global furniture trade is not just much lower (less than one 
percent), but it has been falling and is effectively limited to a single country 
(South Africa). This is despite the fact that SSA has better resource endowments 
for furniture than it does for clothing and textiles. The primary reasons for this are 
the absence of the high levels of effective subsidy in final markets which applies 
to clothing and textiles, and underdeveloped manufacturing capabilities. 
 
SSA furniture producers are subject to the same competitive pressures from 
China and other Asian countries as are the clothing manufactures, but to more 
devastating effect.2 Europe’s major importer of garden furniture has ceased 
sourcing from SSA, and will draw all of its incremental imports from Vietnam and 
China rather than from Ghana from which has now divested its equity in a joint 
venture with a local partner. There is a single reason for this – SSA is not price 
competitive (Box 1.6) 
 
                                            
2  In fact the major exporters of furniture include a number of European countries. However, 
the major competitors for the furniture products exported by SSA are in Asia. 
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By contrast, China’s furniture industry has been booming. Between 1993 and 
2002 it has moved from being the world’s eighth largest to the second largest 
exporter. Between 1995 and 2002, its furniture production grew at an annual rate 
of 25 percent, and exports at 21 percent. Imports by comparison were static. Like 
the clothing and textiles sectors, this global expansion occurred during a period of 
falling world prices. 
 
SSA producers have thus either retreated from, or are largely in the process of 
retreating from global markets. In the case of South Africa, the hope is to target 
the domestic market. In the case of Ghana, the intention is to target the regional 
market. However both South African and Ghanaian manufacturers report high 
levels of competition in their domestic market from China and other Asian 
economies (such as Vietnam), and it is questionable whether this inward-oriented 
strategy will be as successful as hoped. 
  
In the face of this inability to compete with Asia in general and China in particular, 
SSA’s furniture manufacturers are moving backwards into their resource sectors, 
exporting raw logs, chips for the paper industry and sawn timber. Ghana is 
making an attempt to resist further “backward movement” by banning the export 
of logs. There is also probably a significant trade in illegally-logged hardwoods 
from West and Central Africa to Asia, but this is by its nature very difficult to 
evidence. Much of this SSA-sourced timber is used by Asian manufacturers to 
produce furniture which displaces SSA from global furniture markets. There are 
even allegations that it is used to produce furniture which is then exported back to 
SSA exporters of wood. 
 
In the clothing and textile sectors the poverty impact of Chinese competition is 
clear, with large job losses in existing enterprises in a number of SSA countries. 
In furniture this is less evident, since the industry is one with potential rather than 
realised presence. The exception is South Africa. Here, the industry has begun to 
shed labour and employment fell by around 10 percent in 2004. Hence the link to 
poverty and livelihoods is one of missed opportunity. Furniture is a labour 
intensive sector; it has significant backward linkages to agriculture and other 
sectors. It has the capacity to contribute significantly to growth and exports, and 
hence to reduce economy-wide poverty. Yet, it has failed to achieve this 
potential, and whilst competition from China explains only a small part of this 
historic picture, it makes it that much more difficult for SSA to achieve progress in 
the future. For the industry’s potential to be achieved will require a concerted 
programme to improve value chain efficiency (requiring attention to forestry, 
Box 1.6. Comparative costs of same item 
of garden furniture from SSA and Asia 
 
  Average price Price index
Ghana  £50 100% 
South Africa £60 120% 
China  £30 60% 
Vietnam £38 76% 
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sawmills, design, production and marketing) and perhaps also increased levels of 
protection in access to final consuming major markets 
 
 
1.4 GENERAL CONCLUSIONS 
 
Considering the two sectors together, six general conclusions can be drawn: 
 
1. China’s economic expansion has significant implications for SSA industry 
and growth. Indirectly, it excludes outward-oriented SSA producers from 
global markets, and directly it squeezes locally-focused producers.  
 
2. This has severe implications for both poverty and income distribution, 
particularly for changing patterns of income. Whilst domestic consumers 
gain from lower-priced imports, employment loss is severe and 
concentrated, the ability to “grow” future labour intensive industries has 
been diminished, and for those economies with a commodities sector, 
income will probably become increasingly concentrated. For those 
economies without a commodities sector, there are limited alternative 
sources of foreign exchange generation. 
 
3. At existing exchange rates and with existing cost structures SSA exporters 
of manufacturers will find it very difficult to compete without high degrees 
of preferences in external markets. The major from of preference affecting 
AGOA clothing exporters is the derogation on material inputs, but this is 
due to expire in September 2007. 
 
4. There is scope for significant improvements in operating efficiency in both 
sectors, but this will require attention to firm-level efficiency, systemic 
value chain integration, and bureaucratic and physical infrastructure. 
 
5. We do not know the extent of Dutch Disease impacts, but these look 
severe, especially through their indirect impacts on economies linked to 
currencies of commodity exporting economies. This not only has 
implications for exports from non-commodity sectors, but the distributional 
and political fallout from commodity specialisation is likely to be significant. 
 
6. We have observed the impact of China on SSA at a nascent stage of 
China’s expansion and only in relation to the vector of trade. Even then we 
can see non-marginal impacts. As China’s expansion continues and when 
other vectors are considered (FDI, governance, the environment), we can 
anticipate even greater impacts. 
 
These conclusions have important implications for a poverty-focused policy 
agenda, both by DFID and by individual and groups of SSA economies. However, 
before policies are adopted, further detailed enquiry will be required, bearing in 
mind that this has only been a pilot investigation. For example, we do not know 
whether the relatively small drop in SSA’s clothing exports represents poor trade 
data, or transfer pricing by Asian investors in Southern Africa. We do not know 
why exporters of similar products have reduced exports from Kenya and raised 
them from Madagascar in some products and made diametrically opposed 
decisions in regard to other products. We do not know whether polling the Asian 
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based buyers will provide a different picture from the relatively optimistic scenario 
painted by US buyers. Perhaps most importantly insofar as SSA as a whole is 
concerned, we do not know whether the changes in manufactures/commodities 
terms of trade which we are witnessing are likely to be sustained, how they are 
felt in individual SSA economies, and how their effects are being transmitted from 
core regional economies to their partner countries. 
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PART 2 
 
MFA QUOTA REMOVAL AND THE IMPACT ON SOUTHERN AND EAST 
AFRICAN CLOTHING AND TEXTILES EXPORTERS TO THE USA 
 
2.1. BACKGROUND 
 
Why are clothing and textiles important? 
 
In 2004, a US International Trade Commission enquiry into competitiveness in 
the global textiles and clothing industry provided a comprehensive overview of 
emerging trends based in part on a series of country case-studies conducted by 
industry experts. It concluded that China is “expected to become the ‘supplier of 
choice’ for most U.S. importers (the large apparel companies and retailers) 
because of its ability to make almost any type of textile and apparel product at 
any quality level at a competitive price”. The ITC concluded that China’s low unit 
labour costs were due to a combination of low wages and high productivity. As for 
quality, it is “considered by industry [to be] among the best in making most 
garments and made-up textile articles at any quality or price level”. (USITC, 2004: 
x1 and xiii). Lead times, too, were relatively low. 
 
If accurate, this will represent a major challenge for SSA clothing and textile 
exporters. Unfortunately, the quality of data on SSA manufacturing value added 
and trade is not adequate to permit a data-driven, detailed and recent 
assessment of the clothing and textile sector in SSA economies.3 But it is a 
sector of considerable economic importance, and because of its labour intensity, 
a sector having a major impact on poverty patterns, sustainable livelihoods and 
income distribution.  
 
One indicator of the sector’s regional importance is that although clothing and 
textiles exports declined between 2003 (the peak year) and 2004, they still 
accounted for 4.7 percent of total SSA merchandise exports, and 18.7 percent of 
total SSA manufactured exports in 2004 (WTO, 2005). (Most of these exports, 
4.1 percent and 16.4 percent respectively, were clothing). SSA clothing and 
textile exports were heavily concentrated in a few economies (see below), and in 
some of these, their strategic significance is very important, with major 
implications for growth and poverty reduction. For example, in Lesotho, clothing 
and textiles accounted for 99 percent of all exports and 50 percent of GDP in 
2002, and in Kenya in 2003, employment in export processing zone export-
orienting clothing enterprises accounted for the equivalent of nearly 20 percent of 
all formal sector manufacturing employment outside of the EPZs (Kaplinsky, 
2004). 
                                            
3  The UNIDO database on global manufacturing does not provide data beyond 1998. 
The WTO Annual Report on trade flows and the IMF Direction of Trade Statistics do 
not provide data on sectoral disaggregation. 
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Figure 2.1 The significance of clothing and textile exports in five major SSA 
exporting economies 
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Therefore, in the light of the strategic significance of clothing and textiles in SSA, 
of China’s competitiveness, and because of the removal of the remaining MFA 
quotas in January 2005, the potential impact of China on SSA GDP growth, 
exports, manufacturing value added and employment in selected SSA economies 
cannot be underestimated. In assessing this impact we begin with a brief review 
of the changing structure of trade in this sector in the global economy. 
 
The global clothing and textiles sector 
 
China is substantially the world’s largest exporter, successfully increasing the 
value of its clothing exports by 540% from $9.7 billion in 1990 to $62.0 billion 
in 2004 (Table 2.1). In 1990, China represented only 9% of the world’s total 
clothing exports, but by 2004, its share had increased to 24%, and if Hong 
Kong with 10% of the world total is included, China effectively accounted for 
one third of world clothing exports. Although Italy grew clothing exports by 
51% (1990 – 2004), its share of world exports declined from 11% (1990) to 
only 7% (2003), and its 2004 exports of $17.9 million is less than one third 
China’s exports. Mexico and India are the only other countries among the top 
10 exporters to increase their world share. Mexico increased its clothing 
exports from $0.6 billion in 1990 to $7.2 billion in 2004 (an increase of 
1,126%), in the process growing its share of the world total from 1% to 3%. 
India’s clothing exports grew by 162% (from $2.5 billion to $6.6 billion) 
between 1990 and 2004, at the same time increasing its share of world total 
exports from 2% to 3%. Although the US increased its clothing exports by 
97% to $5.05 billion in 2004, the US’s share of total world exports remained 
constant at 2%. SSA is only a small participant on this global stage. Its share 
of global textile exports was only 2.6 percent in 2004, and 3.7 percent for 
clothing (WTO, 2005). 
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Developed countries dominate the global importation of clothing, with the US 
importing the greatest value of clothing products. Between 1990 and 2004, 
imports of clothing goods into the US grew by 181%, increasing its share of 
world imports from 24% to 28%. Germany is the second largest importer of 
clothing goods, followed by Japan, the UK and Hong Kong. In 2004, the US 
imported $75.7 billion worth of clothing; three times the amount imported by 
Germany ($24.1 billion); nearly quadruple the value of Japan and UK’s 
clothing imports ($21.7 billion and $19.2 billion). In 2004, the $140.7 billion 
imported by the top four clothing importers represented more than 50% of the 
world’s total clothing imports, whilst the top 10 clothing importers accounted 
for 77% of the value of world imports. 
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Table 2.1: World trade in clothing by top 10 countries (US$ million) 
 
                                              Exports Clothing % World Total
Country 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
1990-
2004  
%  
change 1990 2004 
China 1,625 2,450 9,669 24,049 36,071 36,650 41,302 52,061 61,856 540% 9% 24% 
Hong Kong 4,976 6,718 15,406 21,297 24,214 23,446 22,343 23,152 25,097 63% 14% 10% 
Italy 4,584 5,320 11,839 14,424 13,384 14,220 14,643 16,191 17,925 51% 11% 7% 
Germany 2,882  7,882 7,530 7,320 7,444 8,338 9,749 11,221 42% 7% 4% 
Turkey 131 1,208 3,331 6,119 6,533 6,661 8,057 9,937 11,193 236% 3% 4% 
France 2,294 1,935 4,671 5,659 5,414 5,469 5,882 6,935 7,865 68% 4% 3% 
Mexico 2  587 2,731 8,631 8,012 7,751 7,343 7,197 1126% 1% 3% 
India 673 930 2,530 4,110 6,179 5,484 6,037 6,459 6,620 162% 2% 3% 
Belgium     3,941 4,206 4,649 5,353 6,235  0% 2% 
USA 1,263 785 2,565 6,651 8,629 7,012 6,032 5,537 5,059 97% 2% 2% 
World 40,590  108,129 158,353 197,498 194,490 202,310 225,940 258,097 139% 100% 100% 
Imports Clothing 
USA 6,943 16,202 26,977 41,367 67,115 66,391 66,731 71,277 75,731 181% 24% 28% 
Germany 8,326  20,411 24,550 20,183 19,330 19,647 22,219 24,076 18% 18% 9% 
Japan 1,537 2,012 8,737 18,758 19,709 19,186 17,602 19,485 21,687 148% 8% 8% 
UK 2,858 2,694 6,961 8,002 12,995 13,169 14,657 16,551 19,245 176% 6% 7% 
Hong Kong 695 1,671 6,913 12,654 16,008 16,098 15,640 15,946 17,129 148% 6% 6% 
France 2,637 2,707 8,381 10,639 11,412 11,769 12,402 14,771 16,791 100% 7% 6% 
Italy 797 779 2,580 4,703 6,139 6,697 7,576 9,342 11,130 331% 2% 4% 
Spain 152 121 1,649 2,492 3,847 4,279 4,965 6,559 7,732 369% 1% 3% 
Belgium     4,828 5,013 5,272 6,249 7,156 0% 0% 3% 
Netherlands 2,875 2,045 4,768 5,132 5,371 5,220 5,250 5,943 6,644 39% 4% 2% 
World 42,271 50,822 112,236 162,871 207,093 203,820 211,765 236,035 269,473 140% 100% 100% 
 
Source: Morris, Barnes and Esselaar (2006, forthcoming) 
 
The textiles sector is far more capital-intensive than clothing, with long lead 
times, resulting in large minimum order-quantities and less flexibility (Nordas, 
2004). Textiles firms in industrialised economies are therefore increasingly 
producing household and industrial textiles which are more technology- and 
R&D-intensive. This, coupled with the capital-intensity of textiles production has 
meant that it has been more difficult to relocate textiles production to developing 
economies, and most of the relocation that has taken place has been 
concentrated in the areas of clothing fabric (Nordas, 2004). 
 
With 17% of the world total, China was the world’s largest exporter of textiles 
products. Chinese exports of textiles increased from $7.2 billion in 1990 to 
$33.4 billion in 2004 (or by 363%), while its share of the world total more than 
doubled. Italy was the second largest exporter of textile products valued at 
$15.2 billion in 2004 representing 8% of world exports. Hong Kong accounts 
for approximately 7% of total textile exports, exporting $14.3 billion in 2004, 
followed by Germany with $13.6 billion and the US with $12 billion, 
representing 7% and 6% of the world total respectively.  
 
The importation of textiles shows less significant concentration among the top 
10 countries than the importation of clothing, highlighting the more 
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differentiated markets that the textiles industry supplies into (Table 2.2). The 
top five importers of textiles: US, China, Hong Kong, Germany and France, 
import 35% of the world total, while the top 10 importers (including the UK, 
Italy, Mexico, Japan and Spain) import just over half of the world total. The US 
is the leader in textiles imports with its imports increasing from $6.7 billion in 
1990 to $18.3 billion in 2004, an increase of 207%. China’s imports of textiles 
increased by 189% over the period, from $5.3 billion to $15.3 billion, whilst 
Hong Kong’s textile imports increased by 39% (from $10.8 billion to 14.1 
billion). Germany experienced a decline in textile imports of 5%, and France 
remained constant, revealing the loss of their clothing industries and their 
movement towards importing made-up garments. 
 
 
Table 2.2: World trade in textiles by top 10 countries (US$ million) 
Exports Textiles 
Country 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
1990-2004  
%  change 1990 2004 
China 2,540 3,680 7,219 13,918 16,135 16,826 20,563 26,901 33,428 363% 7% 17%
Italy 4,158 4,727 9,492 12,877 12,040 12,165 12,131 13,569 15,199 60% 9% 8%
Hong Kong 1,771 3,038 8,213 13,815 13,442 12,214 12,374 13,085 14,296 74% 8% 7%
Germany 6,296   14,033 14,385 10,851 10,547 10,873 12,014 13,582 -3% 13% 7%
USA 3,757 2,541 5,039 7,372 10,961 10,491 10,698 10,917 11,989 138% 5% 6%
S. Korea 2,209 2,534 6,076 12,313 12,711 10,941 10,713 10,122 10,839 78% 6% 6%
Taipei 1,771 2,490 6,128 11,882 11,896 9,905 9,532 9,321 10,038 64% 6% 5%
Belgium         6,311 6,079 6,244 6,960 7,670   0% 4%
France 3,432 2,885 6,058 7,474 6,664 6,278 6,389 7,078 7,356 21% 6% 4%
India 1,306 1,054 2,180 4,358 5,998 5,375 6,028 6,510 No Data   2%  
World 54,990  104,354 152,319 154,366 146,866 152,758 169,422 194,732 87% 100% 100% 
Imports Textiles 
USA 2,543 4,978 6,730 10,441 16,008 15,429 17,002 18,289 20,662 207% 6% 10%
China 1,100 2,040 5,292 10,914 12,832 12,573 13,060 14,218 15,304 189% 5% 7%
Hong Kong 2,967 4,281 10,182 16,859 13,717 12,177 12,019 12,929 14,110 39% 9% 7%
Germany 6,871   11,868 12,477 10,007 9,528 9,244 10,292 11,259 -5% 11% 5%
UK 3,560 3,869 7,018 7,262 6,889 6,452 6,489 6,894 7,804 11% 7% 4%
France 4,119 3,484 7,595 7,526 6,751 6,336 6,236 7,001 7,641 1% 7% 4%
Italy 2,618 2,524 6,133 6,461 6,210 6,067 6,077 6,733 7,459 22% 6% 4%
Mexico 133   992 1,768 5,824 5,385 5,573 5,461 5,790 484% 1% 3%
Japan 1,663 1,901 4,106 5,985 4,939 4,756 4,536 5,035 5,599 36% 4% 3%
Spain 354 314 2,050 2,647 3,359 3,302 3,460 4,137 4,301 110% 2% 2%
World 56,975 55,618 107,839 156,515 163,121 155,718 161,015 179,011 205,884 91% 100% 100% 
 
Source: Morris, Barnes and Esselaar (2006, forthcoming) 
 
SSA is only a small participant on this global stage. Its share of global textile 
exports was only 2.6 percent in 2004, and 3.7 percent for clothing (WTO, 2005). 
Most of these clothing and textile exports are destined for the USA  and here in 
order of importance, the largest SSA clothing and textile exporters are Lesotho, 
Madagascar, Kenya, Mauritius, Swaziland and South Africa (see Table 2.5 
below) 
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Preferential trading regimes and AGOA 
 
This structure of the global clothing and textiles sector reflects three major 
factors. The first is the concentration of global buying power. This is an 
increasingly widespread phenomenon, spanning most final products sectors 
(Feenstra and Hamilton, 2005). In the USA, between 1987 and 1991 the five 
largest chains increased their share of retail clothing sales from 35 to 45 percent; 
by 1995 this had increased to 68 percent, and a further 24 chains controlled 30 
percent of the market. In other words, something like 30 giant retail chains supply 
virtually all of the US clothing market. Wal-Mart and Kmart have become 
particularly dominant and, alone, account for 25 percent (by volume) of all sales. 
In Germany in 1992, five retailers (C&A, Quelle, Metro/Kaufhof, Kardstadt and 
Otto) accounted for 28 percent of the clothing market. In the UK, the top five 
retailers had 32 percent of the market in 2000, and the top 10 retailers had 42 
percent. In both France and Italy, independent retailers declined in importance 
after the mid-1980s, and specialised chains, franchise networks and 
hypermarkets grew rapidly. In Japan, the dominant role of high-fashion 
department stores such as Seibu and Isetan has been undermined by specialised 
clothing retailers competing with lower-cost imported products (Gereffi and 
Memedovic, 2004; Kaplinsky, 2005; and Malone 2002 and McGrath, 2003, both 
cited in Appelbaum, 2005)). 
 
The significance of this buyer concentration is their requirement for large volumes 
(and of course low prices). This has made it difficult for small scale suppliers to 
meet the requirements of large global buyers, and this has advantaged countries 
such as China with large volume plants, and transnational companies (often 
based in Hong Kong and Taiwan) who have a competitive advantage in 
organising large scale production runs. 
 
The second major explanation for the structure of global production has been 
costs and efficiency. Although the clothing industry has become increasingly 
characterised by the requirement for shorter lead-times, greater inter- and intra 
seasonal variety and tighter logistics (ITC, 2004; Kaplinsky, 2005), cost has been 
king in this industry. The intensity of competition in these areas has been 
reflected in cost pressures, and as Figure 2.2 shows, since the mid-1990s there 
has been a secular downtrend in the unit price of imported clothing. 
 
Figure 2.2: US Import prices for clothing and textiles, 19832002 ($/sq.m. 
equivalent) 
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Source: Manchester Trade Team (2005), from Textile Outlook International 
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The third and the most important determinant of global production structure has 
been the protective regime, since this has determined the pool of countries who 
can reliably serve these large scale global buyers with low cost and quality-
assured product. Without going into too much detail, three protective regimes 
have been important, particularly in explaining SSA’s role in this global industry. It 
is important to note here that it is the US protective regime which is most 
important to the SSA clothing and textiles industry, since the overwhelming share 
of exports are destined to the US market, particularly for Kenya, Lesotho and 
Swaziland (Table 2.3 provides the data for key SSA Eastern, and Southern 
African clothing and textile exporters; it excludes Mauritius, which is a major 
exporter to the EU). 
 
Table 2.3. Share of US in exports of key SSA clothing exporters.* 
 
Supplier Year Exports ($ '000): 
     World   USA  US share 
Kenya 2000 51,527 46,701 90.6% 
  2001 74,094 68,967 93.1% 
  2002 139,607 135,180 96.8% 
  2003 208,476 201,749 96.8% 
  2004 305,448 295,520 96.7% 
Lesotho 2000 154,192 146,364 94.9% 
  2001 236,968 223,549 94.3% 
  2002 347,957 342,432 98.4% 
  2003 427,504 418,995 98.0% 
  2004 494,155 481,787 97.5% 
Madagascar 2000 610,683 115,377 18.9% 
  2001 686,695 188,102 27.4% 
  2002 237,440 96,706 40.7% 
  2003 363,023 211,742 58.3% 
  2004 559,501 345,728 61.8% 
Swaziland 2000 37,712 33,356 88.4% 
  2001 56,518 50,340 89.1% 
  2002 102,219 95,352 93.3% 
  2003 153,054 149,683 97.8% 
  2004 190,537 188,467 98.9% 
South 
Africa 2000 453,153 150,313 33.2% 
  2001 456,433 183,713 40.2% 
  2002 347,239 193,376 55.7% 
  2003 415,233 248,532 59.9% 
  2004 252,453 149,402 59.2% 
 
*  Mauritius in a major SSA exporter but is excluded form this table as it is 
not part of this study. 
 
Source: UNSD COMTRADE database, accessed via World Integrated Trade 
Solution (WITS) on 15th December 2005; Country and sectoral data 
calculated on the basis of US imports 
 
Historically, the most important preferential trade regime has been the Multi-Fibre 
Arrangement (MFA) (formally superseded by the Agreement on Textiles and 
Clothing in 1994, but still largely referred to as the MFA). For the last quarter of 
the 20th Century the MFA regulated much of global trade and production in this 
sector, ratifying countries’ rights to impose quotas on textiles and clothing 
imports. This was intended to allow rich countries time to restructure their textiles 
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and clothing industries before opening up to competition from poorer country 
producers. Within this, each of the large importing blocs negotiated separate 
bilateral arrangements with developing countries to set up complex tariff 
schedules protecting the more capital-intensive parts of the chain, and reducing 
tariffs on labour-intensive stages in the production cycle. The aim was to allow 
their domestic producers to take advantage of outsourced cheap labour for the 
unskilled labour-intensive part of the production cycle. 
 
This quota-based preferential trade access meant that production spread to an 
ever-increasing number of countries. This was largely because firms in quota-full 
economies organised garment production in under-utilised quota producer 
countries. Thus, during the 1990s, a rapid process of third party organising and 
supply sourcing functions spread throughout the developing world to provide 
access to established markets. Hong Kong garment producers opened factories 
in Mauritius and elsewhere, and Korean and Taiwanese producers spread their 
operations to the Caribbean and to sub-Saharan Africa. In turn, as they matured 
in their operations and established their own footholds, Mauritian garment 
producers also spread their operations to Madagascar. In more recent years, 
large Asian producers, especially in Hong Kong and Taiwan, developed the 
capacity to mobilise and coordinate full-package manufacture (i.e. all the 
manufacturing stages) in the global textile and clothing value chain, leading to 
what Gereffi (1999) termed “triangular production networks”. In other words, 
production in one country (usually least developed) was organised and 
coordinated by firms in another (mostly middle-income) country, with products 
produced sold on to final buyers in yet a third (usually industrialised) economy.  
 
On December 31 2004, the MFA came to an end and with it, the termination of all 
quotas on textiles and clothing trade between member states of the WTO. 
Although the phasing down of the quotas had been planned as a gradual process 
spanning five years, importing countries had been given latitude on what 
products they would remove from quotas. Most chose to remove items in the first 
few years of the phase-down which were of little significance in their imports. 
Thus the final step of quota removal came as a “big bang” on the 1st January 
2005 - 86.5 percent of US quotas and 73.3 percent of EU quotas were involved 
(Williams, Yuk-Choi and Yan, 2002: 580). 
 
However, the removal of quotas did not mean a “level playing field” since global 
trade in clothing and textiles is still regulated by tariffs. It is important to note here 
that the GSP preference scheme by which the US and 26 other developed 
countries provides duty-free tariff preferences to over 100 beneficiary countries 
notably excluded clothing and textiles. In the case of the US, in 2001 the average 
weighted tariff for clothing and textiles was 15.5 percent, but they ranged from 
around 13 to 17 percent for cotton products and from 25 to 35 percent for 
synthetic products.4 
 
                                            
4  Ad valorem tariffs only (UNCTAD, 2003: 15). There are two explanations for the higher 
tariffs on synthetic products despite the fact that this is the area of speciality for the US 
clothing and textiles industry. First, the US industry sees cheap synthetics as a cheap 
competitor to its cotton products. Second, synthetics were incorporated into the MFA at a 
later stage than cotton products, and the US industry which had been scarred by 
competition in cotton products, saw this as an opportunity to dampen potential future 
competition in synthetics. (We are grateful to Peter Minor for these observations). 
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The African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) was signed into USA law on 
18th May 2000, aiming to assist SSA by using trade as a means of generating 
revenue, investment and employment. The trade preferences provided by AGOA 
are contingent upon countries meeting certain criteria, including a range of 
provisions on democracy and anti-corruption, and property rights and trade 
liberalisation. A number of SSA countries have increased exports on the back of 
AGOA, including in the petroleum sector. The largest manufacturing sector 
beneficiary of AGOA has been the clothing and textiles sector, since the key 
relevant element of AGOA is that it extends the GSP preferences to clothing and 
textiles.  
 
AGOA incorporated different rules of origin to the GSP. The GSP provisions 
require that articles must be shipped directly from the exporting country, and not 
go through processing in a third country. In addition, the value added to the 
product must be at least 35% – “Imported materials can be counted towards the 
value-added requirement only if they are ‘substantially transformed’ into new and 
different constituent materials of which the eligible article is composed.”5 
However, because few SSA countries were able to meet these rules of origin, 
The AGOA rules of origin instead built on procedures which had been established 
early in the 1990s in relation to the Caribbean Basin Initiative: 
 
• The cost or value of materials produced in the customs territory of the 
United States may be counted towards the 35 per cent requirement up to 
a maximum amount not to exceed 15 per cent of the article’s appraised 
value. 
 
• The cost or value of the materials used that are produced in one or more 
beneficiary sub-Saharan African countries may be counted towards the 35 
per cent requirement (cumulation among AGOA-designated countries).  
 
Nevertheless, despite these concessions, few SSA economies were able to meet 
these rules of origin in the clothing and textiles sector. Thus, in a further key 
amendment, AGOA-qualifying countries which were also classified under the 
UN’s “least developed category” (that is, per capita incomes of less than $1,500 
in 1998) were also subject to a further amendment to GSP rules of origin. That is, 
until September 2005 (subsequently amended to September 2007) they could 
source their material and accessory inputs from non-AGOA and non-US bases 
suppliers (up to a restricted share of US clothing imports), including from China 
and other Asian economies. In other words, they were freed from the minimum 
value added requirement. Table 2.4 summarises the key components of the 
AGOA rules of origin in the clothing sector. 
 
                                            
5   UNCTAD (2003: 8),  
10 
Table 2.4: Summary of Apparel Rules of Origin Under AGOA 
 
Description of the Rules of Origin 
Requirement 
Conditions of Access 
Apparel assembled from US formed 
and cut fabrics from US yarn 
Unrestricted 
Apparel assembled  and further 
processed from US formed and cut 
fabrics from US yarn 
Unrestricted 
Apparel assembled from US fabric from 
US yarn and thread 
Unrestricted 
Apparel assembled from regional fabric 
from US or African yarn 
Tariff rate quota that grows from a cap of 
1.5 to 3.5 % of total US apparel imports 
(these caps have recently been doubled) 
Only applicable to Least Developed 
Category economies 
Apparel assembled in a lesser 
Developed Country using foreign fabric 
or yarn 
Unrestricted for four years from 2001 
(subsequently extended to September 
2007) but exports counted against the 1.5 
to 3.5 % caps specified above. 
Cashmere sweaters, knit to shape Unrestricted 
Merino wool sweaters, knit to shape, 
with fibres 18.5 microns or finer 
Unrestricted 
 
Source: Elaboration of Mattoo, Roy and Subramanian (2002) 
 
In 2004, the six largest exporters of clothing to the US under the AGOA scheme 
were Lesotho, Madagascar, Kenya, Mauritius, Swaziland and South Africa (Table 
2.5). The critical issue is the relationship between total exports of clothing and 
those under AGOA qualifying rules from these countries (compare Tables 2.2 
and 2.3).  In 2004, the vast bulk (except for Mauritius South Africa, more than 90 
percent) of SSA clothing exports to the US has been via AGOA’s preferential 
trade access. The share of AGOA exports in all exports grew rapidly between 
2001 and 2004 (particularly for Swaziland and Kenya), and this reflects two 
general tendencies. First, new investments (including plant-expansion) were 
made, directly targeting AGOA exports to the US. And, second, in some cases 
pre-existing plants exporting to the US were brought under the AGOA umbrella. 
The impact that this clothing based industrialisation process has had on creating 
wage employment and reducing poverty in these poor SSA countries has been 
huge (see below).  
Table 2.5: AGOA clothing exports to US, 2001 – 2003 ($m)  
Country 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Lesotho 129 318 373 448 
Madagascar 92 75 186 315 
Kenya 52 121 176 272 
Mauritius 39 107 135 148 
Swaziland 8 74 127 176 
11 
South Africa 30 85 127 115 
 
Source: For 2001 and 2002, Gibbon, 2003; For 2003 and 2004, 
http://dataweb.usitc.gov/ and www.tralac.org (Accessed March-October 
2005, and Gibbon  
 
 
2. 2.  SSA IN THE POST QUOTA ERA; A BIRD’S EYE VIEW OF FIVE KEY 
EXPORTING ECONOMIES 
 
The “big bang” of January 2005 was a very significant event. It allowed countries 
such as China, which had formerly been limited in accessing major markets by 
import quotas, to compete on price. As we have seen, this does still not constitute 
a “level playing field”.  Those countries such as the AGOA-qualifying economies 
and other groupings incorporated in preferential trading arrangements (for 
example, the Caribbean Basin Initiative economies and Mexico through NAFTA) 
continue to benefit from a remission of duties. But, crucially, it provided China 
with a platform to take advantage of the low production costs and higher overall 
efficiency noted by the USITC Report in 2004 (see Section 1 above). China 
prepared for quota removal with investments to improve efficiency. In 2002 China 
accounted for 75 percent of global shuttleless loom purchases, and in the 
process displaced 1m workers (USITC, 2004). This was reflected at the firm-
level. For example, between 1998 and 2004 the Shanghai Shenda Group fired 
50,000 workers out of a total labour force of 60,000 and closed 20 factories. In 
the same period, sales rose from $170m to $415m (Hilligas, 2004: 13). 
 
It was not just China which geared itself for this change, but more importantly the 
global TNCs which had developed to serve the needs of the large scale buyers in 
the major clothing importing countries. Many of these clothing and textiles TNCs 
have their bases in Asia. In 2003, there were 20,000 FDI investments in China in 
clothing and textiles, and FDI inflows into this sector comprised 10 percent of 
overall incoming FDI into China. More than one-third of China’s clothing and 
textile exports in 2004 were directly exported by TNCs (Appelbaum, 2005), but 
perhaps more importantly, externally-based global intermediary buyers (Gereffi’s 
“triangular manufacturers” – see Section 3 below) coordinated much of the 
clothing and textiles exported directly by Chinese-owned companies. 
 
Predictions 
 
In anticipation of quota removal, there were a large number of attempts to predict 
the outcome. These predictions are summarised and annotated in Annex 1, and 
can be grouped into four categories – predictions on the poverty-impact in 
vulnerable countries; predictions on the impact on the structure of global trade; 
predictions on the impact on China; and predicted outcomes for SSA.  
 
The main conclusions in these pre-January 2005 Reports are as follows:  
 
• With regard to the poverty and livelihoods, the impact on the living 
standards of the poor in key exporting countries which are likely to see 
adverse impacts from quota removal - Bangladesh, Mexico, Cambodia 
and Lesotho – will be very adverse (Table 2.6) 
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• With regard to global trade, the centre of gravity of the clothing and textiles 
sector will move even further to Asia in general, and China in particular. 
Figure 2.3 below summarises the view that both in absolute and relative 
terms, the two regions most likely to be adversely affected are Mexico and 
the Caribbean Basin Initiative economies. SSA is equally badly hit in terms 
of the share of its exports subject to high-risk (around 80 percent in the 
highest risk category), but the values involved are relatively small. The 
least likely victims of quota removal are Asia in general, and China in 
particular. 
 
• China (and India) will be major beneficiaries and individual SSA economies 
– particularly (Lesotho and South Africa) are likely to be hit very hard. 
 
Table 2. 6: Expected Impact of Elimination of Quotas post 2005 on Selected 
Countries. 
 
 Prospects for the 
garment industry 
 
Prospects for 
garment workers 
and communities
 
Dependence on 
garment industry 
* 
 
Bangladesh Severely challenged 
– Export decline and 
job losses expected, 
although should 
remain a significant 
garment exporter. 
Very Vulnerable 
Few other job 
opportunities for 
women workers. 
Dependent 
 1,800,000 
workers,  
40% jobs  
62% exports 
Mexico Severely challenged 
in the immediate 
future. NAFTA and 
proximity to US remain 
big advantages. 
Poor – but some 
other industrial job 
opportunities 
exist. 
Declining but 
still significant  
750,000 workers 
18% of jobs  
6% exports 
Cambodia Unclear – differences 
of opinion over future 
competitiveness. 
Extremely 
Vulnerable Few 
other job 
opportunities for 
women workers. 
Dependent  
250,000 workers  
62% of jobs  
82 % of exports 
Lesotho Unclear – Lesotho has 
been AGOA success 
story, but vulnerable to 
competition after 2005.
Extremely 
vulnerable Very 
poor country with 
no other industrial 
employers 
Dependent  
45,000 workers  
90 + % of jobs 
 90 + % of exports 
* % of jobs in this column indicates % of industrial employment, % of exports 
indicates % of manufactured exports, most recently quoted figures. 
Shaded boxes indicate those countries with most cause for concern in each area. 
 
Source: Business for Social Responsibility (2005)  
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Figure 2.3. 
 
 
 
The outcome in 2005 in five key SSA economies 
 
In the discussion in Section 3 below we report the detailed impact on five key 
SSA economies based on our discussions with enterprises, key industry 
informants and government departments in these economies and on their 
prominence as clothing and textiles exporters to the US. The economies in 
question are Lesotho, South Africa and Swaziland in Southern Africa, Kenya in 
East Africa, and Madagascar.6 But before reporting on these discussions, we 
begin by analysing the emerging trade patterns during 2005. The data presented 
compares the trade performance of all AGOA clothing exporters to the US, as 
well as that of Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar and Swaziland. In the case of South 
Africa we include textiles exports since, uniquely amongst these countries, it also 
has significant textiles exports. In each case we compare these countries to the 
main beneficiary of quota removal – China, In Annex 2 we extend the analysis to 
India and East Asia (Cambodia, Vietnam, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Indonesia, 
Taiwan, Korea), since they, too, are likely to benefit from quota removal.  
 
These comparisons are made with respect to the collectivity of the ten largest 
product categories exported to the US in each case, and in detail for the five 
largest exported products. We then analyse market growth, the unit value of 
export prices and the outcome in terms of market shares, comparing 2005 with 
2004. We assume in this that the most competitive countries are able to 
simultaneously reduce their export prices and increase their market share 
(Kaplinsky and Readman, 2005). We also provide data on market shares in 2001 
and 2004 to show how these African economies had benefited from AGOA 
preferences and the quota regime, and how these compared to the period in 
2005 when AGOA countries only benefited from GSP tariff preferences. 
 
The common features from this comparison are that  
                                            
6  The only large exporter excluded is Mauritius. 
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• The value of African clothing exports to the US dropped by 17 percent in 
the first year after quota removal. Volumes were up slightly, but unit prices 
fell back in aggregate and in key product groupings, by more than 10 
percent. 
 
• In general AGOA economies performed less badly in their major exported 
items than they did in aggregate, suggesting a process of specialisation. 
However, alarmingly, in general China’s export growth in these sectors 
and the rate of price decline was faster than for its overall exports, 
suggesting potentially heightened competition for SSA products in the 
future. 
 
• China’s market share in the same product groupings grew dramatically, 
whilst with very few exceptions those of AGOA as a whole and individual 
exporting countries fell back. This was the case for virtually every product 
category, with the exception of Lesotho’s exports of denim jeans following 
the commissioning of its denim mill in late 2004. 
 
• Even though overall export values remained broadly stable, employment in 
the clothing and textiles sector fell very significantly in all of the five 
economies, probably reflecting an increase in efficiency and growing firm-
mortality. 
 
• South Africa, Lesotho and Madagascar fared worse than Swaziland 
(whose exports fell only slightly), and Kenya (whose value of exports 
remained unchanged). 
 
• South Africa reflects a possible and negative face of SSA’s future. Unable 
to access imported materials through the derogation on market-entry for 
least-developed countries, it uniquely saw a very large fall (a halving in 
fact) of its exports to the US. 
 
• The share of SSA exporters in the US clothing and textiles imports grew 
between 2001 and 2004, reflecting the combination of quota-access and 
preferential AGOA trading arrangements. However, the removal of MFA 
quotas set back this advance, and African exporters experienced a 
significant fall in their share of the US market after quota removal. 
 
 
AGOA and China (Table 2.7) 
 
The value of all AGOA economies’ exports fell by 17 in the first year after quota 
removal, whereas the value of China’s exports in the same product groupings in 
the same period rose by 58 percent. The top 10- AGOA clothing exports 
performed in the same way as the aggregate, falling in value by nearly 15 
percent. The value of China’s exports in these key items grew very significantly, 
by 161 percent in the same period. The decline in AGOA export values for the top 
three exported products was even greater.  
 
China’s export surge was built on a sharp fall in unit prices which virtually halved 
for the top 10 products in aggregate, and an even greater fall in the top three 
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AGOA-exported items. Consequently, whereas the AGOA economies had seen a 
rise in their market share in the US between 2001 and 2004 (from 1.6 to 3 
percent for the top 10 products), this fell between 2005 and 2004 (to 2 percent). 
In the same period – the first ten months of 2005 - China’s market share surged 
from 3.3 to 8 percent for the top 10 AGOA-exported products, and to an even 
greater extent for the top three AGOA-exported products. 
 
Table 2.7: AGOA versus China; Top 5 AGOA clothing exports to US, 2005 
versus 2004 
Item AGOA exports 
2005 ($) 
Value change 
(%) 
 05/04 
Unit price 
change (%) 
 05/04 
AGOA market share 
(%) 
 
 
China market 
share (%) 
  AGOA China AGOA China 2001 2004 2005 2004 2005
Total 1,460,600,000 -17 58   1.6 3 2 16 23 
1 162,100,000 -21.4 215.3 -6.5 -57.5 4.34 5.4 4.0 1.8 5.5 
2 113,600,000 -22.7 82.5 -10.2 -67.7 3.61 6.7 4.7 2.3 3.8 
3 116,700,000 -18.1 231.3 4.7 -53.5 2.27 6.1 4.5 4.3 13.0 
4 98,200,000 17.3 138.2 -8.5 -45.1 2.97 5.2 5.5 1.7 3.5 
5 74,400,000 -1.2 442.0 -3.4 -34.1 3.53 4.2 3.6 1.5 7.1 
Avg  
Top 
10* 
76,400,000 -14.7 161.1 -0.9 -45.9 3.4 
 
5.3 4.3 3.3 8.0
item  
1 Women's Or Girls' Other Pullovers, And Similar Garments, Of Cotton, Knitted Or Crocheted, Containing 
Less Than 36 Percent By Weight Of Flax Fibers 
2 Men's Or Boys' Other Pullovers, And Similar Garments, Of Cotton, Knitted Or Crocheted, Containing 
Less Than 36 Percent By Weight Of Flax Fibers 
3 Women's Trousers And Breeches, Of Cotton, Not Knitted, Other 
4 Men's Trousers And Breeches, Not Knitted, Of Cotton, Blue Denim 
5 Women's Trousers And Breeches, Of Cotton, Not Knitted, Blue Denim 
*weighted average 
Source: Calculated from http://dataweb.usitc.gov data, accessed on 10th January 
2006 
 
Lesotho and China (Table 2.8) 
 
The performance of Lesotho’s overall exports to the US mirrored that of AGOA 
very closely – a fall in value of 14 percent with a rise in China’s exports of 112 
percent. The overall value of Lesotho’s top-ten AGOA exports decreased by 
more than seven percent in the year after quota removal, whereas China 
increased its value by 151 percent in the same products. The gains made in the 
top five products reflect the exports of denim jeans incorporating material from 
the denim mill completed in 2004. Lesotho’s Unit prices fell by around three 
percent post quota removal (China’s unit export prices for the same products 
almost halved in value), and market share fell in all products except denim. Post 
quota- removal China’s market share rose in all of the major products exported 
by Lesotho to the US, including in the denim categories. 
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Table 2.8: Lesotho versus China; Top 5 AGOA clothing exports to US, 2005 
versus 2004 
Item Lesotho 
exports  
2005 ($) 
Value change 
(%) 
 05/04 
Unit price change 
(%) 
 05/04 
Lesotho market share 
(%) 
 
China market 
share (%) 
  Lesotho Chin
a 
Lesotho China 2001 2004 2005 2004 2005 
Total 390,600,000 -14  112   0.53 1.0 0.8 8 16 
1 59,300,000 -9.3 215.3 -9.2 -57.5 1.42 1.7 1.5 1.8 5.5 
2 43,900,000 -16.7 82.5 -12.8 -67.7 0.95 2.4 1.8 2.3 3.8 
3 39,300,000 36.1 138.2 -8.5 -45.1 1.58 1.8 2.2 1.7 3.5 
4 30,800,000 34.0 534.7 -4.6 -52.8 2.76 6.9 8.2 0.7 4.0 
5 12,000,000 -41.0 442.0 -9.9 -34.1 1.39 1.1 0.6 1.5 7.1 
Avg  Top 
10* 
24,500,000 -7.4 151.6 -3.2 -46.2 1.2 
 
1.8 1.5 3.2 7.7 
item  
1 Women's Or Girls' Other Pullovers, And Similar Garments, Of Cotton, Knitted Or Crocheted, Containing Less Than 36 
Percent By Weight Of Flax Fibers 
2 Men's Or Boys' Other Pullovers, And Similar Garments, Of Cotton, Knitted Or Crocheted, Containing Less Than 36 
Percent By Weight Of Flax Fibers 
3 Men's Trousers And Breeches, Not Knitted, Of Cotton, Blue Denim 
4 Boys' Trousers And Breeches, Not Knitted, Of Cotton, Not Imported As Parts Of Playsuits, Blue Denim 
5 Women's Trousers And Breeches, Of Cotton, Not Knitted, Blue Denim 
*weighted average 
Source: Calculated from http://dataweb.usitc.gov data, accessed on 10th January 
2006 
 
The decline in the labour-intensive knitwear products was reflected in 
employment patterns, and Lesotho saw a very dramatic decline in the number of 
firms and in employment in the clothing sector in the year between July 2004 and 
July 2005, spanning the removal of MFA-quotas (Table 2.9). Whilst the 
commissioning of the denim mill did much to sustain export values, it is a very 
capital-intensive plant (employing 9000 people at the outset, and 750 in early 
2006, an investment cost of $100m) and resulted in only a small increase in total 
employment in woven products subsector. It produces 2m metres of cloth per 
month, somewhere below the requirement in 2002 of 2.5m.mpm. The investor - 
Nien Hsing from Taiwan - is the world’s largest jeans manufacturer. A second 
Taiwanese jeans producer in Lesotho (CGM) purchased a Taiwanese-owned 
denim plant in South Africa in 2002, producing 500 mpm. Thus, it is likely that 
Lesotho will be able to source almost all its current denim cloth requirements 
from AGOA countries, and hence to be able to meet the AGOA rules of origin 
even after the local content derogation has expired in September 2007 
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Table 2.9: Firm population and employment in Lesotho’s textile and clothing 
sector, 2004-5 
 
 Knitwear Woven 
products 
Fabrics, Yarn, Embroidery, 
screen-printing, packaging 
Number of firms: 
  July 2004 
  July 2005 
 
38 
29 
 
6 
6 
 
NA 
6 
Employment 
  July 2004 
  July 2005 
 
50,217 
35,678 
  
NA 
1,171 
  
Source; Interviews and personal communication Mark Bennett  
 
Swaziland and China (Table 2.10) 
 
In the year after quota removal, Swaziland’s total clothing and textile exports 
declined by ten percent. The largest impacts were felt in the same pullover 
subsector (its largest export item) where all AGOA exporters suffered from 
competition from China. Chinese exports increased at a higher rate (128 
percent). In aggregate, Swazi producers reduced the unit prices of their exports 
marginally (2.7 percent), unlike China, whose exports of similar products more 
than halved in price. In some products, price pressures were keenly felt.7  Whilst 
Swaziland’s market share in the US fell back between 2004 and 2005 (from 0.4 
to 0.3 percent), that of China in the same product categories almost doubled, 
from 9 to 17 percent between 2004 and 2005.  
 
Despite this largely stable export performance, the number of firms operating in 
the Swazi clothing halved between 2004 and 2005 (many of the Chinese 
extension owned firms leaving), and employment, having risen from 3,000 in 
2001 to 32,000 in 2004, collapsed to only 14,000 in 2005 (Table 2.11). This 
implies either a significant increase in productivity in the Swazi clothing sector, or 
the transition to higher value added products or (as claimed by a authoritative 
source) significant trans-shipment of the Chinese produced clothing from those 
who relocated back to China claiming AGOA export benefits. 
 
                                            
7  A Swaziland producer won an order for $21 per dozen woven trousers (chinos) in 2004. In 
2005 the same US buyer placed a new order for the same specifications to a China 
producer at $9.50 per dozen. Both manufacturers quoted a price using the same fabric. 
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Table 2.10: Swaziland versus China; Top 5 AGOA clothing exports to US, 
2005 versus  2004 
Item Swaziland 
exports  
2005 ($) 
Value change (%) 
 05/04 
Unit price 
change (%) 
 05/04 
Swaziland market 
share (%) 
 
China market 
share (%) 
  Swazi  China Swazi China 2001 2004 2005 2004 2005 
Total 160,800,000 - 10 91   0.12 0.4 0.3 9 17 
1 16,900,000 -46.3 215.3 -5.5 -57.5 0.49 0.8 0.4 1.8 5.5 
2 13,700,000 10.9 231.3 -2.5 -53.5 0.03 0.5 0.5 4.3 13.0 
3 10,600,000 8.8 48.3 -13.7 -36.0 0.00 1.1 1.2 8.4 12.7 
4 13,200,000 52.5 57.7 15.1 -31.6 0.11 0.5 0.9 9.6 16.9 
5 11,300,000 58.4 97.4 0.2 -41.5 0.02 1.0 1.7 3.5 7.3 
Avg  
Top 
10* 
8,900,000 -5.8 
 
127.6 -2.7 -51.9 0.2 
 
0.7 0.6 3.6 7.8 
item  
1 Women's Or Girls' Other Pullovers, And Similar Garments, Of Cotton, Knitted Or Crocheted, Containing Less 
Than 36 Percent By Weight Of Flax Fibers 
2 Women's Trousers And Breeches, Of Cotton, Not Knitted, Other 
3 Women's Trousers And Breeches, Of Synthetic Fibers, Not Knitted 
4 Women's Or Girls' Other Pullovers, And Similar Articles, Of Man-Made Fibers, Knitted Or Crocheted, Containing 
Less Than 30 Percent By Weight Of Silk 
5 Men's Or Boys' Other Pullovers, And Similar Articles, Of Man-Made Fibers, Knitted Or Crocheted, Containing 
Less Than 30 Percent By Weight Of Silk 
*weighted average 
Source: Calculated from http://dataweb.usitc.gov data, accessed on 10th 
January 2006 
 
 
Table 2.11: Firm population and employment in Swaziland’s textile and clothing 
sector, 2004-5 
 
 2001 2004 2005 
Number of firms 3 32 16 
Employment 3,000 32,000 14,000 
 
Source: Company interviews in Swaziland 
 
Kenya and China (Table 2.12) 
 
Kenya’s aggregate AGOA clothing and textile exports fell relatively little in 2005, 
by only 2.5 percent. Unlike the other AGOA economies, the aggregate performed 
better than the top 10 products, where overall export value of the 10 major 
products fell by 9 percent in 2005. Kenya’s exports of women’s trousers rose 
sharply, whereas those of men’s products fell. By contrast, China’s exports to the 
US of these top-10 products rocketed by 270  percent, on the back of a near-
halving of unit export prices. Kenya’s unit export prices also fell, by 9.3 percent. 
In the face of this export performance, its market share in its top 10 products fell 
back 1.5 to 1.3 percent between 2004 and 2005, and China’s grew rapidly, from 
2.5 to 8.8 percent in the same period. 
 
Employment fell in the export oriented firms in Kenya’s EPZs, as the number of 
firms declined from 30 in 2004, to 25 in June 2005 (Table 2.13). The decline in 
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employment, whilst severe (from a peak of 36,348 in 2003 to 31,745 in June 
2005), was much less than the predicted loss of 25,000 jobs (East African 
Standard, cited in Manchester Trade Team, 2005. 
 
 
Table 2.12: Kenya versus China; Top 5 AGOA clothing exports to US, 2005 
versus 2004 
Item Kenya exports  
2005 ($) 
Value change 
(%) 
 05/04 
Unit price 
change (%) 
 05/04 
Kenya market share 
(%) 
 
China market 
share (%) 
 
  Kenya  China Kenya China 2001 2004 2005 2004 2005 
Total 270,300,000 - 2.5 77   0.14 0.54 0.49 12 19 
1 60,500,000 8.3 231.3 15.7 -53.5 0.35 2.4 2.4 4.3 13.0 
2 33,400,000 24.8 442.0 2.9 -34.1 1.07 1.5 1.6 1.5 7.1 
3 12,700,000 -46.2 114.8 -6.6 -38.6 0.19 1.5 0.8 3.5 7.7 
4 5,700,000 -64.9 548.7 1.1 -40.0 0.94 2.3 0.8 2.3 14.7 
5 9,800,000 -20.6 1123.4 -12.4 -48.8 1.10 4.4 3.5 1.1 14.2 
Avg  
Top 
10* 
15,900,000 
 
-9.3 269.6 -1.9 -44.8 0.5 
 
1.5 1.3 2.5 8.8 
item  
1 Women's Trousers And Breeches, Of Cotton, Not Knitted, Other 
2 Women's Trousers And Breeches, Of Cotton, Not Knitted, Blue Denim 
3 Men's Trousers And Breeches, Not Knitted, Of Cotton, Other 
4 Men's Shorts, Not Knitted, Of Cotton 
5 Girls' Trousers And Breeches, Of Cotton, Not Knitted, Other, Other 
*weighted average 
Source: Calculated from http://dataweb.usitc.gov data, accessed on 10th January 
2006 
 
Table 2.13 Firm population and employment in Kenya’s textile and clothing 
sector, 2002-5 
 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 (June) 
Number of firms 30 35 30 25 
Employment 25,288 36,348 34,614 31,745 
 
Source: Export Promotion Council 
 
Madagascar and China (Table 2.14) 
 
Madagascar experienced a decline of 14 percent in its total exports, and more 
than 16 percent in the exports of its top-10 products to the US in 2005. As in the 
case of other AGOA countries, China’s exports to the US grew very rapidly in this 
period (by 226 percent for Madagascar’s top-10 exports) on the back of a near-
halving of unit export prices. Whilst Madagascar’s market share fell in 2005, that 
of China rose from thirteen to twenty two percent in the relevant product 
groupings. Significantly, Kenya and Madagascar compete in the same product 
grouping (women’s trousers), but whilst Madagascar’s exports fell in this product 
grouping, those of Kenya grew. This reflects the differing strategic decisions of 
TNC investors in the two economies. (However, we have no detailed knowledge 
of whether sourcing was directly switched from Madagascar to Kenya for these 
products). 
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Table 2.14: Madagascar versus China; Top 5 AGOA clothing exports to US, 
2005 versus 2004 
Item Madagascar 
exports  
2005 ($) 
Value change (%) 
 05/04 
Unit price change 
(%) 
 05/04 
Madagascar market 
share (%) 
 
 
China market 
share (%) 
 
  Madagascar China Madagascar China 2001 2004 2005 2004 2005 
Total 276,900,000 - 14 76   0.36 0.57 0.46 13 21 
1 33,000,000 -24.6 231.3 -3.1 -53.5 0.34 1.9 1.3 4.3 13.0
2 31,200,000 -13.1 82.5 -8.9 -67.7 0.69 1.6 1.3 2.3 3.8
3 28,300,000 -8.0 215.3 1.7 -57.5 0.64 0.8 0.7 1.8 5.5
4 22,400,000 51.4 138.2 -2.0 -45.1 0.39 0.9 1.2 1.7 3.5
5 7,400,000 -45.9 548.7 -0.1 -40.0 0.79 2.0 1.1 2.3 14.7
Avg  
Top 
10* 
15,300,000 -16.4 226.8 -9.5 -44.0 0.5 
 
1.4 1.0 2.9 8.8
item  
1 Women's Trousers And Breeches, Of Cotton, Not Knitted, Other 
2 Men's Or Boys' Other Pullovers, And Similar Garments, Of Cotton, Knitted Or Crocheted, Containing 
Less Than 36 Percent By Weight Of Flax Fibers 
3 Women's Or Girls' Other Pullovers, And Similar Garments, Of Cotton, Knitted Or Crocheted, 
Containing Less Than 36 Percent By Weight Of Flax Fibers 
4 Men's Trousers And Breeches, Not Knitted, Of Cotton, Blue Denim 
5 Men's Shorts, Not Knitted, Of Cotton 
*weighted average 
Source: Calculated from http://dataweb.usitc.gov data, accessed on 10th January 
2006 
 
South Africa and China (Table 2.15) 
 
South Africa suffered very badly after the removal of quotas, experiencing a fall of 
34 percent in 2005. In the same period, China’s exports in the same product 
categories rose by 65 percent – a “less stellar” performance when compared to 
China’s performance in the major products exported by Lesotho and all-AGO, but 
nevertheless substantial. As for the other AGOA countries South Africa’s unit 
export prices were largely stable (and indeed rose slightly by three percent), as 
China’s fell by one-third. Its share of the US market, having decreased slightly 
between 2001 and 2004 (unlike the other AGOA economies, South African firms 
were unable to use extra-AGOA fabrics) halved after the elimination of MFA 
quotas. South Africa is also the one country where there are substantial direct 
effects of Chinese competition, with significant Chinese penetration from imports 
of its substantial domestic market. 
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Table 2.15: SA versus China; Top 5 AGOA clothing exports to US, 2005 
versus 2004 
Item S Africa 
exports  2005 
($) 
Value change 
(%) 
 05/04 
Unit price 
change (%) 
 05/04 
S Africa market share 
(%) 
 
China market 
share (%) 
 
  SA China SA China 2001 2004 2005 2004 2005 
Total 92,400,000 - 45 65   0.37 0.25 0.13 13 21 
1 22,100,000 0.1 82.5 -7.3 -67.7 1.3 1.0 0.9 2.3 3.8 
2 6,000,000 -70.3 138.2 -14.1 -45.1 0.3 1.3 0.3 1.7 3.5 
3 2,900,000 -66.9 215.3 13.1 -57.5 1.2 0.2 0.1 1.8 5.5 
4 1,000,000 -86.8 114.8 9.5 -38.6 0.4 0.5 0.1 3.5 7.7 
5 2,100,000 -73.2 48.3 8.7 -36.0 0.1 0.9 0.2 8.4 12.7 
Avg  
Top 
10* 
4,800,000 
 
-50.3 166.2 3.0 -33.0 0.7 0.7 0.3 3.0 7.5 
item  
1 Men's Or Boys' Other Pullovers, And Similar Garments, Of Cotton, Knitted Or Crocheted, Containing Less Than 
36 Percent By Weight Of Flax Fibers 
2 Men's Trousers And Breeches, Not Knitted, Of Cotton, Blue Denim 
3 Women's Or Girls' Other Pullovers, And Similar Garments, Of Cotton, Knitted Or Crocheted, Containing Less 
Than 36 Percent By Weight Of Flax Fibers 
4 Women's Trousers And Breeches, Of Synthetic Fibers, Not Knitted 
5 Men's Trousers And Breeches, Not Knitted, Of Cotton, Other 
*weighted average 
Source: Calculated from http://dataweb.usitc.gov data, accessed on 10th January 
2006 
 
 
The employment impact of this fall in exports to the US (and EU) markets has led 
to a substantial loss of employment in South Africa’s formal and informal sector 
clothing industries (Table 2.16). By contrast, in the larger scale and more capital 
intensive textiles sector where some firms have proved to be innovators in 
industrial textiles, employment has fallen less significantly. 
 
Table 2.16: Firm population and employment in South Africa’s textile and clothing 
sector, 2002-5 
 
 Clothing  Textiles 
 Formal 
sector 
Formal and 
informal sector 
Formal and 
informal sector 
Number of firms: 
  July 2004 
  July 2005 
 
1,175 
1,170 
 
2,200 
NA 
 
310 
300 
Employment 
  July 2004 
  July 2005 
 
98,000 
86,000 
 
240,000 
200,000 
 
61,500 
61,000 
 Source: Industry and Government interviews 
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2. 3. SSA IN THE POST QUOTA ERA IN FIVE KEY EXPORTING 
ECONOMIES; WHAT’S HAPPENING ON THE GROUND? 
 
Method 
 
Section 2 above provided a bird’s-eye view of developments in AGOA exports to 
the US, by all AGOA economies and for five individual economies. It was based 
largely on an analysis of secondary data. The broad conclusion was that although 
there has been considerable pricing pressure and employment loss, and although 
some sectors (knitwear) and some economies (South Africa and Lesotho) were 
hit worse than others, SSA AGOA exports were surprisingly resilient. This 
outcome, at least in the 12 months in 2005, runs against some of the bolder 
predictions of the post-quota future of SSA’s clothing and textile sector (Annex 1).  
 
What explains this resilience, and what policy-implications flow from it? These 
dynamics can only be understood by more detailed empirical enquiry. In order to 
explore these issues we undertook two types of investigation. Although a 
seemingly obvious beginning point is to understand what buyers want from their 
suppliers, this exercise has seldom been undertaken. There are multiple buyers 
in this chain, as can be seen from Figure 2.4. The train is triggered by the final 
retailers in the US who, often using in-house design offices, will define the 
product lines and price points which they require for the coming season. In a very 
limited number of cases retailers and brand-sellers (such as Gap Inc.) will make 
direct contact with manufacturers. But in most cases they will pass over their 
requirements to US-based sourcing agents. These sourcing agents, in turn, will 
either contact sourcing agents in producing countries, or more commonly and 
especially when there are very large orders, will make contact with predominantly 
Asian-based manufacturing companies (the “triangular manufactures”). (In recent 
years the emergence of small SSA-based triangular producers can be observed). 
It is these manufacturing houses who will ultimately decide where different 
products are to be sourced from, and most often will provide clothing 
manufacturers not just with the designs, but also the fabrics which they will use. 
However, in most cases the US principals and sourcing agents will be aware of 
the source of these garments and will influence the decision made by their Asian 
intermediary buyers and manufacturing houses 
 
Our interviews were exclusively with the US-based retail and sourcing agents, 
shaded grey in Figure 2.4. Our reasons for this decision were based on the 
premise that SSA clothing exports were overwhelmingly destined for the US final 
market (Table 2.5 above), and we assumed that it was here that the key sourcing 
decisions were to be made.  
 
The views and perspectives of 20 U.S. buyers were obtained by Nathan 
Associates Inc. in a telephone survey undertaken in the summer of 2005. These 
companies are large, multi-store operations with substantive global sourcing 
activities in clothing and other consumer goods. The participants came from four 
key market segments: branded specialty retail (nine responses), manufacturers 
(branded and private label eight responses), department stores (two responses), 
and mass merchants (one response). The share of their total sourcing portfolio 
which comes from SSA ranges from one to five percent with the exception of one 
small company (turnover of $30m in 2004) which obtained 30 percent of its 
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product from SSA. The structure of this sample of buyers is shown in Table 2.17 
below. 7 
Table 2.17: Sample size of U.S. buyers 
Size (turnover) in 2004 No. of firms
Under $50 million 1 
$100 to $250 million 3 
$300 to $500 million 4 
$500 million to $ 1billion 2 
More than $1 billion 8 
Turnover not available 2 
Total sample 20 
Source: Nathan Associates Inc., 2005 
 
Figure 2.4: Triangular manufacturing and SSA clothing exports to the USAa 
 
a Dotted lines represent weak linkages; Interviews conducted with buyers in 
shaded-boxes. These represent “ideal types” – for example, The Gap has 
strong direct links with manufactures. 
US-based principles – 
brands, agents, retail 
chains 
US-based sourcing 
agents 
Asia based 
sourcing agents 
Asia-based 
manufacturing 
head offices 
Asia based 
material and trim 
suppliers 
African garment manufacturers 
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What do buyers think? 
 
The first set of questions we asked buyers was whether quota-removal was likely 
to lead them to retreat from SSA, and whether this differed between the short-
term (the coming one-to-two years) and the medium-term (the coming three-to-
five years). A key response (Table 2.18) was that 16 of the 19 respondents said 
that they were largely sourcing from SSA in order to compete on price. Their 
inability to access product from quota-constrained economies such as China had 
not been the major reason why they were importing from SSA.8 Second, and as a 
consequence of SSA’s current price competitiveness, around half of the buyers 
thought that there would be no change over the coming two years, and four of 
them said that, if anything, they were likely to increase purchases from SSA. 
However, there is clearly an expectation that SSA will suffer from diminishing 
competitiveness, since when asked about intentions over the medium-term, 
almost half of the buyers (nine of the 19) thought that they were likely to decrease 
imports from SSA over the three-to-five year time horizon. 
 
Table 2.18: How important have MFA quotas been in your decision to source 
from SSA? (Number of buyers) 
 
 Decrease Unchanged Increase Total 
“How are you likely to change SSA 
sourcing as a result of quota 
elimination?” 
3 16 0 19 
“What are your plans to source 
from SSA in the next 1-2 years?” 
4 11 4 19 
“What are your plans to source 
from SSA in the next 3-5 years?” 
9 8 2 19 
 
If quotas were not a major reason why buyers currently source from SSA, then 
how important are AGOA preferences to SSA’s competitiveness? The response 
(Figure 2.5) was that this was obviously critical, with more than half of the buyers 
(10 out of 19) reporting that it was “very important”. However, even more 
important was the view that it was the derogation on the rules of origin allowing 
AGOA economies to source fabrics from Asia which made it possible for these 
economies to compete (15 of the 19 buyers characterised this as being “very 
important”). Again, reflecting the fact that quotas have not been the basis for 
sourcing from SSA in recent years, few of the buyers thought that existing or 
likely future “China safeguards” would make much difference.9 A majority of 
buyers also thought that consumer pressures on Corporate Social Responsibility 
                                            
8  Although this is the current perception of US buyers, it is undoubtedly the case that the 
origins of the export-oriented clothing and textile sector in SSA are to be found in its 
availability of quotas at a time in which Asian economies had filled their quotas in 
exporting to major markets.  
9  The Chinese accession agreement to the WTO, allows for safeguard tariffs and quotas to 
be applied solely against Chinese textiles and clothing, even when imports exert only a 
slight adverse impact on the domestic industry. In June 2005, the EU and China reached 
an agreement that limited 10 categories of Chinese textiles exports to the EU to between 
8 and 12.5 percent growth above a specified base period for the next three years.  In 
December 2005, the US and Chinese trade representatives agreed to a three-year 
agreement reducing US. imports of Chinese textile and apparel products in all or parts of 
34 sensitive categories. 
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(CSR) were a significant factor in sourcing from SSA, reflecting the growing 
commercial need of buyers to show awareness of the poverty-impact of their 
sourcing decisions. 
 
Figure 2.5: Buyer perceptions of the relative importance of AGOA preferences, 
China safeguards and corporate social responsibility in the decision to source 
from SSA (1=not important; 5= very important) 
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Given the decision to source from SSA, buyers may be affected by factors which 
are specific to the country, and those which are specific to the supplying firm. 
Figures 2.6 and 2.7 report the views of buyers on country-specific factors, and 
compares their ratings of AGOA countries in general with China and India. China 
has a clear advantage across the board, particularly with respect to access to 
materials (either domestically or from the region), transit time and the capabilities 
of its labour force. The only country-specific area in which SSA is not 
disadvantaged is in regard to corporate social responsibility (CSR), but even here 
it only compares with, rather than exceeds, standards available in China and 
India. In general, with the exception of labour standards and CSR, China’s 
competitive standing far exceeds that of India and SSA, once again pointing to 
the importance of AGOA tariff preferences in the decision to source from SSA. 
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Figure 2.6: The importance of country-specific factors in the sourcing decisions of 
US buyers 
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Figure 2.7: The importance of country-specific factors in the sourcing decisions of 
US buyers 
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Figures 2.8 and 2.9 report the firm-specific concerns which lead buyers to choose 
particular suppliers, and again compares the general capabilities of firms in 
China, India and SSA. Here, once again, Chinese firms stand out as competitive 
producers, and SSA lags India as well. The relative weakness of SSA producers 
is most pronounced with regard to delivery and lead-time (partly a function of 
internal procedures), technology and product development capabilities. Some US 
branded buyers complain that Lesotho jeans manufactures have not kept up with 
changes in fashion and in wet and dry finishing technologies However, SSA 
producers perform less badly with respect to manufacturing costs (reflecting in 
part access to tariff preferences) and labour relations. 
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Figure 2.8: The importance of firm-specific factors in the sourcing decisions of US 
buyers 
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Figure 2.9: The importance of firm-specific factors in the sourcing decisions of US 
buyers 
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There is one very important caveat for the views expressed by these US buyers 
which emerged in our interviews with AGOA manufacturers (see below). Whilst 
these US principals clearly had views about the impact of quotas, trade 
preferences and country and firm-specific factors in sourcing from SSA, China 
and India, in most cases they did not make the key sourcing decisions. These 
were in fact made by the Asian trading houses and the Asia-based manufacturing 
houses described in the discussion of Figure 2.4 above. We return to the 
significance of this sourcing process later in the Report. 
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What do producers think? 
 
The second set of empirical investigations which we undertook was to visit 
enterprises, governments and key industry informants in the producing countries. 
Field research was conducted in Kenya, Lesotho, South Africa and Swaziland 
between September and November 2005 and March 2005 in Madagascar. In 
total, 51 interviews were undertaken with manufacturers, local government 
officials and key industry informants (Table 2.19), and with the exception of South 
Africa, the sample of firms’ accounts for at least 15 percent of total sectoral 
employment (Table 2.20).  
 
Table 2.19: Breakdown of interviews from the Sub-Saharan Africa apparel 
industry 
No. of interviews 
 
Kenya Lesoth
o 
South 
Africa 
Swazilan
d 
Madagascar
Clothing 
manufacturers 
6 4 4 4 21 
Textile 
manufacturers 
  2   
Government officials 4 1 2   
Industry experts  1 2   
 
Table 2.20: Sample and industry size: a claim for representation 
 Kenya Lesotho S. Africa Swaziland Madagascar 
Number of clothing firms:      
  Sample  6 4 4 4 21 
  Total industry  29 33 1,170 16 118 
Industry workforce:      
  Sample  5,000 15,900 2,400 2,600 36,780 
  Total industry  32,00 35,678 86,00 16,000 100-120,000 
 
By design, this was a pilot study. Although we had a reasonably accurate sample 
of the population of the key categories of US-based buyers and SSA-based 
manufacturers, the interviews were short and were largely questionnaire-based, 
with little scope for a more detailed understanding of institutional and structural 
dynamics or of the determinants of firm performance. 
 
One of the more surprising outcomes of these plant level visits was the unrealistic 
pessimism of the firms, at least insofar as this is reflected in responses from 
enterprises in Kenya, Lesotho, Swaziland and South Africa. As Figure 2.10 
shows, the US buyers have much more positive intentions of staying in the region 
than the firms perceive. Fully 80 percent of them expect either to have 
unchanged purchasing requirements or increased requirements from SSA over 
the coming 1-2 years, and almost half believe that this will be the case even over 
the 3-5 year time horizon. By contrast, producers in all countries (and especially 
Lesotho) think it much more likely that sourcing requirements will deteriorate. 
This pessimism reflects their unwillingness to invest in training and thus has 
unfortunate negative consequences. 
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Figure 2.10: Producer perceptions of future sourcing from SSA 
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There was much closer awareness amongst the producers of the extent to which 
trade preferences influenced the sourcing decisions of buyers, although here the 
South African producers (who have no access to cheap Asian fabrics) were not 
quite as perceptive at those from the smaller economies (Figure 2.11). The 
exception here was in regard to China safeguards where the producers are 
probably guilty of clutching at straws. That is, the US buyers were less likely to 
rate China safeguards as being as significant as the producers. This is because 
their decisions to source from SSA in the past have been driven more by cost 
(the benefits of duty free access) and CSR concerns than by the quota-
determined inability of the Chinese to serve the US market prior to January 2005. 
 
Figure 2.11 The importance of trade and corporate factors 
(1= not important; 5=very important) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Company interviews 
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Figures 2.12 and 2.13 show differing perceptions amongst buyers and producers 
of the importance of country-specific factors in the sourcing decisions of the 
buyers. As a general rule, buyers tended to rate these as being more important 
than do producers, with the exception of government incentives. This exception is 
perhaps not surprising, given the understandable expectation of the producers 
that somehow government might be persuaded in the future to introduce 
incentives which might save them from bankruptcy. The biggest gap in 
understanding arises in relation to the significance of the derogation on access to 
third-country fibres. This is clearly the key requirement of buyers – an issue which 
we will return to in the conclusions of this Report – and it is somewhat surprising 
that producers are not adequately aware of its significance 
 
Figure 2.12. Importance of national condition factors 
(1= not important; 5=very important) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Company interviews 
Figure 2.13. Importance of physical infrastructure and human capital 
(1= not important; 5=very important) 
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We also asked producers to assess the importance to buyers of firm-specific 
competitive attributes, namely with respect to costs, quality, delivery time, 
flexibility, technology, product development capabilities, product range and labour 
relations (Figure 2.14). In general producers in Lesotho, Swaziland, South Africa 
and Kenya were well-attuned to these firm-specific critical success factors of the 
US buyers, although within this, the gap was greatest for the Swazi firms. When 
we asked the US buyers to rank the performance of firms in SSA when compared 
to Chinese and Indian counterparts, the outcome was more concerning. Chinese 
firm capabilities were clearly seen to be more developed, in every respect, 
followed by Indian suppliers and the, some way behind, by SSA suppliers. The 
performance gap was smallest for labour relations, and greatest for delivery time 
and flexibility, product development capabilities, technology levels and quality. 
With the exception of delivery time, these are all areas where SSA firms can 
improve and this is an issue which we address in the policy conclusions below. 
 
Figure 2.14 The performance of SSA, China and India clothing firms on 
operational factors 
(1=very poor performance; 5=excellent performance) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Company interviews 
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2. 4. CAN AN EXPORT-ORIENTED SSA CLOTHING AND TEXTILE INDUSTRY 
SURVIVE? 
 
As we have seen, contrary to the expectations of many, the removal of quotas 
has not led to a collapse of AGOA clothing and textile exports. Indeed, in some 
cases, they have even increased.  
 
It is widely believed that by limiting China’s export surge, the introduction of 
China safeguards in the US (and in the EU) midway through 2005 for three years 
may lead to a further strengthening of SSA clothing and textile exports. However, 
the impact of the imposition of China safeguards is generally misinterpreted. 
Although designed to “protect domestic industry” from Chinese competition, it is 
not only China whose exports were kept out of major importing markets by 
quotas. Other low-cost and high-quality Asian producers are similarly able to 
compete effectively in the major markets (see Annex 2 for detailed data on India 
and other Asian competitors), and they, rather than SSA or domestic industries in 
the US and the EU, are likely to be the primary beneficiaries of China safeguards. 
 
Tariff preferences are key …10 
 
Although, historically, quotas were important in the establishment of the export-
oriented clothing and textiles sector in SSA, the key to understanding the 
relatively robust performance of SSA AGOA exporters lies in the realm of costs. 
This, as we have seen from earlier analysis, is the single most important driver 
for the buyers. Within this, the degree of competitive advantage held by AGOA 
exporters arises from their duty preferences. And, here, US nominal tariffs 
significantly underestimate the degree of preference which AGOA producers are 
actually accorded. This can be seen by taking the example of two different 
products exported by Swaziland producers (Table 2.21). The first product is 
cotton denim jeans, where nominal duty preference is 16.6 percent, and the 
second is synthetic women’s underwear, where the nominal duty preference is 
higher, at 28.2 percent.  
 
These tariffs effectively translate into effective rates of subsidy for exporting firms. 
The rates of effective subsidy on these products are in fact much higher than 
these nominal rates, due to the derogation which Swaziland (and all other AGOA 
producers bar Mauritius, outside of a short period in 2004-5, and South Africa) 
producers have in using imported fabrics. That is, the nominal duty applies to the 
whole value of the product, but for AGOA producers using the fabrics derogation, 
much of the value of their output is made up of imported material. Moreover, not 
only do the synthetic products’ manufacturers gain from higher duties, but 
because in general cotton products are more complex to manufacture, the 
proportion of (generally imported) cotton fabric is in fact lower than in the case of 
imported synthetic material products. Hence, in the case of cotton products (such 
as denim), the effective rate of subsidy provided by this protective regime is 27.7 
percent (rather than 16.6 percent), and in the case of synthetic products (such as 
underwear) it is 83.9 percent (rather than 28.2 percent) 
                                            
10  In this Report we are only addressing tariff preferences into the US, since this is the major 
current export market for SSA industry. However, EU Roles of Origin are even more 
problematic for SSA producers, and explain why almost all exports currently go to the US. 
Thus an analysis of EU Rules of Origin is important, but is outside of the purview of this 
report. 
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Table 2.21: Value added and effective rates of subsidy in cotton denim jeans and 
synthetic women’s undergarments in two Swaziland clothing factories 
 
 DENIM JEANS SYNTHETIC 
WOMEN’S 
UNDERGARMENTS
Labour costs 45% 30% 
Fabric and other imported inputs 40% 66% 
Utilities 3% 1% 
Distribution 2% 2% 
Other (agent fee, transport, etc )  10% 1% 
Total 100% 100% 
Duty preference 16.6% 28.2% 
Effective rate of subsidy 27.7 83.9 
 
Source: Company interviews 
 
An indication of the influence of the higher rate of effective subsidy on AGOA 
clothing and textile exports can be seen in relation to the value of exports of 
different products. There is a significant positive correlation between tariff rates 
and the value of exports with regard to the export of 120 products (the top 20 
products exported by each of the five countries plus the top-five AGOA exported 
products) (Table 2.22). In other words, the higher the tariff preferences, the more 
likely export values will rise. However, this may only confer a temporary 
advantage. These same sectors are being targeted by Chinese and other Asian 
producers. This is evidenced by a significant negative correlation between tariff 
preference levels and unit prices. In other words, it is precisely those highly 
protected sectors which are under the most severe forms of price pressure, and 
where falling market shares are most likely to be experienced by AGOA 
exporters. 
 
Table 2.22: Correlations between the degree of tariff preference, the value of 
exports, the unit price of exports and market shares in the US: 120 sectorsa 
 
 Correlation coefficient Degree of significanceb 
Value of exports 0.189 0.05 
Unit price -0.146 0.10 
Market share 0.290 0.01 
 
a top 20 products for each of AGOA, Lesotho, South Africa, Swaziland and 
Madagascar.  
b   Pearson product moment correlation coefficient two tailed test 
 
The fabric derogation is critical… 
 
Without the derogation on the AGOA Rules of Entry which allow least developed 
qualifying SSA economies to import their fabrics from outside of the region (or the 
US), little of the clothing and textile industries in the region would survive. As can 
be seen from Figure 2.15, with the exception of South Africa (which also affects 
the AGOA total), almost all fabric in AGOA clothing exports has been imported 
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(although the new denim mill opened in Lesotho in 2004 will reduce this 
somewhat in the future). South Africa’s experience represents the dark side of 
AGOA clothing producers’ future when and if the fabric derogation is repealed. Its 
inability to import fabrics, on top of an appreciated exchange rate, lies at the 
source at the source of the halving of its AGOA exports in the first ten months of 
2005 (compared to the same period in 2004). In fact the trajectory of the South 
African industry – severe difficulties in exporting clothing made from natural 
fibres, a focus on the domestic market and moving into high technology textile 
niches (see below) – may represent one option facing other SSA producers. But 
unlike South Africa with its long tradition of industrial production and a developed 
textile sector, these options may not be possible for other SSA producers. 
 
Figure 2.15: Share of non-AGOA and non-US cloth in AGOA exports to US, 
2004-2005. 
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Source: Calculated from US Department of Commerce, Office of Textiles and 
Apparel (OTEXA). 
 
Most of the firms operating in the region source their material inputs from East 
Asia in general, and predominantly from China. (However, as Table 2.23 shows, 
Lesotho’s long links with Taiwanese investors means than in its case, fabrics are 
largely sourced from Taiwan rather than China). This is an ironical side effect of 
the derogation on the rules of entry, in that given the importance of fabrics in 
production costs (especially in the case of synthetics), the primary beneficiary of 
the AGOA scheme are the Asian fabric suppliers! 
 
Table 2.23: fabric suppliers for Lesotho clothing firms 
 2005 2004 2003
China 10% 15% 5% 
Taiwan 90% 85% 95% 
 
Source: Company interviews in Lesotho 
Specialisation has increased 
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In all of the AGOA exporting economies, specialisation has increased. This is 
reflected in the fact that overall export values have fallen by more than the top 
five or top 10 products. On the one hand this can be seen as a positive 
development, since specialisation lies at the heart of productivity growth and 
upgrading. But on the other hand it is also a source of vulnerability – the more 
specialised a system becomes, the more sensitive it becomes to a change in 
external conditions. And here it is noticeable that Chinese exports to the US in 
the major items exported by the five major AGOA economies have grown 
particularly rapidly, on the back of significant declines in prices. 
 
Regional wage costs are high…. 
 
Although of primary significance, tariff protection is not the only factor influencing 
the competitive costs of SSA producers. In other respects they are also 
penalised. For example, with regard to wages, our interview results suggest that 
when correcting for hours worked, wages in SSA are relatively high when 
compared to Asia (Table 2.24). In general Asian producers pay wages of 
between $0.15 and $0.33 per hour, whereas Southern and East African hourly 
wages range from $0.44 to $1.87 an hour. 
 
Table 2.24: Hourly wage costs in clothing factories 
 
 
India Pakistan Bangl S.Lanka 
China 
(interior Indon. Ghana 
 
Kenya 
 
Lesotho 
 
SA* 
 
Swazi 
Hrs/w 40 40 35 55 40 60 50 48 45 425 48 
$/hr 0.18 0.18 0.15 0.31 0.17 0.33 0.31 0.44 0.51 1.87 0.82 
* Formal sector urban areas 
Source: Company interviews  
 
Moreover, productivity is low 
 
Wages are only one component of unit labour costs. The other components are 
the degree of automation involved, the skills possessed by the labour force and 
the effectiveness of management. A detailed investigation of efficiency in Lesotho 
observed low levels of skill and efficiency (Salm et. al., 2002). Middle 
management was particularly weak, and was largely made up of Chinese 
workers with shopfloor experience, but little management know-how and largely 
unable to communicate with the labour force. They concluded that “operator 
productivity within the industry was generally low. This is principally due to 
deficient recruitment policies, inadequately trained operators, poor supervisory 
management, communication difficulties and cross-cultural misunderstanding 
(Salm et. al., 2002: 51)”…”The Industrial Engineering function ,, is not carried out 
in a focused manner.. [with the possibilities of] ” significant improvements in 
productivity (passim). Poor labour relations are part of this. A detailed survey of 
worker attitudes found that 51.3 percent of workers felt “very negative” towards 
their employers, and a further 14.3 percent felt “quite negative”. Only one percent 
felt “very positive”. 54 percent felt that their lives had not improved at all since 
joining their factories, and a further 37 percent that it had improved “only a little”. 
“There was remarkable consensus across the different focus groups: regardless 
of age, employment status or gender the participants expressed fundamentally 
the same views… The overwhelming majority see Asian investors (their factory 
managers) in an extremely negative light” (Salm et al, 2002: Annex 3, 21). 
Although this data is sourced from detailed interviews in Lesotho, the likelihood is 
that they replicate the conditions in other SSA producing countries. 
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And other costs are high … 
 
Manchester Trade Team (2005) compared costs along a range of factors for 
COMESA and China and India for an equivalent product to show the barriers 
faced by SSA clothing exporters. They found that: 
 
• Export finance costs in Kenya (13 percent p.a.) and Madagascar (18 
percent p.a) were much higher than in China (5.5 percent) and India (10.5 
percent) 
 
• Material costs were much higher in Kenya ($3/sq ft) and Madagascar 
($4/sq. ft) than in China ($1.50/sq ft) and in India (($2.50/sq.ft) 
 
• Transport costs to the US East Coast were lower for Kenya and 
Madagascar than for China ($0.29 versus $0.33 per jean) but were lowest 
for India ($0.23 per jean). 
 
• The cost of machinery and of power were rather similar, but labour 
productivity with equivalent machines was significantly higher in China (25 
pieces/day) than in India (21 p.d.), Kenya (18 p.d) and Madagascar (16 
p.d). 
 
 
And poor infrastructure doesn’t help… 
 
Clothing manufactures depend heavily on access to reliable infrastructure. Here 
SSA producers are disadvantaged compared to their Asian counterparts. In some 
countries water supplies, critical to successful production are intermittent. One of 
the clothing firms in Lesotho had to close 13 out of 23 lines temporarily in 2004 
due to water shortages and another Lesotho firm also observed poor water 
supplies as a handicap to production, along with occasional power outages. 
Swazi firms also reported water shortages and power outages. In Kenya, 
production is often confined to EPZs precisely because of the failure of 
infrastructure supplies in the wider economy, and electricity costs are more than 
three times those in South Africa (Ikiara and Ndirangu, 2003a). The comparison 
with China is stark, with Kenyan firms facing frequent outages, losing significant 
production due to power shortages, despite having to invest in generators, and 
new businesses have to wait very long periods for connection to the grid (Table 
2.25). 
 
Table 2.25: Electricity supplies in Kenya and China 
 Kenya China 
Freq of power outages (times last yr) 33.1 n.a. 
% of production lost due to power outages 9.3 1.8 
Have own generator (%) 70.0 17 
No. of days to obtain an electricity connection 65.6 18.2 
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Source: World Bank, 2003 
 
The weakness of the transport system, associated with bureaucratic hold-ups 
also leads to considerable delays and makes it almost impossible for SSA 
producers to produce items for higher-margins rapid-response markets, even if 
their capabilities were enhanced through the procurement of locally-produced 
fabric. Unlike Asian competitors, SSA producers have to wait around 30 days to 
obtain their imported inputs and a further 28-40 days to deliver product to final 
markets (Table 2.26). However effective production might be, perhaps halving 
throughput time to around 15 days, it will not be possible to make up for these 
structural weaknesses in the economy. 
 
Table 2.26: Determinants of lead time – Kenya, Lesotho and Swaziland 
 
DELIVERY TYPE KENYA LESOTHO SWAZILAND
Delivery of fabric from Asia 
(Taiwan or China) 
30 days 30 days 
 
30 days 
From port to factory  
 
7 days 
(Nairobi) 
3 days 3~10 days 
Production lead-time 
 
30 days 25 - 30 days 25~30 days 
Factory gate to port 3 days 3 day 
 
2 days 
Port to U.S.A. Port (NY) 40 days  
Mombassa to 
NY 
28 days 
Durban to NY 
28 days 
Durban to 
NY 
Total delivery time 110 days  90 – 100 days  90~100 days
 
Source: Company interviews 
 
Exchange rates don’t help either … 
 
Those economies liked to the South African Rand faced a further disadvantage. 
The Chinese remnimbi has been pegged to the US$ for some years, although in 
mid-2005 there was a mild revaluation of 3.5 percent. Similarly, the Kenyan 
shilling was pegged to the $ and neither of these economies faced adverse 
exchange rate movements in their sales to the US (or indeed to the EU, since the 
€ appreciated in relation to the $). The major casualties amongst SSA AGOA 
economies were the three Southern African economies and Madagascar. As 
Figure 2.16 shows, between early 2002 and mid 2005, the Rand appreciated by 
more than 50 percent against the dollar, with an adverse impact on South Africa, 
Lesotho and Swaziland. In the case of Madagascar, an initial depreciation of 
currency between in the first ten months of 2004 was followed by a steep 
depreciation in the last quarter of 2004. Almost as damaging as the level of the 
Rand has been its volatility, making it difficult for firms to plan ahead with 
confidence. 
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Figure 2.16 Exchange rate against the US$ - China, Kenya, Madagascar and 
South Africa 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: (https://pengva1.unjspf.org) last accessed 3 January 2005 
 
With the exception of South Africa, the impact of currency depreciation was less 
severe than it seems at first sight. This is because around 40 percent of value 
added in the case of natural fibre products, and two-thirds of value added in the 
case of synthetic products comprised imported material, and whilst currency 
appreciation has a downside on the export side, it has an upside in reducing the 
costs of imports. This is another factor promoting the shift from natural to 
synthetic fibre products. South Africa is the exception to this since it uniquely 
amongst the countries studied in this Report, has no access to imported fabrics 
for AGOA exports. 
 
Nevertheless SSA producer efficiency is growing… 
 
Despite these handicaps, the evidence seems to suggest that SSA clothing and 
textile exporters who are able to draw on trade preferences are still largely able to 
compete with the best competition in the world. They also do so with the 
evidence of significant productivity improvement over the past year, in that export 
values and volumes have held up much better than employment in Kenya, 
Lesotho and Swaziland. Moreover, as various industry analysts have pointed out, 
there is considerable scope for further improvements in efficiency (Manchester 
Trade Team, 2005, Salm et. al, 2002). But to achieve this requires tailored and 
effective government support. In Lesotho, for example, the government co-
financed CONMARK training scheme has led to very significant increases in 
operator efficiency. In the case of one factory, plant output increased by 25 
percent as a result of the training scheme.  
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And it is possible to upgrade and diversify … 
 
South African producers confronted by an appreciating currency and an inability 
to source low-cost Asian fabric have chosen from six options – exit from the 
market, concentration on the local market, upgrading production capabilities 
seeking to attain world class manufacturing operational performance, using local 
fabrics, focusing on higher value added fashion garments as well as using man-
made synthetic fabric, and upgrading into specialised niches.  
 
The second of these options - the local market – is not without its difficulties. A 
producer of underwear faced a 50 percent increase in imports in the first ten 
months of 2005, with a halving of its exports. Hence the domestic industry is 
focusing on a rapid-response capability to help its retailers to slim overall 
inventories and to respond flexibly to changing market tastes. This strategy 
currently goes hand in hand with attempts (driven by the domestic retailers) to 
synergise the local value chain and achieve systemic efficiency.  
 
Closely allied to it is the third option of developing localised clusters to upgrade 
operational capabilities through learning networks. These are however still in their 
infancy and the jury is still out as to whether they will achieve the same success 
levels as similar initiatives in the automotive sector.   
 
The fourth option – deeper investments in fabric production – confronts the need 
for nervous investors to commit large sums of money to what are perceived to be 
risky ventures. Our interviews with textile producers in South Africa did not 
identify major dynamism in this sector. This affects not just the viability of the 
South African industry, but the future of other SSA economies which might cope 
with the phased removal of the fabric derogation in 2007 by sourcing material 
from South Africa. Its current textile capabilities are not adequate to meet these 
needs and numerous firms in the region have tried to source from South Africa 
and found the mills to be unresponsive and high cost, with long lead times and 
poor quality. The attempts to synergise the domestic value chain may well turn 
the textile sector around and overcome these inefficiencies. 
 
The fifth option takes advantage of AGOA’s higher tariff rates for producing 
clothing using synthetic fabric. Swaziland has used this successfully, as has 
some of South Africa’s exports, by vacillating between Chinese imported 
synthetic fabric or local South African fabric. However, despite the higher 
protection levels this strategy accords, its usage has been limited primarily to 
Swaziland.  Finally the sixth option – upgrading into specialised niches - has 
however been more successfully pursued by some firms. One large firm began 
manufacturing suit linings in the 1960s, moving into industrial fabrics in the early 
1970s. The industrial fabric division was developed to also cover the parachute 
sector, and specialised and high-tech industrial products now comprise 70 
percent of output, and are targeted to reach 90 percent of sales by 2007. 
Significantly, this high-tech textile producer is very capital intensive in nature – 
labour costs are only 14 percent of costs (compared to 45 percent in the natural 
fibres clothing sector). Although this transition is beyond the reach of producers in 
other least developed SSA markets, the strategy of focusing on long-term 
upgrading and diversification provides an important lesson for SSA textile and 
clothing producers. 
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Even if technologically-sophisticated upgrading is difficult, there may 
nevertheless be scope for diversification to take advantage of emerging 
opportunities. For example, like South Africa, the Mauritian clothing industry was 
unable to take advantage of the derogation on rules of entry. It therefore targeted 
an AGOA exemption for yarns which are in short supply in the US, and used this 
to import Chinese and Italian yarn to manufacture high quality shirts for the US 
market. Thus comparing 2004 with 2003, dutiable exports declined by 43 percent 
and duty-free exports to the US increased by 17 percent (Appelbaum, 2005).  
 
2. 5. POLICY 
 
The strategic significance of the clothing and textile sector in SSA should not be 
underestimated. First for those countries such as Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar 
and Swaziland which have seen major AGOA exports, this sector has been a 
major source of growth. Indeed in many respects it has been the primary source 
of growth in these economies. Second, these AGOA exports have contributed 
very significantly to export revenues. Third, the clothing sector in particular is 
labour intensive and has been an important source of job growth outside of 
agriculture. The nature of the skills involved – generally unskilled work for women 
– has had important distributional consequences and has helped to mitigate the 
unequalising consequences of globalisation (Kaplinsky, 2005). Finally, it is a 
sector which at least historically, has shown the face of industry to countries in 
the early stages of their growth paths, and has provided a stepping stone for the 
development of industrial capabilities. 
 
As we have seen, despite the mostly gloomy prognoses, with the exception of 
South Africa, the AGOA clothing and textile industries generally fared well in the 
first ten months of the post-quota era. The reasons for this are considered in 
Section 4 above, and it is by learning from these determinants of success that we 
can identify key policy options confronting the region, and bi- and multi-lateral 
donors. The key policy implications are as follows:  
 
Maintain an uneven playing field 
 
The success of the SSA clothing and textiles sector depends on its preferential 
access to the US market. Whilst WTO regulations rule out quota restrictions, the 
degree of tariff protection which is conferred by AGOA, coupled with the ability to 
import fabrics from East Asia, has been very significant, with effective rates of 
protection ranging between 25 and 85 percent. Without this preferential market 
access, which is due to expire in 2015, the SSA clothing and textile industry 
would not survive 
 
Lobby for an extension of the derogation on rules of entry 
 
But even if the AGOA economies continue to benefit from preferential access to 
the US economy, as their industries are currently constituted they will still fail 
unless they have access to the derogation on the rules of entry beyond 
September 2007 when this is due to expire. There have been some steps to 
deepen the textile industry, notably in the case of the new denim mill in Lesotho 
in 2004 and a new knitting and dyeing mill under construction in Swaziland. But 
the development of a cost-effective and competitive textile industry takes time 
and, moreover, is unlikely to result from the simple interplay of market forces. 
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Given the long gestation period in capital-intensive textile investments, with the 
exception of denim products, it is inconceivable that AGOA economies will be 
able to meet the rules of entry when the fabric derogation expires in 2007. It will 
need to be extended and this will require a coordinated and intensive lobbying 
process, by individual governments, by governments working in consort, by the 
SSA industry and by bi- and multi-lateral agencies.  
 
In 2005, following a process driven by Kenya, four countries – Kenya, 
Madagascar, Mauritius and South Africa established the African Clothing and 
Textiles Industry Federation (ACTIF). ACTIF has been negotiating with the US to 
negotiate an extension of the AGOA 3rd party rules of origin provision beyond Sep 
2007 until end of AGOA (i.e. 2015). This received a favourable response but has 
to be put to and pass through US legislature. ACTIF has a position paper 
circulating in Washington and has engaged two major lobbyists to canvass 
Congress and Senate. ACTIF has also had discussions with the Importers of 
Textiles Association (ITA) on this issue.  
 
One of the arguments which ACTIF has been pursuing has been the issue of risk 
reduction in global sourcing. They are arguing that buyers need an alternative to 
sourcing only from the Chinese (and SE Asia) region. However, this cannot be 
done on a country basis and has to be based on a regional platform. It 
recognises that the US has a number of global options – Africa, Latin America, 
Middle East (Turkey including), South Asia (India/Sri Lanka) – but is pushing for 
special consideration to be given to SSA for both geopolitical and a poverty-
reducing reasons.  
 
ACTIF believes that this lobbying has given SSA a lobbying-edge in its position to 
extend the AGOA derogation on fabric sourcing until 2015 and that because US 
retailers recognise this, this is the major reason why US buyers continue to see 
SSA as a viable source of clothing imports. 
 
It is significant however, that ACTIF excludes Lesotho and Swaziland, the two 
economies which have managed some measure of backward integration into 
textiles, and who therefore do not have the same interests in the extension of the 
3rd party fabric provision. This opens-up the possibility of a real divide amongst 
SSA clothing producers. Countries such as Lesotho and Swaziland have begun 
to follow the route underlying the AGOA initiative – temporary infant-industry tariff 
preferences to promote backward linkages. Others – Kenya, Madagascar and 
South Africa - have resisted this. For firms and governments this reflects a 
difficult balancing act between two forms of risk. On the one hand, integrate 
backward with heavy investments and risk losing out to more competitive Asian-
based textile producers; on the other hand, fail to integrate backwards and suffer 
when the 3rd party fabric derogation is removed. The latter path is may be less 
risky since should the derogation go and Lesotho and Swazi fabric be cost 
competitive (and available in appropriate quantities, and infrastructure allowing), 
then they can source from intra-region fabric producers. Logically, the best way 
into this is through some form of regional cooperation, but this has not always 
been successful in the SSA region. 
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Develop the textiles sector 
 
As is evident from the discussion on rules of entry, it is necessary to 
simultaneously develop programmes for the development of the textile sector. 
Sustained policy support, including external financial and technical support and 
incentives to FDI are necessary for the fabric sector to develop. There are signs 
of some dynamism in Lesotho, Swaziland and Madagascar, but little in Kenya. 
However, the nature of the AGOA rules of entry mean that whilst each country 
will clearly benefit from the expansion of the textile industry within its own 
borders, its AGOA-qualifying needs can nevertheless be met from the expansion 
of the textile sector within the region as a whole. Here there is a particular 
opportunity for South Africa, with its relatively sophisticated industrial sector and 
with access to large sums of domestic capital. But for it to succeed in this venture 
will require a significantly enhancement of competitive ambition and capabilities, 
both within the private sector and in government. 
 
Devote more attention to synthetics 
 
The nature of AGOA tariff preferences – as presently constituted – and the 
derogation on rules of entry provide particular incentives to products using 
synthetic fibres. This is both because of the higher duties which these products 
attract in the US, and their share of total product costs (hence enhancing the rate 
of effective protection). To the extent that these two characteristics of the trade 
regime are sustained, the opportunities provided by the production of synthetics 
are substantial. In general this requires a medium-term perspective, since 
switching product lines can take time, and can be costly. Synthetic fabrics are 
inherently more capital intensive to produce than are cotton fabrics. Our 
interviews with firms in the region did not suggest that they had fully taken on 
board the potential offered by this shift ion product portfolio. 
 
Enhance competitiveness 
 
Comparative studies (for example, the 2004 ITC study and the 2005 Manchester 
Trade Team study) show that China’s competitive advantage cannot be reduced 
to a weak currency or low wages. Both of these factors are important, but are 
overwhelmed by the relative impact of generally superior total factor productivity 
in Chinese enterprises. Much of this superior productivity arises from investments 
in new technology (for example, shuttleless looms), but factory organisation and 
skill development play a very important role. 
 
We know from other sectors that particularly in the early stages of industry 
development, it is the investments in process and training which provide the 
major competitive advances. These are generally incremental in nature and are 
significantly aided by structured and inter-related processes of benchmarking and 
continuous improvement. South African firms possess major capabilities in this 
area, as do specialised global clothing sector service providers. This constitutes 
an immediate and high-impact route to enhancing competitiveness in the region, 
and is greatly facilitated by government incentive schemes. However it depends 
on the active cooperation of the private sector and given its foreign ownership in 
much of the region, this has important process implications in the design and 
delivery of policy support to the sector. 
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Infrastructure (including policy infrastructure) 
 
One of the primary competitive benefits of Chinese industry is the efficiency with 
which the infrastructure functions. This includes not just physical infrastructure 
such as roads, water and power, but also bureaucratic infrastructure such as port 
clearance, enterprise set-up and the delivery of appropriate certification. Many of 
the AGOA economies are fully aware of this. Yet in most cases policy response is 
cumbersome, and action is slow. Amongst the countries we visited we found that 
enterprises in Lesotho were most favourably disposed towards the government 
support which they received. They felt that they had ready access, and an open 
ear in government. Not all of their problems were solved (for example, water 
shortages), but the general response from government was conducive to 
enhanced investments, such as the new $100m denim mill. 
 
In conclusion  
 
There is thus clearly much that government (and bi- and multilateral aid 
agencies) can do to facilitate the continued growth of the clothing and textiles 
sector in SSA. It requires a joined-up approach – between firms in value chains, 
between governments and the private sector and the trades unions, between 
different governments, in regional industry associations and in backing support 
from bi- and multi-lateral agencies.  
 
Whilst all the policy conclusions listed above are important, two stand out in 
significance. First, there needs to be an industry- and region-wide campaign, 
backed by bi- and multi-lateral agencies to maintain both the preferential duty 
access of AGOA exporters and an extension of the rules of origin derogation. 
This will require sophisticated and costly lobbying in the US political system, 
including the use of public opinion. And, second, SSA needs to get its competitive 
act together. Much can be done to enhance competitive performance in the 
clothing and textiles sector by structured programmes of benchmarking and 
continuous improvement, and more detailed and region-wide incentives need to 
be developed to encourage the deepening of investments in the textile sector. 
 
 
2. 6. SOME IMPORTANT CAVEATS 
 
As observed in the Executive Summary, by design this has been a pilot study, 
designed to explore the emerging threats posed to SSA manufacturing by China 
and other Asian economies, and to develop appropriate methodologies to explore 
these issues. 
 
Although we conducted more than 50 interviews with key industry informants, 
there are three primary limitations to our methodology. First and foremost, we 
interviewed buyers in the US to determine their perspectives on future sourcing 
from the SSA region. During the course of our interviews with producers, it 
became clear that the key sourcing decisions are not being made in the US, even 
though this is where the final markets are to be found. In general, US buyers 
hand over sourcing responsibility to Asian-based buying houses and 
manufacturing houses. They provide the key to determining the extent to which 
SSA will remain a future source of supply to the US market. 
 
44 
Second, although there is much evidence of differential competitive performance 
amongst enterprises, the pilot-nature of our work did not provide us with the 
opportunity to effectively benchmark firm-level performance. This benchmarking 
provides the key to continuous improvement (kaizen), and to the development of 
dynamic capabilities in the region. 
 
Third, again a function of the pilot-nature of this Report, we do not throw any light 
on the role of ownership in the differential performance of individual firms and 
countries. In Kenya, Sri Lankan owned firms were notably more optimistic than 
Taiwanese owned firms. In Lesotho, Taiwanese firms are the dominant and 
dynamic participants in the clothing sector, and have been the major source of 
major investment in the textile sector in the region. They have a presence in the 
region because of its recognition in the Apartheid era of Taiwan rather than 
communist China. They also probably have less access to production networks in 
China than does FDI emanating from other regions of the world. To what extent 
does this explain the resilience of Lesotho’s clothing industry in the context of 
currency appreciation, and what wider policy lessons can be learned in attracting 
FDI into the region, and dealing with existing foreign investors? 
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PART 3 
 
HOW WILL SSA’S WOODEN FURNITURE INDUSTRY SURVIVE 
COMPETITION FROM THE ASIAN DRIVERS? 
 
3.1. BACKGROUND 
 
Why is furniture important? 
 
The wood furniture value chain has the potential to play an important role in 
promoting growth and alleviating poverty in SSA. As will be seen below, it is a 
large and rapidly-globalising sector. There is scope for labour-intensive 
production, but at the same time, the ability to mechanise production and 
innovate new products lays out a path for upgrading and innovation over time. 
This not only supports growing producer incomes in the furniture value chain, but 
also acts as an example to other sectors. It is also a resource -intensive sector. 
This provides opportunities for many SSA countries where timber grows rapidly 
and cheaply and helps to facilitate productive linkages between industry and 
agriculture and urban and rural areas. Consequently, like the clothing sector, the 
furniture industry has been one of the primary stepping stones used by 
industrialising economies in promoting growth and diversifying economic 
structures. It is potentially a key industry in SSA’s future development. 
The wood furniture value chain 
 
Figure 3.1 maps the broad features of the wood furniture value chain. Raw 
materials such as seed inputs, chemicals, equipment and water feed into the 
forestry sector. Wood flows to the sawmills, and sawn timber and intermediate 
wood products move to the furniture manufacturers who, in turn, obtain inputs 
from the machinery, textiles, plastics, adhesives and paint industries. The 
furniture industry also draws on logistical, design and branding skills from the 
service sector. Depending on which market is served, the furniture then passes 
through various intermediary buying stages until it reaches the final customer. 
(The buying function is represented by a dotted box in this Figure in order to 
emphasise that several organisation types including wholesalers, retailers and 
independent buyers can manage this function). And finally, customers will either 
recycle or dispose of the furniture.  
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Figure 3.1: Wood furniture value system 
Factors contributing to the globalization of the wood furniture value chain 
 
The wood furniture value chain is an increasingly global industry. Seen from the 
buyer-end of this chain, four distinct globalising strategies can be observed. The 
first of these are firms who have little or no involvement in production or in the 
organisation and coordination of global production networks. They are satisfied to 
buy furniture either directly from producers in arms-length relationships, or to 
work through specialised buying firms. They comprise independent furniture 
stores, many of which are small or medium-sized and which serve local sub-
national markets. The second category are the much larger national or 
international firms which make extensive use of marketing and brand names and 
purchase directly from suppliers, often providing assistance with upgrading and 
the sourcing of inputs. Examples of these TNCs are IKEA and B&Q. Third are 
manufacturing firms in the importing country who buy-in semi-finished 
components. This has become, for example, a major element in the burgeoning 
furniture trade in rubber-wood products between Thailand and Japan (Mitsuhashi, 
2006) and is referred to as “production sharing’. Finally, there are the 
manufacturing firms in the importing countries which have established 
subsidiaries in low-income economies, such as Steinhoff of Germany expanding 
production in Poland, Ukraine and South Africa.  
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Underlying this fragmenting global division of labour in this chain has been a 
series of changes in technology and organisation. The major components of 
these technological advances reflect the transfer of practices from other 
industries and include:11  
 
• Computer-numerically-controlled (CNC) wood working machinery 
enhances productivity, reduce waste, improve time-to-market and facilitate 
modular production of non-standardised items.  
 
• Computer-aided design and manufacturing (CAD/ CAM) allows designs to 
be fed from designers to manufacturing firms (anywhere in the world) with 
significant improvements in quality and productivity.  
 
• The introduction of flat-pack or RTA (ready-to-assemble) furniture led to an 
important change to furniture production methods. RTA designed furniture, 
with standard shapes and sizes and high volume demand, led factories to 
take advantage of design for manufacturing processes. It also dramatically 
cut the transport costs of shipping bulky products. 
 
• The development of flat-pack furniture was critically dependent on 
advances in material technology, such as MDF (multi-density fibre) which, 
in addition to using off-cuts and “waste”, makes for the optimal use of 
forestry products. 
 
• Flexible manufacturing systems (FMS) and cellular plant layout improve 
the flow of furniture parts efficiently through the plant, enhancing flexibility 
and quality, and reducing inventories and costs 
 
• Made-to order and just-in-time distribution systems reduce inventory levels 
of raw material inputs and finished but-not-sold items 
 
These technological and organisational innovations have allowed for the growing 
globalisation of this sector. It has enabled producers in high wage economies to 
significantly reduce their costs, such that the share of wage in company sales in 
European manufacturing firms fell from around 50 percent in the 1960s to 28 
percent in the mid 1990s (European Commission, 1997). But, simultaneously, it 
has also provided a role for low-income and resource-intensive economies to 
become increasingly active participants in the global chain.  
 
Another factor facilitating the globalisation of this chain has been the growth of 
concentrated buying power in final markets. This is part of a much larger 
phenomenon, spanning many sectors of final consumption, including as we saw 
in Part 2, the clothing sector (Feenstra and Hamilton, 2005; Kaplinsky, 2005). For 
example, in Germany although there are more than 15,000 furniture stores 
employing more than 110,000 people, the buying groups (Einkaufsverbände) and 
their affiliates control 60 percent of the market. The majority of retailers and 
manufacturers are connected with these groups. Similar buyer concentration 
                                            
11  Company interviews and industry reports. See Spalding, 2001 and European Commission, 1997. 
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occur in many other countries, including the UK where retail multiples control 40 
percent of the furniture market. 
 
Global trade in furniture intensifies 
  
These evolving corporate strategies, changes in technology and increasingly 
concentrated buying structures have led to the rapid globalisation of the wood 
furniture value chain. At the 3-digit SITC level, in 2002 the furniture industry was 
the 16th largest out of 141 traded manufacturing product groups (SITC 5 to 8 
excluding SITC 68), with a total value of global trade of manufactures of $66.1bn. 
(www.unctad.org, last accessed on 20 June 2005). It was the largest traditional, 
low-technology traded sector in 2002, exceeding the value of trade in the 
footwear industry ($43.6 bn.) and the toys and sporting goods industry ($49.8 
bn). The growth of world trade between 1993 and 2002 in the furniture sector (94 
percent) exceeded that for all world trade of manufactures (75 percent), as well 
as that of toys and sporting goods (52 percent) and footwear (26 percent). 
 
Although furniture is a resource and labour-intensive product, it is striking that the 
major exporting countries are the industrially advanced economies. As can be 
seen from Table 3.1, of the 20 largest exporters, only five (China, Mexico, 
Indonesia Malaysia and Thailand) are low-wage economies and two (Poland and 
the Czech Republic) are transitional economies. However, given that emerging, 
transitional and developing countries tend to be small importers of furniture, their 
participation in the group of the largest net exporters is much more significant - 
only five advanced industrial countries (Italy, Canada, Denmark, Spain and 
Sweden) of the top 20 gross exporting countries are also positive net exporters. 
Italy is by some distance the largest gross and net exporter of furniture.  
 
Table 3.1 also shows the very rapid growth of furniture exports by low-income 
economies. Between 1993 and 2002, China’s exports increased by 6.2 times, 
Mexico by a factor of 5.3, Poland by 5, Malaysia by 2.6 and, Indonesia by 2.3.. 
Although to some extent these very high growth rates are a result of low export 
volumes in 1993, these results highlight that these countries have become  
leading global exporters of furniture. It is also striking that, other than Canada, all 
of the major dynamic furniture exporters are low-income or transitional 
economies. 
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Table 3.1: Value of global furniture trade (SITC 821): the leading 20 exporting 
countries, 1993 and 2002 
 
$ thousands 
 Gross exports 
1993 
Gross exports 
2002 
Per cent 
change 
Net exports 
2002 
Italy 5,797,350 8,885,963 53% 7,792,247 
China 1,080,566 6,696,259 520% 6,377,748 
Germany 3,758,009 5,384,098 43% -1,342,364 
Canada 1,672,760 4,795,399 187% 1,694,281 
USA 3,027,889 4,703,943 55% -18,889,234 
Mexico 649,941 3,409,381 425% 2,267,533 
Poland 580,978 2,893,334 398% 2,452,535 
France 1,648,592 2,355,577 43% -1,706,937 
Denmark 1,589,971 2,057,728 29% 1,323,356 
Bel.-Lux. 1,409,314 1,817,374 29% -361,084 
Indonesia 675,588 1,519,572 125% 1,500,561 
Spain 548,801 1,502,148 174% 313,670 
Malaysia 564,853 1,489,940 164% 1,310,355 
UK 904,498 1,350,189 49% -3,322,389 
Austria 650,646 1,278,178 96% -152,753 
Sweden 825,930 1,269,427 54% 154,205 
China,(Taiwan) 1,833,173 1,198,911 -35% 952,679 
China, (Hong Kong) 563,632 1,141,647 103% -159,480 
Czech Republic 191,733 1,102,751 475% 686,169 
Thailand 593,849 914,334 54% 840,290 
Other countries 5,447,541 10,240,568 88% -6,469,599 
World 34,041,110 66,086,250 94%  
Source: Calculated from UNCTAD, 2005 (www.unctad.org last accessed on 21 June 2005)  
 
 
Furniture imports have increased in most high-income countries, with the value of 
global trade almost doubling between 1993 and 2002 (Table 3.1). As we illustrate 
below, prices during this period fell sharply (Table 3.3 and Figure 3.2). This 
pervasive fall in global prices of furniture has clearly benefited consumers in 
trade-liberalising economies who have access to cheaper, better quality and 
more varied products. Consumers in the USA have particularly taken advantage 
of low priced imports: the share of the USA in global imports rose from 21 to 33 
percent between 1993 and 2002, whilst that of the EU fell from 46 to 37 percent 
in the same period (Figure 3.3.).12 
 
 
                                            
12  EU imports include EU-extra and EU-intra trade 
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 Figure 3.2. Share of global furniture imports (SITC 821), 1993 -2002 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Calculated from UNCTAD, 2005 (www. unctad.org last accessed on 6 July 2005) 
 
Intermediate products such as wood-based panels consisting of veneer sheets, 
plywood, particle board, hardboard, MDF (medium-density fibreboard), 
compressed fibreboard and insulating board also experienced rapid growth 
during this period. Global exports of these wood-based panels were $17.7 billion 
in 2002, an increase of 34 percent since 1993 (Table 3.2). Although some low-
income economies have seen export growth (notably Poland and China), the 
stellar performers tended to be high-income economies (Canada, Germany, 
Austria). In some cases low-income economies have seen a fall or stagnation in 
the value of the export of these intermediate product; for example, Indonesia and 
Malaysia, saw their market share decline by 22 percent and 2 percent 
respectively while Brazil’s share remained unchanged during the 1993 to 2002 
period.   
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Table 3.2:  Leading 20 producers of wood-based panels by value and market 
share, 1993 and 2002 
 
 Value ($,000) Market share 
  1993 2002 Per cent 
change 
1993 2002 Per cent 
change 
Canada 909,457 2,404,937 164% 7% 14% 7%
Germany 675,461 2,010,540 198% 5% 11% 6%
Indonesia 4,311,515 1,818,219 -58% 33% 10% -22%
Malaysia 1,354,653 1,404,271 4% 10% 8% -2%
USA 921,886 927,617 1% 7% 5% -2%
China 402,129 873,705 117% 3% 5% 2%
Austria 370,789 801,994 116% 3% 5% 2%
Bel.- Lux. 492,481 791,527 61% 4% 4% 1%
France 434,985 680,916 57% 3% 4% 1%
Finland 441,835 621,260 41% 3% 4% 0%
Brazil 433,823 501,601 16% 3% 3% 0%
Italy 308,599 450,126 46% 2% 3% 0%
Poland 55,739 392,700 605% 0% 2% 2%
Spain 193,574 371,465 92% 1% 2% 1%
Russian Federation 180,270 335,352 86% 1% 2% 1%
New Zealand 160,615 280,320 75% 1% 2% 0%
Switzerland 163,750 210,522 29% 1% 1% 0%
Ireland 57,823 165,759 187% 0% 1% 0%
Chile 61,429 164,886 168% 0% 1% 0%
Portugal 122,653 158,110 29% 1% 1% 0%
Other countries 1,172,470 2,348,463 100% 9% 13% 4%
World 13,225,936 17,714,290 34%  
 
Source: Calculated from FAOSTAT data, 2005 (www.fao.org last accessed on 21 
June 2005) 
 
Price trends in the global wood furniture value chain 
 
In the measurement of unit price performance in the furniture industry, we draw 
on the data for EU imports. This is because the EU is the major destination for 
extra-continental furniture exports from SSA. Since the EU accounts for more 
than one-third of global imports, it is a reasonable surrogate for global price 
performance and for assessing the future export prospects of the SSA furniture 
industry.  
 
Over the 1990s, there were a number of significant trends in the unit prices of 
furniture imported into the EU (Figure 3.3 and Table 3.3)13: 
 
• For the industry as a whole, there was a pervasive trend towards a decline 
in unit prices, of 36 percent between 1989 and 2001.  
 
                                            
13. Unit prices are calculated as a two year moving average to even out possible currency fluctuations. This means that “1989” is an 
average of 1988 and 1989 unit prices and “2001” is an average of 2000 and 2001 unit prices. 
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• The growing globalisation of the furniture industry meant that there was a 
tendency for a “world price” to emerge that is for a growing convergence in 
the price of products originating from different types of economies. (In 
eight of the eleven product categories, the standard deviation of prices - 
measured as average unit prices of different exporting economies - fell 
between 1989 and 2001),  
 
• There were sub-sector variations: the largest fall in unit price was for 
upholstered wooden seats, wooden office furniture (= < 80 cm. in height) 
and wooden dining and living room furniture (40 percent, 39 percent and 
37 percent respectively).  
 
• There was a growing dispersion in global sourcing. The number of 
countries with at least one percent market share of one of the 11 imported 
product markets increased from 28 in 1989 to 48 in 2001.  
 
• The total number of low-wage countries with at least one percent market 
share in one of the 11 imported product markets more than doubled during 
this period from 11 countries in 1989 to 28 countries in 2001. 
 
 
Table 3.3: Average unit prices (two-year moving averages) and the number of 
countries holding 1% of market share of wood furniture imports to the EU, 1989 
and 2001 
 Average unit price 
($1,000/ 
metric ton) 
Average unit price 
(per. change) 
Unit price standard 
deviation  
Total no. of country 
exporters 
 
No. of low-wage 
country exporters  
 1989 2001 1989-01 
 
1989 2001 1989 2001 1989 2001 
Kitchen furniture 
 
3.63 2.51 -31% 4.26 1.83 15 14 2 4 
Bedroom furniture 
 
2.34 1.94 -17% 2.36 1.74 18 25 6 11 
Upholstered seats with 
wooden frames  
7.38 4.42 -40% 4.03 3.16 19 26 6 12 
Seats with wooden frames  
 
3.26 3.06 -6% 2.77 4.44 24 31 10 18 
Wooden office desks 
 
3.13 2.51 -20% 4.23 2.16 19 19 5 6 
Wooden office furniture (=< 
80 cm.) 
4.41 2.68 -39% 3.84 2.41 19 25 3 7 
Wooden office cupboards 
(>80 cm.) 
4.09 3.09 -24% 1.76 1.90 14 18 1 6 
Wooden office furniture 
(> 80 cm. ex. cupboards) 
3.52 2.88 -18% 2.48 2.50 17 20 2 4 
Wooden furniture (dining/ 
and living  room)  
3.26 2.07 -37% 3.32 1.99 20 35 6 18 
Wooden furniture (shops)  
 
5.31 4.73 -11% 2.51 4.64 14 23 1 7 
Other wooden furniture  
 
2.90 2.19 -25% 2.47 2.44 23 31 8 16 
All wooden furniture 
(aggregate) 
2.72 2.17 
 
-36%   28 48 11 28 
Source: Calculated from Eurostat COMEXT data base 
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Figure 3.3:  Unit price (two-year moving averages) trends for wood furniture 
imports to the EU, 1989 -2001  
 
 
The demand for timber and the growth of environmental concerns 
 
Both for reasons of maintaining biodiversity and because of concerns with carbon 
depletion, the global wood furniture industry has increasingly had to deal with the 
problems of the regulation of logging. The primary concerns relate to the 
depletion of hardwoods, and this has led to two major responses. The first has 
been the growth of certification schemes such as the FSC (Forestry Stewardship 
Council) which regulates not only the need to replant cut timber, but also the 
AVERAGE UNIT PRICE
EU IMPORTS - SEATS
0.00
2.00
4.00
6.00
8.00
10.00
1988-89 1991-92 1994-95 1997-98 2000-01
$1
,0
00
/ m
et
ric
 to
n 
(T
Y
M
A
)
Upholstered seats with wooden frames 
Seats with wooden frames 
AVERAGE UNIT PRICE
EU IMPORTS - OFFICE FURNITURE
0.00
2.00
4.00
6.00
8.00
10.00
1988-89 1991-92 1994-95 1997-98 2000-01
$1
,0
00
/ m
et
ric
 to
n 
(T
Y
M
A
)
Wooden office desks
Wooden office furniture = < 80 cm height
Wooden office cupboards > 80 cm height
Wooden office furniture > 80 cm height 
AVERAGE UNIT PRICE
EU IMPORTS - KITCHEN AND BEDROOM 
FURNITURE
0.00
2.00
4.00
6.00
8.00
10.00
1988-89 1991-92 1994-95 1997-98 2000-01
$1
,0
00
/ m
et
ric
 to
n 
(T
Y
M
A
)
Kitchen furniture Bedroom furniture
AVERAGE UNIT PRICE
EU IMPORTS - DINING, LIVING ROOM, SHOP 
FURNITURE
0.00
2.00
4.00
6.00
8.00
10.00
1988-89 1991-92 1994-95 1997-98 2000-01
$1
,0
00
/ m
et
ric
 to
n 
(T
Y
M
A
)
Wooden furniture for dining rooms and living rooms 
Wooden furniture for shops 
Other wooden furniture 
 
 
Source: Calculated from Eurostat COMEXT data base 
56 
procedures used in logging and the rights of indigenous peoples. The second 
response to these environmental concerns has been the search for substitutes 
for hardwoods, such as rubberwood (predominantly from Thailand and Malaysia) 
(Mitsuhashi, 2006), and eucalyptus/saligna from Brazil and South Africa 
(Kaplinsky, Morris and Readman, 2001). 
 
As a consequence of these developments, there have been significant changes 
in the type of timber used in the global furniture industry14: 
 
• Hardwood production is shifting from Asia to Latin America, with Asia’s 
share forecasted to fall from 60 percent to 10 percent in 2000.  
 
• In terms of volume, the tropical timbers most in demand are lighter 
hardwoods such as lauan, meranti and seraya from Indonesia, Malaysia 
and the Philippines, and increasingly rubberwood and saligna 
 
• Over the last decade rubber wood, a tropical timber, has gained strong 
markets as a material for furniture production and saligna is also gaining 
ground rapidly 
 
• There has been an Increasing use of logs of smaller dimensions (e.g., 
rubberwood, melina, acacia, saligna, teak and pine) from fast-growing 
plantations.  
 
• As teak obtained from natural stands have become more scarce in 
Myanmar, the key Asian producer country, more producers are turning to 
plantation-grown teak, if end-use specifications allow it.  
 
• New bio-composite boards — extracted from oil palm residues, coconut 
shells or flattened bamboo — are being developed to help overcome the 
raw material shortages. 
 
These developments illustrate an industry in the process of global reconfiguration 
– the rapid growth of exports of labour-intensive final products, often 
incorporating capital and technology-intensive intermediates imported from high-
income economies. It is also an industry that is experiencing intense competition 
with new entrants and escalating price pressure, and subject to growing concerns 
and regulation on the environmental implications of logging and deforestation. It 
is an industry also where China is showing a growing presence, both with respect 
to final products and in relation to intermediate products. 
 
 
3. 2. THE CHINESE AND SSA FURNITURE INDUSTRIES 
 
Data on the SSA furniture industry is very poor. The overwhelming bulk of the 
continent’s production occurs in informal sector workshops, using a combination 
of locally-sourced timber, offcuts and timber supplies from the formal sector 
which are largely cut to meet the needs of the construction industry. These 
workshops target the domestic market for middle, and especially lower-middle 
and low-income consumers. Designs are unsophisticated, but often incorporate 
                                            
14  International Trade Forum - Issue 2/2001 
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ingenious use of local materials (such as tyre-offcuts for springs). With the 
exception of a very small craft segment, this informal sector has no presence in 
export markets.  
The major SSA furniture exporters are South Africa, the Ivory Coast (before the 
recent political turmoil) and Ghana. However, SSA’s main role in the global wood 
furniture value chain (as opposed to the furniture sector) is as a provider of timber 
to other producers, often at the cost of its own furniture sector (see below). In the 
context of the global economy, SSA’s furniture industry can therefore be 
characterised as an industry with potential, rather than one with a discrete 
presence. 
Although no data is available, SSA’s share of global furniture exports is 
miniscule. South Africa, overwhelmingly the largest exporter, had wooden 
furniture exports of less than $60m in 2004 (NPI, 2005), and even at its peak, 
Ghana’s furniture exports were less than $14m in 2001. This compares with 
global exports of $66bn in 2002. So, even with the most generous assumption 
that total exports are in the region of $100m, SSA’s share of global furniture 
exports were somewhat less than 1.5 percent in 2002. Since then, furniture 
exports from the largest exporter (South Africa) have fallen (see below), and 
global trade continues to grow, so that the current share of SSA in global markets 
is probably around one percent. As can be seen from Part 2 of this Report, this is 
much lower than its share of global clothing and textiles exports. This is because 
unlike the clothing sector where tariffs into the US and the EU are high (between 
16.6 and 32.2 percent), in the furniture sector tariffs are relatively low (Table 3.4). 
The real measure of this disparity between clothing and textiles and furniture is 
concerned is not to be found in the comparison of nominal rates of protection in 
the US and Europe. This is because the furniture industry uses domestic inputs, 
and there is little difference between the derived nominal and “effective rates of 
subsidy” provided to SSA producers by these tariff preferences. By contrast, the 
clothing and textiles sectors make extensive use of imported inputs, so that 
nominal rates of subsidy are much higher than effective rates of subsidy. In other 
words, in the furniture sector, SSA competes ineffectively on a much less uneven 
playing field, which is not adequately sloped in its favour. 
 
Table 3.4: Tariffs on furniture in major importing regions, 2005 
 
HS Number USA EU Japan Canada Australia 
9401 Logs 0 0-5.6% 0-3.8% 0-15.5% 0-10% 
9403 Timber 0 0-5.6% 0 0-9.5% 5% 
9404 Furniture 0-12.8% 3.7% 3.2-3.8% 8-15.5% 0- 7.5% 
Source: World Tariff Online15 
Compare this SSA continental performance with the dynamism of China’s 
furniture industry. The Chinese furniture industry consists of around 50,000 
companies and 5 million employees (CNFA 2003). Most of these companies are 
small- to medium-sized operations with annual sales less than $36 million ($U.S.) 
(or CNY ¥300 million). 90 percent of the companies are privately owned, stock-
                                            
15  http://www.tdctrade.com/main/industries/t2_2_15.htm (accessed on 09/01/06) 
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holding companies, as well as various joint ventures (Xu 2004a)16. Taiwanese 
“triangular manufacturers” have helped revolutionise local furniture-making 
sectors with state-of-the-art manufacturing facilities and modern business 
concepts (Wall Street Journal 2004; Lei and Mcgowin, 2002). It is estimated that 
Taiwanese companies are contributing 75 percent of the furniture export 
shipments from China (CNFA 2003). 
 
Between 1995 and 2002, Chinese furniture production grew in value from $6.8 to 
$20bn (Table 3.5), a compound annual growth rate of 17 percent. In the same 
period, exports grew from $1.1bn to $5.3bn, a compound annual growth rate of 
27 percent. The export ratio increased from 16 to 26.5 percent. Imports of 
furniture were negligible and showed little growth. Double digit annual growth is 
expected during this decade (Sun and Bean, 2001), driven both by export 
markets and increases in domestic furniture consumption17.  
 
Table 3.5: Chinese Furniture Industry (US$bn) 
 
 1995  2000  2002  Compound 
annual growth 
rate 1995–
2000 
Compound 
annual growth 
rate 2000–
2002 
Furniture 
production 
6.78  12.74  19.95  13%  25% 
Furniture 
exports 
1.10  3.65  5.30  27%  21% 
Furniture 
imports 
0.08  0.10  0.10  5%  0% 
Apparent 
domestic 
consumption 
of furniture 
5.76  9.19  14.75  10%  27% 
Source: Elaboration of CSIL data (Anon, 2001) and CNFA data (Anon, 2003), 
cited in Robb and Bin Xie (2003) 
In order to fuel this boom in production, Chinese forest products imports are 
growing quickly, rising from $6.4 billion in 1997 to $11.2 billion in 2002 (Sun et al. 
2004). As the world's second-largest wood products importer behind the United 
States, China imported 106.7m cubic metres in round wood equivalent (RWE) 
volume of wood products in 2003, more than double the 40.2m cubic metres of 
1997. Russia, Malaysia, Indonesia, New Zealand, and Thailand are the top five 
timber suppliers to the Chinese market. Much of these timber imports run against 
international conservations agreements and are illegal, both in the exporting 
economies and in China (Watts, 2005). It is forecasted that by 2010, domestic 
Chinese wood supplies will be 114m cubic metres, creating a shortfall of 99m 
cubic metres that needs to be filled by imports (Lague 2003). The furniture-
making sector will account for at least 18 percent of the country’s total wood 
consumption by 2010 (Xu, 2004; China National Furniture Association, 2004). 
 
                                            
16   Xiaozhi Cao, Hansen, Meiqi Xu and Boming Xu (2004) 
17  Robb and Bin Xie (2003)  
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3. 3. A CASE STUDY OF THE GARDEN FURNITURE INDUSTRIES IN SOUTH 
AFRICA AND GHANA 
Bearing in mind that this is a limited pilot project which identifies the emerging 
impact of China on SSA manufacturing exports, we focus on interviews with key 
informants in a particular segment of the wood furniture industry, that is, the 
garden furniture sector. We chose this sector since it represents the major wood 
furniture export from Ghana. Here we interviewed key informants which included: 
• Major global buyers of garden furniture 
• Producers of garden furniture in Ghana and South Africa 
• Producers of non-garden furniture in Ghana 
• Furniture retailers in Ghana. 
• Government officials and other key informants in both countries 
Although a restrictive sample in terms of numbers (especially in South Africa), 
these interviews identify important emerging trends. 
What do global buyers of garden furniture think about future trends in global 
sourcing? 
 
A group of fifteen firms exhibiting garden furniture, at GLEE 2005, the 
international garden and leisure exhibition at Birmingham were interviewed 
between the 18th and 20th September 2005. They ranged in size from small family 
business to large scale firms. All of these firms specialised in the import of garden 
furniture, predominantly for the UK market, but also for the continental European 
market. Most of this furniture was made from hardwoods. Some of the firms had 
product ranges covering wood and non-wood products, and all offered 
accessories such as cushions and parasols as part of their service. 
 
The major source of furniture imports was Indonesia, followed by China. 
Indonesia benefits from indigenous sources of certified teak, and most of the 
importers had long-standing relationships with Indonesian suppliers, ranging from 
three to 15 years. Unlike China where they had no contact with manufacturers 
themselves and purchased through third parties, there are generally direct links 
to Indonesian producers, who were visited on a frequent basis. Indonesian firms 
posses both the required technology and the skills. However, unlike the clothing 
and textile sector (see Part 2 above), importers paid little attention to labour 
standards and were much more focused on the use of certified timber. 
 
Notwithstanding Indonesia’s overall dominance as a supplier, China is a rapidly-
growing source of supply based in part on the use of hardwoods procured from 
West Africa, and substitute hardwoods such as rubberwood obtained from 
Malaysia. China’s particular strength lies in products combining different types of 
materials (for example, aluminium and wood) and cushions and parasols. 
Importers are concerned that some of China’s furniture exports use uncertified 
illegal timber sourced from Myanmar and this is one factor holding back the rapid 
progress of China as a source of supply. One advantage which China clearly 
holds is its flexibility as a suppler and also its design capabilities.  
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Whilst Indonesia and China dominate this sector, other suppliers are also 
important, notably Poland (a niche provider of hand-made oak swings), Sweden 
(low-cost softwood pine furniture), and Thailand and Vietnam. None of these 15 
importers either sourced from SSA or considered it likely that they would do so in 
the future, notwithstanding the fact that much of China’s garden furniture was 
made from timber sourced from West Africa.  
 
In addition to these importers, we interviewed the largest importer of Ghanaian 
garden furniture into Europe, using iroko a teak-like hardwood. It also sources 
hardwood furniture from China, Vietnam and Indonesia, softwood pine furniture 
from Poland and contemporary furniture (a hybrid wood and metal product series) 
from Central and Eastern Europe. Products are designed for the high-income 
niche market and are sold into both UK and continental EU markets. 
 
This importer has had a long-term relationship with Ghana’s major exporter of 
garden furniture, accounting at its peak for more than two-thirds of the Ghanaian 
firm’s exports. In the past it held a share of equity in the Ghanaian furniture 
manufacturing plant and a linked sawmill. Its link with the Ghanaian exporter 
began in the 1980s when it acted as a buyer for UK retailers. In 1992, the 
company developed a product line of garden furniture under its own brandname. 
Crucially, it rather than the Ghanaian producer was responsible for designing the 
products sold under this brandname.  
 
Despite the co-evolution of the UK and Ghanaian firms, and the link in equity, the 
UK-based importer gradually began to diversify its sourcing after the late 1990s. 
By 2001, only 56 percent of its furniture was sourced from Ghana, and this 
dropped further to 35 percent in 2005. Its imports from Ghana now account for 
over 95 percent of Ghanaian wood furniture exports. It is expected that the 
absolute value of orders from Ghana will remain constant, but market growth for 
garden furniture will be met from its other primary suppliers, China and Vietnam. 
It used to source from South Africa, but with the strengthening of the Rand (Part 
2, Figure 2.16 above), South Africa has been dropped as a source of supply. 
 
The major reason for diverting imports from Ghana to China and Vietnam is cost. 
The price of furniture from Asia is between 24 and 40 percent lower than similar 
products from Ghana. South African costs are 20 percent higher than those of 
Ghana (Table 3.6). 
 
Table 3.6: Price of a similar piece of garden furniture from selected countries, 2005 
  Average price Price index
Ghana  £50 100% 
South Africa £60 120% 
China  £30 60% 
Vietnam £38 76% 
 
Source: Company interview 
 
Delivery times work in Ghana’s favour with an average shipping time of 18 days 
(from the date of placing an order to reaching an UK port). Shipments from China 
and Vietnam take 28 days and 22 days for South Africa. However, speed of 
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delivery is much less important than on-time delivery. Ghana has no advantage 
over China in this respect. 
 
We asked this UK importer to rank the importance to their sourcing decision of 
national condition factors. We also asked the company to compare the national 
conditions of Ghana, China, Vietnam and South Africa. The results are presented 
in Figure 3.4.  China, and to a lesser extent Vietnam, import raw wood for 
production but access to material does not have any influence on sourcing 
decision of the buyers. Red tape is an important issue but local governments do 
not hinder the shipping of goods. Although there is differential performance 
between these supplying countries (with China and Vietnam generally being seen 
as more desirable locations), all of these four countries meet the firm’s minimum 
expectations. 
Figure 3.4. Buyer’s views on national conditions  
Importance scale (1=not important; 5=critical) 
Performance scale (1=poor; 5=excellent) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Company interview 
 
We also asked the UK buyer to rank the importance of physical infrastructure and 
human capital factors and to evaluate the performance of suppliers. Figure 3.5 
shows that the buyer considers the labour capabilities of China in general to be 
superior to that of other suppliers. Its workforce is better educated than the 
Ghana workforce. Corporate social responsibility is becoming an important issue 
for this buyer but the company was not in a position to comment on the 
performance of the suppliers. 
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Figure 3.5. Buyer’s views on physical infrastructure and human capital 
Importance scale (1=not important; 5=critical) 
Performance scale (1=poor; 5=excellent) 
 
Source: Company interview 
 
The buyer was also asked to consider operational factors (Figures 3.6 and 3.7). 
Cost, quality and on-time delivery are critical order winners. Products from Ghana 
performed better than other suppliers in delivery and quality factors while Asian 
products performed better on price. Chinese firms appear to be more ambitious 
however. The MD observed that:  
 
“On more than one occasion, our Chinese suppliers have offered an 
improvement on one of our designs and did not charge me for it.  Other 
suppliers would probably not be able to make this change. And if they 
could, they would send me a bill”.   
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Figure 3.6: Evaluation of operational factors, cost, quality, and delivery 
Importance scale (1=not important; 5=critical) 
Performance scale (1=poor; 5=excellent) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Company interview 
Figure 3.7. Evaluation of operation factors, technology and labour 
Importance scale (1=not important; 5=critical) 
Performance scale (1=poor; 5=excellent) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Company interview 
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What is happening on the ground in Ghana? 
Unfortunately there appears to be no structured analysis of the Ghanaian 
furniture value chain in general, or the garden furniture and exporting segments 
in particular. (The Furniture Manufacturing Association of Ghana has 
unsuccessfully tried to produce a census of the industry in recent years). A single 
firm is responsible for most furniture exports, and this comprises a mix of garden 
furniture to the EU (via its UK buyer – see above) and parquet flooring to Italy. It 
is estimated that informal-sector producers account for at least two-thirds of the 
local market (interviews with key informants). 
A number of factors define and dominate the Ghanaian furniture industry. The 
first arises from the global demand for certified hardwoods. The Ghanaian 
government has taken extensive steps to ensure that all of its hardwood timber 
supplies are of certified origin. There is no clear estimate of how successful this 
has been, and the extent of illegal logging. Second, complementing this policy on 
certification has been a ban on the export of unsawn logs. In order to preserve 
the local industry, the local saw mills are required to allocate at least 20 percent 
of their output to the local market. However, as in the case of South Africa 
(Kaplinsky, Morris and Readman, 2001), most of this timber is for the building 
industry, and furniture manufacturers have both to struggle for supplies and, 
more importantly, are unable to get the wood cuts in sizes or qualities which are 
suitable for furniture manufacture, particularly for the quality of furniture required 
to compete in external markets. Furniture manufacturers in Ghana therefore often 
resort to the use of illegal timber, roughly and inefficiently chain-sawn (with high 
wastage) in rural areas. None of this is helpful in achieving high quality products. 
A third problem confronting the local industry is the absence of complementary 
inputs, particularly aluminium and other metal fittings, but also soft furnishings 
(although these latter products are often acquired independently by external 
buyers). This is a growing problem as garden furniture becomes more innovative 
in design and wood is only part of a more complex product. A further problem 
inhibiting competitive production, particularly in export markets, is the short time-
horizon and high cost of capital (more than 20 percent p.a), and the fluctuating 
exchange rate which make exports a hazardous business. 
Almost all of the manufacturers we interviewed saw China as a problem. The 
major exporter described conditions in its external markets as being very tough. 
In the late 1990s China first entered global markets with poor quality products 
and suffered from an adverse reputation. However, subsequently Chinese 
producers began to use better woods, including hardwoods imported from West 
Africa, and have now become a very substantial threat, leading in a drop in its 
unit export prices. But manufactures targeting the local market also complained 
about Asian competition in general, and Chinese competition in particular. Some 
reported attempts to raise the matter with government in 2001, but to no avail; 
government’s over-riding concern has been with certification and the ban on 
exports of raw logs, and the furniture industry has had little lobbying power. In the 
face of these pressures, manufacturing firms reported either that they had given 
up all hope of exporting, or that they saw the emerging ECOWAS market as their 
primary target. We are unable to judge the realism of this response of targeting 
regional markets and none of our respondents seem to have considered this 
issue very thoroughly.  It may, therefore, be a matter of clutching at straws. A 
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number of furniture firms had either reduced their labour forces, or expected to do 
so in the near future.  
Ghana’s furniture industry is not in a robust state of health. 
 
What is happening on the ground in South Africa? 
Nor is the South African wood furniture industry in a robust state of health. The 
recent NPI Customised Sector Programme (NPI, 2005) shows a “furniture 
industry” dominated by the export of leather automobile seats. After achieving 
steady growth between 1963 and 2003 (73 percent in real terms), real output 
began to decline after 2002. This reflected both a fall in exports (wooden furniture 
exports declined from R892m in 2003 to R629m in 2004) and an increase in 
imports. The share of imports in domestic consumption rose from four percent in 
1995 to 21 percent in 2002. Employment in the furniture industry remained fairly 
stable after reaching its peak in 1989 (43,000), but with the sharp fall in exports 
after 2002, fell back to 38,000 in 2004. Profitability is low and many firms are on 
the edge of shedding labour. (All data in this paragraph from NPI, 2005). 
The NPI study ascribed these systemic weaknesses to a combination of poor 
manufacturing processes (with high inventories and outdated equipment), poor 
design and R&D capabilities, high wages and the absence of government 
support. These corroborate the conclusions of Kaplinsky, Morris and Readman 
(2001), who also point to weaknesses in the whole chain, particularly in the links 
between furniture manufacturers, timber suppliers and the forestry sector. There 
are additional problems which arise from high levels of ownership concentration, 
not just in the furniture sector, but throughout the chain (Kaplinsky and Manning, 
1999). 
The NPI study concludes with a depressing message: 
The future of the furniture industry may not immediately hang in the 
balance, but trends suggest that the SA furniture [industry] is moving in 
the direction of ruin” (NPI, 2005:18) 
Our interviews with two garden furniture exporters are illustrative of these general 
trends, and also point to the specific impact of China and other Asian 
competitors. 
The first manufacturer specialises in garden furniture which account for 70 
percent of total sales, selling both into the domestic market and into the 
continental EU market. But falling global prices and a rising domestic currency 
have made export sales very unattractive and exports as a share of sales have 
fallen from 40 percent of sales in 2000 to 10 percent in 2005. Sales fell in current 
Rand prices by one-third between 2003 and 2004. The major external 
competitors are Asian-based, with China and Indonesia being particularly active 
in global markets. There are plans to take over an ailing South African producer 
and to target future export growth by diversifying into indoor furniture and 
developing a brandname. 
The second manufacturer uses saligna hardwood substitutes and produced both 
garden and indoor furniture. Sales rose between 2005 and 2004 (from $1.5m to 
$1.7m), but on the back of falling profitability. In 2003 the labour force was 
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halved, and mechanisation and improved manufacturing processes have seen a 
sharp rise in productivity. Export prices have not risen in relation to either costs or 
domestic prices, and the share of exports has fallen from 50 percent in 2000 to 
30 percent in 2005. Two factors are reported as undermining competitiveness in 
external markets. The first is the appreciating exchange rate, and the second is 
competition from Vietnam and China. As the operations manager observed, 
Down the road from us there is a large saligna forest and sawmill. 
This facility is FSC certified and we buy from them. Lately they 
have been selling timber to Vietnam. It’s expensive to send timber 
by ship. The Vietnamese manufacturers use Australian designs 
and turn out good quality - and cheap – products. Well, furniture 
made from South African trees, produced in Vietnam, can be 
bought in Cape Town and Durban. And this will be cheaper than 
anything we can make.  
 
 
3.4. WHITHER THE SSA FURNITURE SECTOR 
 
The evidence presented above on the SSA industry makes for blunt reading. 
Most of the continent’s furniture industry is inward-oriented and involves the 
informal sector using low-grade timber and timber offcuts (often involving 
wasteful chainsawn timber) to produce basic products for middle- and low-income 
domestic consumers. In some cases, particularly in West Africa, this involves the 
illegal use of uncertified timber, leading to a depletion of scarce global hardwood 
supplies, and contributing to global warming. 
 
The increasingly scarce hardwood timber in which West Africa has a comparative 
advantage, and the hardwood substitute (saligna) in which South Africa has a 
comparative advantage is being exported on a growing scale to Asia in general, 
and China in particular. Partly on the back of timber sourced from other countries, 
China has become a growing presence in global furniture markets, and SSA firms 
are unable to compete effectively with them. It is not just China which threatens 
SSA’s furniture industry in global markets, but other Asian economies such as 
Indonesia, Vietnam and Thailand. And it is not just SSA which is threatened in 
this way, since Thai rubberwood furniture manufacturers (who pioneered the use 
of rubberwood for furniture) are being squeezed out of Japanese markets by 
Chinese competitors using rubberwood imported from Thailand and Malaysia 
(Mitsuhashi, 2006). 
 
As a consequence of this Asia-based competition, furniture exports from SSA 
have therefore come to be threatened by a combination of falling prices, reduced 
profitability and falling and evaporating market shares. To be blunt, SSA’s export-
oriented furniture industry is at a crisis point, if that crisis-point has not already 
been reached. But it is not just the export-market which has been threatened. 
The liberalisation of imports into SSA has meant growing domestic competition 
from low-cost Chinese and Asian sourced furniture. This, too, threatens the 
survival of the formal sector furniture-manufacturing sector throughout SSA. 
 
The threat to the furniture industry has not had an adverse effect on all of the 
wood furniture value chain, since many SSA economies have seen largely stable 
and even growing exports of timber, logs and chips and pulp for the paper 
industry. For example, in 2004, South Africa’s exports of all forestry-related 
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products had grown to $1.3bn, from $794m in 2000; almost all of this was pulp 
and chips for the paper industry, in which it is a major player, and wood furniture 
exports were less than $50m. Similarly, in 2004, Ghana exported $105m of sawn 
timber, compared to $77m in 2000, and less than $9m of wood furniture.18   
 
This pilot study of the furniture sector has been hampered by the absence of 
systematic and detailed data on these sectors. Even the relatively-sophisticated 
South African dataset is based on highly aggregated figures, and provides little 
insights into the underlying processes which determine systemic inefficiency. We 
know that this inefficiency is not confined to individual segments in the wood and 
furniture value chain, but also arises from poor levels of coordination between 
segments in the chain as a whole (Kaplinsky, Morris and Readman, 2001 for 
South Africa). As a consequence we are not only unsure which policy levers to 
tap, but also what the impacts are of this systemic weakness on economic 
growth, on growth multipliers, on the agricultural sector, on employment, and on 
poverty and urban and rural livelihoods. 
 
 
3.5. POLICY 
 
During the late 1980s and early 1990s there was a lively debate in South African 
industrial policy on the necessity of “beneficiating” raw materials (Joffee et al, 
1995). This mirrored the debate in the development literature on the nature of 
dependency in the developing world (for example, Girvan, 1987). On the one 
hand, it was argued that a primary route for industrialisation in low income 
economies was to take advantage of resource-endowments and to become 
processors of these raw materials. Thus, for example, the existence of a natural 
advantage in forestry (tropical trees grow more rapidly and more dense in a 
shorter period of time than they do in temperate climates), meant that developing 
countries should develop a comparative advantage in industries which use 
timber, such as furniture. The policy implication of this was that local raw material 
processors should get privileged access to these inputs. On the other hand, the 
counter-argument was that the post-war industrialising economies in Asia (Japan 
and then the Asian Tigers) had performed well despite (and perhaps because of) 
having no access to these raw materials. They imported these from the lowest-
cost producers and added value to them very efficiently. There was no reason 
why local processors should be favoured, and they should be forced to source 
their inputs at the landed cost of imports. Market prices should prevail. 
 
Clearly, the systemic weaknesses of SSA furniture manufactures means that they 
are unable to add value to their timber as efficiently as their Chinese and other 
Asian competitors. This leaves two sets of related policy-issues to be confronted. 
The first is whether SSA’s furniture industry is in some sense disabled by 
comparison with its competitors by factors exogenous to the enterprise. This may 
be due to poor infrastructure, to high interest rates, to fluctuating and 
uncompetitive exchange rates or to system-wide underinvestment in public goods 
such as basic education. These are policies which are of general relevance, 
targeting market failures which affect all industry and are not to be met via 
sectorally targeted industrial development. 
                                            
18  With the exception of the estimate for Ghana’s wood furniture exports (derived from interviews 
with key industry informants), all figures are drawn from FAOSTAT website, accessed 9th January 
2006 
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The second set of policy issues relates to the specific needs of the furniture 
sector. This involves targeted measures to promote its efficiency such as 
furniture-training programmes, the promotion furniture-design skills, firm-level 
furniture upgrading initiatives, subsidised access to finance and the facilitation of 
value chain coordination and efficiency. For these policies to be justified it would 
need to be shown that the furniture industry is either specifically disabled by 
comparison with other sectors, or that it holds a place of strategic importance in 
overall industrial development. These strategic issues were considered above. 
 
There is one final set of policy conclusions which can be derived from the 
experience of SSA’s clothing and textile sector and analysed in Part 2 above. 
This is that the only factor sustaining the labour- and export-oriented clothing 
sector was the availability of trade preferences in external markets. These trade 
preferences were designed to provide significant support to SSA industry, with 
implicit effective rates of subsidy of between 28 and 84 percent. These effective 
rates of subsidy were much higher than the nominal preference rates since SSA 
clothing exporters can access duty-free imported inputs and obtain tariff 
protection on the nominal cif cost of imported products rather than on their value 
added. This arises from a special derogation to the AGOA provisions, which is 
not only specific to that sector, but holds less potential in a wood furniture 
industry utilising domestic inputs. 
 
 
 
69 
REFERENCES FOR PART 3 
 
China National Furniture Association (CNFA). (2003). China Furniture 
Association Annual Report, 2003. CNFA, Beijing, China. 120 pp. (in 
Chinese) Quoted in Xiaozhi Cao X., Eric N. Hansen, Meiqi Xu, Boming Xu 
(2004) China’s Furniture Industry Today,   USA: Forest Products Journal 
Vol. 54, No. 11. 
European Commission (1997). Panorama of EU Industries-1997: Furniture. 
Brussels, European Commission. 
Girvan, N. (1987), “Transnational Corporations and Non-fuel Primary 
Commodities in Developing Countries”, World Development, Vol. 15, No. 
3, pp. 713-740. 
Joffe A., D. Kaplan, R. Kaplinsky and D. Lewis (1995), Improving Manufacturing 
Performance: The Report of the ISP, Cape Town: University of Cape 
Town Press. 
Kaplinsky, R., M. Morris and J. Readman (2001), “The globalisation of product 
markets and immiserising growth: Lessons from the South African 
furniture industry”, mimeo, Brighton: Institute of Development Studies, and 
Durban: School of Development Studies. 
Kaplinsky R. and C. Manning (1999), “Concentration, competition policy and the 
role of small and medium sized enterprises in South Africa's Industrial 
Development”, Journal of Development Studies, Vol. 35, No. 1, pp. 139-
161. 
Lei, S. and  M. Mcgowin. (2002). If we can’t beat them, let’s work together. US: 
Wood & Wood Products Oct.:63-67. 
Mitsuhashi, K. (2006), “The Furniture Value Chain from Thailand to Japan: 
Upgrading and the Roles of Buyers”, D Phil Dissertation, Brighton: 
University of Sussex. 
NPI (2005), Customised Sector Programme: Furniture, Pretoria, National 
Productivity Institute. 
Robb D., Bin Xie (2003) A Survey Of Manufacturing Strategy And Technology In 
The Chinese Furniture Industry, Great Britain: European Management 
Journal Vol. 21, No. 4, pp. 484–496 
Spalding, Josephine, (2001),  ‘Industry Trade Summary, Furniture and Motor 
Vehicle Seats’, USITC Publication 3382, January 2001, Washington, D.C.: 
US International Trade Commission 
Watts, J. (2005), “China consumes forests of smuggled timber”, The Guardian, 
April 22nd, http://www.guardian.co.uk/china/story/0,,1466021,00.html, 
accessed  9th January 2006. 
Xiaozhi Cao X., Eric N. Hansen, Meiqi Xu, Boming Xu (2004) China’s Furniture 
Industry Today,   USA: Forest Products Journal Vol. 54, No. 11.  
 
 
70 
ANNEX 1 
 
PREDICTIONS OF POST 2005 TEXTILE AND APPAREL SECTORS. 
 
Various predictions were made on the outcomes of quota removal on the 1st of 
January 2005. These can be grouped into four categories – those relating to the 
impact of poverty, those relating to the impact on the structure of the global 
industry, those relating to the impact on Asia, and those affecting AGOA 
economies. 
 
1. Projected impact on poverty 
One of the major concerns arising from the elimination of quotas on textile and 
apparel in 2005 was the impact on the workers and poverty. Table A1 focuses on 
key countries, to show the number of people who might be under threat from the 
post quota competition 
 
Figure A1: Expected Impact of Elimination of Quotas post 2005 on Selected 
Countries. 
 Prospects for the 
garment industry 
 
Prospects for 
garment workers 
and communities
 
Dependence on 
garment industry 
* 
 
Bangladesh Severely challenged 
– Export decline and 
job losses expected, 
although should 
remain a significant 
garment exporter. 
Very Vulnerable 
Few other job 
opportunities for 
women workers. 
Dependent 
 1,800,000 
workers,  
40% jobs  
62% exports 
Mexico Severely challenged 
in the immediate 
future. NAFTA and 
proximity to US remain 
big advantages. 
Poor – but some 
other industrial job 
opportunities 
exist. 
Declining but 
still significant  
750,000 workers 
18% of jobs  
6% exports 
Cambodia Unclear – differences 
of opinion over future 
competitiveness. 
Extremely 
Vulnerable Few 
other job 
opportunities for 
women workers. 
Dependent  
250,000 workers  
62% of jobs  
82 % of exports 
Lesotho Unclear – Lesotho has 
been AGOA success 
story, but vulnerable to 
competition after 2005. 
Extremely 
vulnerable Very 
poor country with 
no other industrial 
employers 
Dependent  
45,000 workers  
90 + % of jobs 
 90 + % of exports 
* % of jobs in this column indicates % of industrial employment, % of exports 
indicates % of manufactured exports, most recently quoted figures. 
Source: Business for Social Responsibility (2005) 
 
Shaded boxes indicate those countries with most cause for concern in each area. 
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2. Projected impact on global trade in textile and apparel: 
 
The key points merging from the literature surveyed in Table Figure A2 below are 
as follows: 
 
• The main beneficiaries after the quota removal would be countries which 
had previously been subject to high quota restraints, such as China and 
India. 
• With increased competitiveness the prices in the sectors will be driven 
down. Consequently, retailers will move to low cost suppliers, and high 
labour cost countries will lose employment.  
• Lead times and proximity to markets will play as differentiating factors in 
choice of suppliers for retailers and provide scope in some product 
markets for flexible producers close to final markets 
• New investments in countries which previously enjoyed preferential 
access, will tail-off. 
• The negative impact is likely to be highest for countries with a larger 
dependence on those categories of textiles and apparel which were 
previously quota constrained and protected.  
• After 2005, China will become the dominant textile and apparel exporter, 
while Indonesia, Vietnam, India and Mexico will become the second tier 
suppliers at the global level.19 
• It is unclear whether the preference margin given to preferential agreement 
countries, will be large enough to offset the price advantage which other 
Asian countries have, once the quotas are removed20.  
• “Analysts predict countries that fully utilize their quotas in the years 
preceding 2005 will increase their exports after that date. However those 
countries not fully utilizing their quotas will unlikely benefit and many will 
lose market share from quota elimination as they face intense competition, 
which they have not experienced before.”21 
• Results of general equilibrium models run are given below: 
• At a regional level, producers in NAFTA, SSA and the Caribbean Basin 
Initiative grouping are most likely to be adversely affected, and those in 
Asia and China most positively affected by quota removal (Figure A.2). 
                                            
19 The Global Apparel Value Chain: What prospects for Upgrading by Developing Countries 
20 Eckart Naumann; (2005) Textiles and clothing: reflections on the sectors integration into the post quota 
environment. 
21 Pg: 27 USAID (2005) Impact and end of MFA quotas on comesa’s textile and apparel exports under 
AGOA. 
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Figure A2: Summary of literature on projected global impact of quota removal 
 
Author / Year Publication Prediction 
G.Gereffi and 
O. 
Memedovic 
(2003) 
UNIDO 
 
The Global Apparel 
Value Chain: What 
prospects for 
Upgrading by 
Developing 
Countries 
 
The main beneficiaries after the quota removal 
would be countries which had previously been 
subject to high quota restraints, such as China and 
India. 
With increased competitiveness the prices in the 
sectors will be driven down. Consequently, retailers 
will move to low cost suppliers, and high labour cost 
countries will lose employment.  
Lead times and proximity to markets will play as 
differentiating factors in choice of suppliers for 
retailers and provide scope in some product 
markets for flexible producers close to final markets 
New investments in countries which previously 
enjoyed preferential access, will tail-off. 
The negative impact is likely to be highest for 
countries with a larger dependence on those 
categories of textiles and apparel which were 
previously quota constrained and protected.  
After 2005, China will become the dominant textile 
and apparel exporter, while Indonesia, Vietnam, 
India and Mexico will become the second tier 
suppliers at the global level. 
 
Eckart 
Naumann; 
(2005) 
Tralac 
working 
paper 
no1/2005 
Textiles and 
clothing: reflections 
on the sectors 
integration into the 
post quota 
environment 
 
It is unclear whether the preference margin given to 
preferential agreement countries, will be large 
enough to offset the price advantage which other 
Asian countries have, once the quotas are removed 
 USAID (7: 
2005)  
 
Manchester 
Trade Team 
Impact and end of 
MFA quotas on 
comesa’s textile 
and apparel 
exports under 
AGOA 
“Analysts predict countries that fully utilize their 
quotas in the years preceding 2005 will increase 
their exports after that date. However those 
countries not fully utilizing their quotas will unlikely 
benefit and many will lose market share from quota 
elimination as they face intense competition, which 
they have not experienced before.” 
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Naumann E. (2005), Textiles and clothing: Reflections on the sector’s integration 
into the post-quota environment, TRALAC Working Paper No 1/2005. 
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Figure A3: Characteristics of selected analytical studies relating to the ATC 
Year Authors Database Model 
Characteristics 
Policy 
Simulation 
General Results 
2001 Francois 
and 
Spinanger 
GTAP 4 (base 
year 1995) 
quota prices for 
Hong Kong for 
1998/99 
Standard Static 
GTAP model and 
parameters 
Quota removal 
plus Uruguay 
Round trade 
liberalization in 
the context of 
China’s WTO 
accession. 
(Focus. Hong 
Kong) 
Textile and clothing exports from 
Asia (especially South Asia) 
increase substantially. Preferential 
access to the USA and EU will be 
reduced and there would be a shift 
in demand away from countries 
like Mexico and Turkey. SSA’s 
exports will also drop. 
2001 Terra GTAP 4 (base 
year 1995) 
Standard Static 
GTAP model and 
parameters 
1)quota removal 
and 2)quota 
removal plus tariff 
reductions 
(focus: Latin 
America) 
Developing countries subject to the 
biggest quantitative restrictions 
would expand their exports at the 
expense of importing developed 
countries, but also of other 
developing countries which are 
less restricted(i.e. Latin America) 
MERCOSUR and Chile would 
reduce their exports of clothing 
significantly, and their exports 
textiles moderately. Effects would 
be stronger in 2) rather than in 1). 
2001 Avisse and 
Fouquin 
GTAP 4 (base 
Year 1995) 
Standard Static 
GTAP model and 
parameters 
Quota Removal Output share of Asia increases 
from 12 % to 18%. China’s exports 
would increase by 87%, South and 
South East Asia’s would increase 
by 36%. Latin America and NAFTA 
would loose 39% and 27% 
respectively. 
2001 Diao and 
Somwaru 
GTAP 5 (Base 
year 1997) 25 
year Base line 
Counterfactual 
analysis using an 
inter-temporal 
version of GTAP 
MFA phase out 
simulated by 
improving the 
efficiency of textile 
and apparel 
exports from 
constrained 
countries. Other 
trade barriers on 
textile and apparel 
imports are 
reduced by 30 to 
40% in all 
countries. They 
econometrically 
estimate that a 
percent increase 
in apparel trade 
shares is 
associated with a 
3.3 percent 
increase in per 
capita income 
The annual growth of world textile 
and apparel trade would be more 
than 5% higher. Market share of 
developing countries as a whole 
would increase by 4 percentage 
points following the ATC. China 
would gain almost 3 percentage 
points of the world textile and 
apparel market, while other Asian 
countries would capture more than 
2%. Non-quota developing 
countries are predicted to lose 
about 20% of their markets (equal 
to 2.3 percentage points of world 
total textile and apparel markets) to 
the restrained ones. 
2002 Matoo, 
Roy and 
Subramani
an 
Data collected 
by authors 
Partial equilibrium. 
ETE’s derived 
from Kathuria and 
Bharadwaj (2000) 
Leontief 
production. Export 
elasticities from 1 
to 5 
Interaction 
between the ATC 
and the AGOA 
rules of origin for 
Mauritius and 
Madagascar 
Under the current AGOA system, 
the apparel exports of Mauritius 
and Madagascar would be about 
26% and 19% lower respectively 
following 2005. If AGOA’s rules of 
origin requirement is eliminated, 
the decline in Mauritius’s exports 
would be only 18% and 
Madagascar exports could 
increase.  
2002 Lankes GTAP 5 (base 
year 1997) 
Standard Static 
GTAP model and 
parameters 
Quota removal Total export revenue loss 
attributed to the MFA quotas 
estimated to be $22 billion for 
developing countries and $33 
billion for the world as a whole.  
Source: USITC Publication 3671 (2004) 
75 
 
 
3. Predicted impact on China 
 
China (and India) will dominate the post quota world, with China’s share alone 
estimated at 50 percent22 
• China will double its exports of clothing and textile, achieving 50% of 
the global trade (Lanchovichina and Martin, 2001; Spinanger, 2003) 
• The expansion of Chinese exports will be hampered by the uncertainty 
regarding imposition of safety measures, when exports surge in 2005. 
• US importers plan to diversify into other low cost producers other than 
China, however China will become the ‘supplier of choice’ for most23. 
• Hong Kong will move its major processing to mainland China, to take 
advantage of the cheap and productive labour. However their extreme 
reliance on Chinese labour could make them vulnerable as both labour 
and land costs are rising in China24.  
• China will receive significant growth towards the end of the decade, 
but only a modest increase in apparel production in the short term after 
quota removals.25 
• China might implement a minimum export price below which products 
cannot be shipped in a number of categories including those exported 
from the COMESA region. This would serve as an inducement for 
Chinese exporters to move into higher-niche exports leaving more 
basic apparel open to African exporters.26 
                                            
22  Hildegunn Kyvik Nordas (2004) The Global Textile and Clothing Industry post the Agreement on 
Textiles and Clothing.  
23 USITC (2004) Publication no. 3671 
24 The Global Apparel Value Chain: What Prospects for Upgrading by Developing Countries?  
25 Managing the Transition to a Responsible Global Textiles and Garment Industry  (2004) 
26 Pg: 3USAID (2005) Impact and end of MFA quotas on comesa’s textile and apparel exports under AGOA. 
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Figure A4: Summary of literature on projected global impact of quota 
removal on China 
 
Author /Year Publication Prediction 
Hildegunn Kyvik 
Nordas (2004) 
Discussion paper 
No. 5. WTO : 
Geneva 
The Global Textile 
and Clothing Industry 
post the Agreement 
on Textiles and 
Clothing 
China (and India) will dominate the post quota 
world, with China’s share alone estimated at 50 
percent 
WTO estimate that India share would grow from 
4-15%, China from 16-50% and SSA share 
decline by 70% 
Lanchovichina and 
Martin, (2001) 
World Economy, 
24:9  
Implications of 
China’s accession to 
the WTO for China 
and the WTO 
China will double its exports of clothing and 
textile, achieving 50% of the global trade 
USITC (2004)  Publication no. 3671 The expansion of Chinese exports will be 
hampered by the uncertainty regarding 
imposition of safety measures, when exports 
surge in 2005 
US importers plan to diversify into other low 
cost producers other than China, however 
China will become the ‘supplier of choice’ for 
most 
G.Gereffi and O. 
Memedovic 
(2003) 
UNIDO 
 
The Global Apparel 
Value Chain: What 
prospects for 
Upgrading by 
Developing Countries 
Hong Kong will move its major processing to 
mainland China, to take advantage of the 
cheap and productive labour. However their 
extreme reliance on Chinese labour could make 
them vulnerable as both labour and land costs 
are rising in China 
2005 
Business for 
Social 
Responsibility; The 
World Bank / 
Institute of Social 
and Ethical 
Accountability 
(accountability), 
Managing the 
Transition to a 
Responsible Global 
Textiles and Garment 
Industry   
China will receive significant growth towards 
the end of the decade, but only a modest 
increase in apparel production in the short term 
after quota removals 
USAID (2005) 
 
Manchester Trade 
Team 
Impact and end of 
MFA quotas on 
COMESA’S textile 
and apparel exports 
under AGOA 
China might implement a minimum export price 
below which products cannot be shipped in a 
number of categories including those exported 
from the COMESA region. This would serve as 
an inducement for Chinese exporters to move 
into higher-niche exports leaving more basic 
apparel open to African exporters 
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4. Predictions for SSA and AGOA eligible countries 
 
• AGOA will provide real opportunities to Africa. Even on conservative 
estimates about Africa’s supply response, Africa’s non-oil exports 
could be increase by about 8-11 percent. If the stringent rules of origin 
did not exist, AGOA would have multiplied the effect five fold, resulting 
in an overall increase in non-oil exports to US $ 0.54 billion compared 
with the US $ 100-140 million increase that is expected in the 
presence of these restrictions27. 
• Africa’s apparel export will fall by over 30 percent with the dismantling 
of the MFA28.  
• Competition from China in third world markets is less of a challenge to 
the countries of the regions than to those of South and South-east Asia 
which have specialized in exporting labour intensive manufacturers, 
particularly textiles and garments. The major exception to this is 
Lesotho, which over the last few years developed a significant garment 
industry which is threatened by the ending of the MFA. India is much 
les of a competitive threat in third world markets as compared to 
China.29 
• It seems highly unlikely that there has been a significant diversion of 
FDI from Africa to China or Asia.30 
• The ITC concluded that before the MFA expired, US retailers were 
increasing their purchasing under AGOA since they did not have to 
pay duties on their imports. However, without quotas on non-SSA 
suppliers, the absence of duties likely would not retain the Sub 
Sahara’s competitive advantage except in cases where import duties 
are high. (man-made fibre) 
• COMESA suppliers will have to compete against increased amounts of 
competitively priced apparel available from countries formally limited 
by quantitative restrictions. Unrestrained suppliers will be freed from 
paperwork, AGOA suppliers will not.   
• It is unclear whether the tariff remission on AGOA countries will be 
large enough to offset the price advantage that the Asian producers 
can carry. 31 
• South Africa will lose share in the US apparel exports, despite the 
AGOA preferences.  
• The East African Standard has estimated that in Kenya, 25,000 
employees working in 37 textile manufacturing firms might lose their 
jobs during the first post MFA year.32  
• With the phasing out of third country fibre allowance of AGOA by the 
end of 2007, countries will have to look inwards for fabric. The ITC 
report cites a company estimate that the cost of standard cotton cloth 
                                            
27 Aditya Mattoo, Devesh Roy and Arvind Subramanian (2002) The African Growth and Opportunity Act 
and its Rules of Origin; Generosity Undermined? 
28 Aditya Mattoo, Devesh Roy and Arvind Subramanian (2002) The African Growth and Opportunity Act 
and its Rules of Origin; Generosity Undermined? 
29 Jenkins and Edward (2005) The Effect of China and India’s growth and trade liberalization on Poverty in 
Africa. 
30 Jenkins and Edward (2005) The Effect of China and India’s growth and trade liberalization on Poverty in 
Africa.  
31 Eckart Naumann; (2005) Textiles and clothing: reflections on the sectors integration into the post quota 
environment. 
32 Pg: 3USAID (2005) Impact and end of MFA quotas on comesa’s textile and apparel exports under AGOA. 
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imported from China imported into Lesotho was $ 0.58 per square 
yard, compared to $ 1.57 for identical fabric produced in South Africa 
 
Figure A5: Summary of literature on projected global impact of quota removal on 
SSA 
 
Author /Year Publication Prediction 
Aditya Mattoo, 
Devesh Roy and 
Arvind 
Subramanian 
(2002) 
The World Bank; 
Development 
Research Group 
Trade Policy 
Research Working 
Paper No. 2908 
The African 
Growth and 
Opportunity Act 
and its Rules of 
Origin; Generosity 
Undermined? 
Africa’s apparel export will fall by over 30 
percent with the dismantling of the MFA. 
However the negative impact could be nearly 
fully offset if the stringent rules of origin did not 
exist, AGOA would have multiplied the effect 
five fold, resulting in an overall increase in 
non-oil exports to US $ 0.54 billion compared 
with the US $ 100-140 million increase that is 
expected in the presence of these restrictions 
Jenkins and 
Edward (2005) 
 
DFID  
The Effect of 
China and India’s 
growth and trade 
liberalization on 
Poverty in Africa 
Competition from China in third world markets 
is less of a challenge to the countries of the 
regions than to those of South and South-east 
Asia which have specialized in exporting 
labour intensive manufacturers, particularly 
textiles and garments. The major exception to 
this is Lesotho, which over the last few years 
developed a significant garment industry which 
is threatened by the ending of the MFA. India 
is much les of a competitive threat in third 
world markets as compared to China 
It seems highly unlikely that there has been a 
significant diversion of FDI from Africa to 
China or Asia 
Eckart Naumann; 
(2005) 
Tralac working 
paper no1/2005 
Textiles and 
clothing: 
reflections on the 
sectors integration 
into the post quota 
environment 
The ITC concluded that before the MFA 
expired, US retailers were increasing their 
purchasing under AGOA since they did not 
have to pay duties on their imports. However, 
without quotas on non-SSA suppliers, the 
absence of duties likely would not retain the 
Sub Sahara’s competitive advantage except in 
cases where import duties are high. (man-
made fibre) 
COMESA suppliers will have to compete 
against increased amounts of competitively 
priced apparel available from countries 
formally limited by quantitative restrictions. 
Unrestrained suppliers will be freed from 
paperwork, AGOA suppliers will not.   
It is unclear whether the tariff remission on 
AGOA countries will be large enough to offset 
the price advantage that the Asian producers 
can carry 
USAID (3: 2005) 
 
Manchester Trade 
Team 
Impact and end of 
MFA quotas on 
COMESA’S textile 
and apparel 
exports under 
AGOA 
South Africa will lose share in the US apparel 
exports, despite the AGOA preferences 
The East African Standard has estimated that 
in Kenya, 25,000 employees working in 37 
textile manufacturing firms might lose their 
jobs during the first post MFA year 
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ANNEX 2; AGOA EXPORT PERFORMANCE COMPARED TO INDIA AND A 
CLUSTER OF ASIAN COMPETITORS (CAMBODIA, VIETNAM, HONG KONG, 
MALAYSIA, INDONESIA, TAIWAN, KOREA) 
 
Notes on Tables in Annex 2. 
 
• Data has been collected from the USITC website using 10 digit HTS item 
codes - http://dataweb.usitc.gov data, accessed on 11th February 2006 
 
• The Total value in $ terms, shows the value of all exports of garments 
to the US, from the selected countries, and only in the case of South 
Africa, does it contain values of textiles and garments. 
 
• The top 5 products shown, and the average for the top 10 products 
are based on the top 10 products by $ value in 2004, for the selected 
countries. 
• Market shares are calculated for each product, according to the total 
value of exports to the US in that particular product.  
 
• All comparisons with China, India and East Asia are done for products 
in the same category as exported by the selected case studies. 
 
• The weighted average shows the percentage change in the average 
value, average price and average market share. 
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AGOA versus China; Top 5 AGOA clothing exports to US, 2005 versus 2004 
Item AGOA exports 
2005 ($) 
Value change 
(%) 
 05/04 
Unit price 
change (%) 
 05/04 
AGOA market share 
(%) 
 
 
China market 
share (%) 
  AGOA China AGOA China 2001 2004 2005 2004 2005 
Total 1,460,600,000 -17 58   1.6 3 2 16 23 
1 162,100,000 -21.4 215.3 -6.5 -57.5 4.34 5.4 4.0 1.8 5.5 
2 113,600,000 -22.7 82.5 -10.2 -67.7 3.61 6.7 4.7 2.3 3.8 
3 116,700,000 -18.1 231.3 4.7 -53.5 2.27 6.1 4.5 4.3 13.0 
4 98,200,000 17.3 138.2 -8.5 -45.1 2.97 5.2 5.5 1.7 3.5 
5 74,400,000 -1.2 442.0 -3.4 -34.1 3.53 4.2 3.6 1.5 7.1 
Avg  
Top 
10* 
76,400,000 -14.7 161.1 -0.9 -45.9 3.4 
 
5.3 4.3 3.3 8.0
*weighted average 
 
AGOA versus India; Top 5 AGOA clothing exports to US, 2005 versus 2004 
Item AGOA exports 
2005 ($) 
Value change 
(%) 
 05/04 
Unit price 
change (%) 
 05/04 
AGOA market share 
(%) 
India market 
share (%) 
  AGOA India AGOA India 2001 2004 2005 2004 2005 
Total 1,460,600,000 -17 36   
1.6 
3 2 3 4 
1 162,100,000 -21.4 79.6 -6.5 -20.7 4.34 5.4 4.0 1.6 2.8 
2 113,600,000 -22.7 22.8 -10.2 -23.1 3.61 6.7 4.7 5.0 5.6 
3 116,700,000 -18.1 78.2 4.7 -20.7 2.27 6.1 4.5 2.3 3.7 
4 98,200,000 17.3 171.4 -8.5 -37.6 2.97 5.2 5.5 0.2 0.4 
5 74,400,000 -1.2 134.2 -3.4 3.1 3.53 4.2 3.6 0.2 0.3 
 
AGOA versus E Asia; Top 5 AGOA clothing exports to US, 2005 versus 2004 (Cambodia, 
Vietnam, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Indonesia, Taiwan, Korea) 
Item AGOA exports  
2005 ($) 
Value change 
(%) 
 05/04 
Unit price 
change (%) 
 05/04 
AGOA market share (%) E Asia market 
share (%) 
  AGOA E Asia AGOA E Asia 2001 2004 2005 2004 2005 
Total 1,460,600,000 -17 -3   1.6 3 2 21 19 
1 162,100,000 -21.4 44.9 -6.5 -2.3 4.34 5.4 4.0 20.6 28.2 
2 113,600,000 -22.7 31.7 -10.2 -12.7 3.61 6.7 4.7 12.5 15.1 
3 116,700,000 -18.1 10.1 4.7 -7.3 2.27 6.1 4.5 30.0 30.2 
4 98,200,000 17.3 9.0 -8.5 -3.8 2.97 5.2 5.5 7.4 7.2 
5 74,400,000 -1.2 49.8 -3.4 3.6 3.53 4.2 3.6 17.6 22.5 
 
Item Description 
1 Women's or girls' other pullovers, and similar garments, of cotton, knitted or crocheted, containing 
less than 36 percent by weight of flax fibers 
2 Men's or boys' other pullovers, and similar garments, of cotton, knitted or crocheted, containing 
less than 36 percent by weight of flax fibers 
3 Women's trousers and breeches, of cotton, not knitted, other 
4 Men's trousers and breeches, not knitted, of cotton, blue denim 
5 Women's trousers and breeches, of cotton, not knitted, blue denim 
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Lesotho versus China; Top 5 Lesotho clothing exports to US, 2005 versus 2004 
 
Item Lesotho 
exports  2005 
($) 
Value change 
(%) 
 05/04 
Unit price 
change (%) 
 05/04 
Lesotho market share 
(%) 
 
China market 
share (%) 
  Lesoth
o 
China Lesoth
o 
China 2001 2004 2005 2004 2005 
Total 390,600,000 -14  112   0.53 1.0 0.8 8 16 
1 59,300,000 -9.3 215.3 -9.2 -57.5 1.42 1.7 1.5 1.8 5.5 
2 43,900,000 -16.7 82.5 -12.8 -67.7 0.95 2.4 1.8 2.3 3.8 
3 39,300,000 36.1 138.2 -8.5 -45.1 1.58 1.8 2.2 1.7 3.5 
4 30,800,000 34.0 534.7 -4.6 -52.8 2.76 6.9 8.2 0.7 4.0 
5 12,000,000 -41.0 442.0 -9.9 -34.1 1.39 1.1 0.6 1.5 7.1 
Avg  
Top 
10* 
24,500,000 -7.4 151.6 -3.2 -46.2 1.2 
 
1.8 1.5 3.2 7.7 
*weighted average 
 
Lesotho versus India; Top 5 Lesotho clothing exports to US, 2005 versus 2004 
Item Lesotho 
Exports  2005 
($) 
Value change 
(%) 
Unit price 
change (%) 
Lesotho market share 
(%) 
 
India market 
share (%) 
  Lesoth
o 
India Lesoth
o 
India 2001 2004 2005 2004 2005 
Total 390,600,000 -14 39   0.53 1.0 0.8 4 5 
1 59,300,000 -9.3 79.6 -9.2 -20.7 1.42 1.7 1.5 1.6 2.8 
2 43,900,000 -16.7 22.8 -12.8 -23.1 0.95 2.4 1.8 5.0 5.6 
3 39,300,000 36.1 171.4 -8.5 -37.6 1.58 1.8 2.2 0.2 0.4 
4 30,800,000 34.0 26.9 -4.6 -26.7 2.76 6.9 8.2 0.3 0.4 
5 12,000,000 -41.0 134.2 -9.9 3.1 1.39 1.1 0.6 0.2 0.3 
 
Lesotho versus E Asia; Top 5 Lesotho clothing exports to US, 2005 versus 2004 (Cambodia, 
Vietnam, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Indonesia, Taiwan, Korea) 
Item Lesotho 
exports  2005 
($) 
Value change 
(%) 
 05/04 
Unit price change 
(%) 
 05/04 
Lesotho market share 
(%) 
 
E Asia market 
share 
(%) 
 
  Lesoth
o 
E Asia Lesoth
o 
E Asia 2001 2004 2005 2004 2005 
Total 390,600,000 -14  0.2   0.53 1.0 0.8 23 22 
1 59,300,000 -9.3 44.9 -9.2 -2.3 1.42 1.7 1.5 20.6 28.2 
2 43,900,000 -16.7 31.7 -12.8 -12.7 0.95 2.4 1.8 12.5 15.1 
3 39,300,000 36.1 9.0 -8.5 -3.8 1.58 1.8 2.2 7.4 7.2 
4 30,800,000 34.0 6.4 -4.6 -12.1 2.76 6.9 8.2 7.9 7.4 
5 12,000,000 -41.0 49.8 -9.9 3.6 1.39 1.1 0.6 17.6 22.5 
item Description 
1 Women's or girls' other pullovers, and similar garments, of cotton, knitted or crocheted, containing 
less than 36 percent by weight of flax fibers 
2 Men's or boys' other pullovers, and similar garments, of cotton, knitted or crocheted, containing less 
than 36 percent by weight of flax fibers 
3 Men's trousers and breeches, not knitted, of cotton, blue denim 
4 Boys' trousers and breeches, not knitted, of cotton, not imported as parts of playsuits, blue denim 
5 Women's trousers and breeches, of cotton, not knitted, blue denim 
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Swaziland versus China; Top 5 Swaziland clothing exports to US, 2005 versus 2004 
Item Swaziland 
exports  2005 
($) 
Value change 
(%) 
 05/04 
Unit price 
change (%) 
 05/04 
Swaziland market 
share (%) 
 
China market 
share (%) 
  Swazil
and  
China Swazil
and 
China 2001 2004 2005 2004 2005 
Total 160,800,000 - 10 91   0.12 0.4 0.3 9 17 
1 16,900,000 -46.3 215.3 -5.5 -57.5 0.49 0.8 0.4 1.8 5.5 
2 13,700,000 10.9 231.3 -2.5 -53.5 0.03 0.5 0.5 4.3 13.0 
3 10,600,000 8.8 48.3 -13.7 -36.0 0.00 1.1 1.2 8.4 12.7 
4 13,200,000 52.5 57.7 15.1 -31.6 0.11 0.5 0.9 9.6 16.9 
5 11,300,000 58.4 97.4 0.2 -41.5 0.02 1.0 1.7 3.5 7.3 
Avg  
Top 
10* 
8,900,000 -5.8 
 
127.6 -2.7 -51.9 0.2 
 
0.7 0.6 3.6 7.8 
*weighted average 
Swaziland versus India; Top 5 Swaziland clothing exports to US, 2005 versus 2004 
Item Swazi 
exports  2005 
($) 
Value change 
(%) 
 05/04 
Unit price 
change (%) 
 05/04 
Swazi market share (%) 
 
India market 
share (%) 
 
  Swazi India Swazi India 2001 2004 2005 2004 2005 
Total 160,800,000 - 10 42   0.12 0.4 0.3 4 5 
1 16,900,000 -46.3 79.6 -5.5 -20.7 0.49 0.8 0.4 1.6 2.8 
2 13,700,000 10.9 78.2 -2.5 -20.7 0.03 0.5 0.5 2.3 3.7 
3 10,600,000 8.8 3.8 -13.7 32.5 0.00 1.1 1.2 0.7 0.8 
4 13,200,000 52.5 1.4 15.1 36.3 0.11 0.5 0.9 0.8 0.9 
5 11,300,000 58.4 -67.0 0.2 -0.6 0.02 1.0 1.7 2.8 1.0 
Swaziland versus E Asia; Top 5 Swaziland clothing exports to US, 2005 versus 2004 
(Cambodia, Vietnam, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Indonesia, Taiwan, Korea) 
Item Swazi 
exports  
2005 ($) 
Value change 
(%) 
 05/04 
Unit price 
change (%) 
 05/04 
Swazi market share 
(%) 
E Asia market 
share (%) 
  Swazi E Asia Swazi E Asia 2001 2004 2005 2004 2005 
Total 160,800,000 - 10 2   0.12 0.4 0.3 22 21 
1 16,900,000 -46.3 44.9 -5.5 -2.3 0.49 0.8 0.4 20.6 28.2 
2 13,700,000 10.9 10.1 -2.5 -7.3 0.03 0.5 0.5 30.0 30.2 
3 10,600,000 8.8 -9.8 -13.7 -2.9 0.00 1.1 1.2 30.9 28.5 
4 13,200,000 52.5 -18.6 15.1 5.9 0.11 0.5 0.9 49.6 44.9 
5 11,300,000 58.4 -31.3 0.2 0.6 0.02 1.0 1.7 28.6 21.0 
Item Description 
1 Women's or girls' other pullovers, and similar garments, of cotton, knitted or crocheted, containing 
less than 36 percent by weight of flax fibers 
2 Women's trousers and breeches, of cotton, not knitted, other 
3 Women's trousers and breeches, of synthetic fibers, not knitted 
4 Women's or girls' other pullovers, and similar articles, of man-made fibers, knitted or crocheted, 
containing less than 30 percent by weight of silk 
5 Men's or boys' other pullovers, and similar articles, of man-made fibers, knitted or crocheted, 
containing less than 30 percent by weight of silk 
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Kenya versus China; Top 5 Kenya clothing exports to US, 2005 versus 2004 
Item Kenya exports  
2005 ($) 
Value change 
(%) 
 05/04 
Unit price 
change (%) 
 05/04 
Kenya market share 
(%) 
 
China market 
share (%) 
 
  Kenya  China Kenya China 2001 2004 2005 2004 2005 
Total 270,300,000 - 2.5 77   0.14 0.54 0.49 12 19 
1 60,500,000 8.3 231.3 15.7 -53.5 0.35 2.4 2.4 4.3 13.0 
2 33,400,000 24.8 442.0 2.9 -34.1 1.07 1.5 1.6 1.5 7.1 
3 12,700,000 -46.2 114.8 -6.6 -38.6 0.19 1.5 0.8 3.5 7.7 
4 5,700,000 -64.9 548.7 1.1 -40.0 0.94 2.3 0.8 2.3 14.7 
5 9,800,000 -20.6 1123.4 -12.4 -48.8 1.10 4.4 3.5 1.1 14.2 
Avg  
Top 
10* 
15,900,000 
 
-9.3 269.6 -1.9 -44.8 0.5 
 
1.5 1.3 2.5 8.8 
*weighted average 
 
Kenya versus India; Top 5 Kenya clothing exports to US, 2005 versus 2004 
Item Kenya 
exports  2005 
($) 
Value change 
(%) 05/04 
Unit price 
change (%) 
05/04 
Kenya market share (%) 
 
India market 
share (%) 
  Kenya India Kenya India 2001 2004 2005 2004 2005 
Total 270,300,000 - 2.5 38   0.14 0.54 0.49 4 5 
1 60,500,000 8.3 78.2 15.7 -20.7 0.35 2.4 2.4 2.3 3.7 
2 33,400,000 24.8 134.2 2.9 3.1 1.07 1.5 1.6 0.2 0.3 
3 12,700,000 -46.2 74.6 -6.6 -22.4 0.19 1.5 0.8 2.1 3.8 
4 5,700,000 -64.9 27.8 1.1 -13.3 0.94 2.3 0.8 4.8 6.0 
5 9,800,000 -20.6 157.6 -12.4 -26.2 1.10 4.4 3.5 1.3 3.4 
 
 
Kenya versus E Asia; Top 5 Kenya clothing exports to US, 2005 versus 2004 (Cambodia, 
Vietnam, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Indonesia, Taiwan, Korea) 
Item Kenya exports  
2005 ($) 
Value change 
(%) 05/04 
Unit price 
change (%) 
05/04 
Kenya market share (%) 
 
E Asia market 
share (%) 
  Kenya E Asia Kenya E Asia 2001 2004 2005 2004 2005 
Total 270,300,000 - 2.5 -1   0.14 0.54 0.49 23 22 
1 60,500,000 8.3 10.1 15.7 -7.3 0.35 2.4 2.4 30.0 30.2 
2 33,400,000 24.8 49.8 2.9 3.6 1.07 1.5 1.6 17.6 22.5 
3 12,700,000 -46.2 -0.6 -6.6 -6.3 0.19 1.5 0.8 15.0 15.1 
4 5,700,000 -64.9 -9.5 1.1 -10.9 0.94 2.3 0.8 20.8 18.5 
5 9,800,000 -20.6 15.9 -12.4 -21.7 1.10 4.4 3.5 21.8 25.5 
 
item Description 
1 Women's trousers and breeches, of cotton, not knitted, other 
2 Women's trousers and breeches, of cotton, not knitted, blue denim 
3 Men's trousers and breeches, not knitted, of cotton, other 
4 Men's shorts, not knitted, of cotton 
5 Girls' trousers and breeches, of cotton, not knitted, other, other 
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SA versus China; Top 5 SA clothing and textile exports to US, 2005 versus 2004 
Item S Africa 
exports  2005 
($) 
Value change 
(%) 
 05/04 
Unit price 
change (%) 
 05/04 
S Africa market share 
(%) 
 
China market 
share (%) 
 
  SA China SA China 2001 2004 2005 2004 2005 
Total 92,400,000 - 45 65   0.37 0.25 0.13 13 21 
1 22,100,000 0.1 82.5 -7.3 -67.7 1.3 1.0 0.9 2.3 3.8 
2 6,000,000 -70.3 138.2 -14.1 -45.1 0.3 1.3 0.3 1.7 3.5 
3 2,900,000 -66.9 215.3 13.1 -57.5 1.2 0.2 0.1 1.8 5.5 
4 1,000,000 -86.8 114.8 9.5 -38.6 0.4 0.5 0.1 3.5 7.7 
5 2,100,000 -73.2 48.3 8.7 -36.0 0.1 0.9 0.2 8.4 12.7 
Avg  
Top 
10* 
4,800,000 
 
-50.3 166.2 3.0 -33.0 0.7 0.7 0.3 3.0 7.5 
*weighted average 
 
SA versus India; Top 5 SA clothing and textile exports to US, 2005 versus 2004 
Item SA 
exports  2005 
($) 
Value change 
(%) 05/04 
Unit price 
change (%) 
 05/04 
SA market share (%) India market 
share (%) 
  SA India SA India 2001 2004 2005 2004 2005 
Total 92,400,000 - 45 36   0.37 0.25 0.13 3 4 
1 22,100,000 0.1 22.8 -7.3 -23.1 1.3 1.0 0.9 5.0 5.6 
2 6,000,000 -70.3 171.4 -14.1 -37.6 0.3 1.3 0.3 0.2 0.4 
3 2,900,000 -66.9 79.6 13.1 -20.7 1.2 0.2 0.1 1.6 2.8 
4 1,000,000 -86.8 74.6 9.5 -22.4 0.4 0.5 0.1 2.1 3.8 
5 2,100,000 -73.2 3.8 8.7 32.5 0.1 0.9 0.2 0.7 0.8 
 
SA versus E Asia; Top 5 SA clothing and textile exports to US, 2005 versus 2004 (Cambodia, 
Vietnam, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Indonesia, Taiwan, Korea) 
Item SA exports  
2005 ($) 
Value change 
(%)  
05/04 
Unit price 
change (%)  
05/04 
SA market share (%) 
 
E Asia market 
share (%) 
  SA E Asia SA E Asia 2001 2004 2005 2004 2005 
Total 92,400,000 - 45 -2   0.37 0.25 0.13 21 20 
1 22,100,000 0.1 31.7 -7.3 -12.7 1.3 1.0 0.9 12.5 15.1 
2 6,000,000 -70.3 9.0 -14.1 -3.8 0.3 1.3 0.3 7.4 7.2 
3 2,900,000 -66.9 44.9 13.1 -2.3 1.2 0.2 0.1 20.6 28.2 
4 1,000,000 -86.8 -0.6 9.5 -6.3 0.4 0.5 0.1 15.0 15.1 
5 2,100,000 -73.2 -9.8 8.7 -2.9 0.1 0.9 0.2 30.9 28.5 
 
item Description 
1 Men's or boys' other pullovers, and similar garments, of cotton, knitted or crocheted, containing less 
than 36 percent by weight of flax fibers 
2 Men's trousers and breeches, not knitted, of cotton, blue denim 
3 Women's or girls' other pullovers, and similar garments, of cotton, knitted or crocheted, containing 
less than 36 percent by weight of flax fibers 
4 Women's trousers and breeches, of synthetic fibers, not knitted 
5 Men's trousers and breeches, not knitted, of cotton, other 
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Madagascar versus China; Top 5 Madagascar clothing exports to US, 2005 versus 2004 
Item Madagascar 
exports  2005 
($) 
Value change (%) 
 05/04 
Unit price 
change (%) 
 05/04 
Madagascar market 
share (%) 
 
 
China market 
share (%) 
 
  Madagascar China Madaga
scar 
Chin
a
2001 2004 2005 2004 2005 
Total 276,900,000 - 14 76   0.36 0.57 0.46 13 21 
1 33,000,000 -24.6 231.3 -3.1 -53.5 0.34 1.9 1.3 4.3 13.0
2 31,200,000 -13.1 82.5 -8.9 -67.7 0.69 1.6 1.3 2.3 3.8
3 28,300,000 -8.0 215.3 1.7 -57.5 0.64 0.8 0.7 1.8 5.5
4 22,400,000 51.4 138.2 -2.0 -45.1 0.39 0.9 1.2 1.7 3.5
5 7,400,000 -45.9 548.7 -0.1 -40.0 0.79 2.0 1.1 2.3 14.7
Avg  
Top 
10* 
15,300,000 -16.4 226.8 -9.5 -44.0 0.5 
 
1.4 1.0 2.9 8.8
*weighted average 
 
Madagascar versus India; Top 5 Madagascar clothing exports to US, 2005 versus 2004 
Item Madagascar 
exports  2005 
($) 
Value change 
(%) 
 05/04 
Unit price 
change (%) 
 05/04 
Madagascar market 
share 
(%) 
India market 
share (%) 
 
 
 
Madag
ascar India 
Madag
ascar India 
2001 2004 2005 
2004 2005 
Total 276,900,000 - 14 37   0.36 0.57 0.46 4 5 
1 33,000,000 -24.6 78.2 -3.1 -20.7 0.34 1.9 1.3 2.3 3.7 
2 31,200,000 -13.1 22.8 -8.9 -23.1 0.69 1.6 1.3 5.0 5.6 
3 28,300,000 -8.0 79.6 1.7 -20.7 0.64 0.8 0.7 1.6 2.8 
4 22,400,000 51.4 171.4 -2.0 -37.6 0.39 0.9 1.2 0.2 0.4 
5 7,400,000 -45.9 27.8 -0.1 -13.3 0.79 2.0 1.1 4.8 6.0 
 
Madagascar versus E Asia; Top 5 Madagascar clothing exports to US, 2005 versus 2004 
(Cambodia, Vietnam, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Indonesia, Taiwan, Korea) 
Item Madagascar 
exports  2005 
($) 
Value change 
(%) 
 05/04 
Unit price change 
(%) 
 05/04 
Madagascar market 
share (%) 
 
E Asia market 
share (%) 
 
 
 
Madag
ascar E Asia 
Madag
ascar E Asia 
2001 2004 2005 
2004 2005 
Total 276,900,000 - 14 -3   0.36 0.57 0.46 22 20 
1 33,000,000 -24.6 10.1 -3.1 -7.3 0.34 1.9 1.3 30.0 30.2 
2 31,200,000 -13.1 31.7 -8.9 -12.7 0.69 1.6 1.3 12.5 15.1 
3 28,300,000 -8.0 44.9 1.7 -2.3 0.64 0.8 0.7 20.6 28.2 
4 22,400,000 51.4 9.0 -2.0 -3.8 0.39 0.9 1.2 7.4 7.2 
5 7,400,000 -45.9 -9.5 -0.1 -10.9 0.79 2.0 1.1 20.8 18.5 
item Description 
1 Women's trousers and breeches, of cotton, not knitted, other 
2 Men's or boys' other pullovers, and similar garments, of cotton, knitted or crocheted, containing less 
than 36 percent by weight of flax fibers 
3 Women's or girls' other pullovers, and similar garments, of cotton, knitted or crocheted, containing 
less than 36 percent by weight of flax fibers 
4 Men's trousers and breeches, not knitted, of cotton, blue denim 
5 Men's shorts, not knitted, of cotton 
 
 
 
